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Abstract 
 
Since the inception of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, the 
TRNC government has attempted to construct and promote a collective national identity 
through various means, including but not limited to heritage projects, new place names, 
and the standardization of history textbooks used in public education. The TRNC 
government placed emphasis on ‘Turkishness’ in order to form a single and unified 
culture that had continuity with past historical ties to Turkey. Over time and in response 
to various external and internal political, economic, cultural and social events, the TRNC 
government’s construction of a collective national identity has been continuously 
redefined and reshaped to promote a more ‘Cypriot’ past, distancing itself from past 
historical ties to Turkey. 
 
Turkish Cypriots, however, do not merely absorb the official constructions of national 
identity; they negotiate and construct their own more nuanced understanding of that 
identity. How do Turkish Cypriots negotiate understandings of ‘Turkishness’? Through 
ethnographic field research in the TRNC and secondary sources this dissertation 
illustrates the ways in which national identity is constructed by Turkish Cypriots, 
negotiated with state constructions of national identity, and reproduced through everyday 
practices. Through these constructions and negotiations, Turkish Cypriots fluctuate 
between rejecting Turkey as an outside oppressor and excluding people from Turkey as 
‘other’, to accepting Turkey as the ‘Motherland’ and including people from Turkey as 
part of their national community.  
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This dissertation highlights the fabricated nature of ‘Turkishness’ and disentangles the 
ways in which understandings of ‘Turkishness’ are negotiated and reproduced by Turkish 
Cypriots. This dissertation posits that Turkish Cypriots are not shifting between Turkish 
nationalism and Cypriot nationalism, but rather these everyday negotiations of 
‘Turkishness’ by Turkish Cypriots produce a distinct Turkish Cypriot demotic 
nationalism from ‘below’.  
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Section 1.1 Introduction 
Shortly after my return to England from field research in North Cyprus, I reconnected 
with a Turkish friend who is currently completing his PhD in international law. He was 
very keen to discuss my research. I started our conversation by explaining that, “In North 
Cyprus there appears to be great tension between the Turkish immigrants and the Turkish 
Cypriots.”  
 
He quickly interrupted me to question, “Turkish immigrants? They must not like that that 
very much!”  
 
A bit perplexed by his reaction, I asked, “What do you mean?”  
 
He replied, “You call them immigrants in their own country?” 
 
This conversation provides a good illustration of the conundrum that Turkish nationalism 
presents in North Cyprus: How is national belonging constructed in North Cyprus? How 
do Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people living in North Cyprus define national 
belonging? The perspective voiced by my Turkish friend is not unique. Many Turkish 
citizens living in Turkey echo this perspective; they understand North Cyprus to be an 
extension of Turkey and see those living there as members of a larger Turkish nation. 
Their belief is exemplified by the Turkish phrase used to refer to North Cyprus, 
“Yavruvatan” (English: “Baby Country” or “Little Country”), implying that North 
Cyprus is the offspring country of “Anavatan” (English: “Motherland”) Turkey. In 
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contrast to this view, my field research in North Cyprus illuminated more complex and 
competing understandings of national belonging and national identity amongst and 
between the Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey in the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 
 
Part of the reason for this complexity can be illuminated by a review of the historical 
context of the island. Only a little over 30 years old, the self-proclaimed Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in part as a result of the 1974 Turkish 
military intervention on the island. The new nation was built on the foundations of a 
shared Turkish history and the promises of a Turkish future. As championed by Rauf 
Denktaș, the first President of the TRNC, “There isn’t a nationality called the TRNC. We 
are Turks of the TRNC. We are proud of being Turks. The motherland [Turkey] is also 
our motherland, our nation. We are part of that [Turkish] nation that has formed a state in 
Cyprus” (Rauf Denktaș quoted in Navaro-Yashin 2012, 53). Today the Turkish state 
continues to attempt to nationalize the Turkish Cypriot community and to maintain their 
connection to “the motherland,” Turkey. These nationalistic connections are fostered 
through close political, economic, and cultural ties. Some examples include the 
celebration of Turkish national holidays, compulsory military service, mainland Turkish 
media channels, and the dispatch of Turkish imams to TRNC mosques. Although both 
Turkey and the TRNC maintain that the TRNC is a sovereign entity, the listed institutions 
and activities mentioned above blur the line between the domestic and the foreign and 
thereby render the Turkish Cypriots’ understandings of belonging ambiguous.  
 
4 
 
Initially, Turkish Cypriots 1  enthusiastically adopted Turkish nationalism. However, 
immediately following the 1974 Turkish military operation on the island, Turkish 
Cypriots were confronted with the realities of the control of the TRNC by the Turkish 
state and an alternative nationalism, Cypriotism, started to grow, creating a shift away 
from Turkish nationalism. While Turkish nationalism is characterized by attachment to 
Turkey as the motherland, Cypriotism is characterized by attachment to the island. As 
will be closely examined in Chapter 2, scholars have presented these two nationalisms as 
separate and competing. Each constructs alternative definitions of belonging, with 
Turkish nationalism fostering a sense of ‘Turkishness’ and Cypriotism fostering a sense 
of ‘Cypriotness’. Vural and Rustemli (2006) frame this dichotomy of national belonging 
to demonstrate that Turkishness is an ethnic identity and Cypriotness is a civic identity. 
Ethnic nationalism and ethnic identity are based on the belief of a common ethnic origin, 
while civic nationalism and civic identity are based on acultural definitions of citizenship 
(Brubaker 1998). Similar arguments have been made in the examination of Greek 
nationalism and Cypriotism in the Republic of Cyprus (Papadakis 1998; Peristianis 
2006). 
 
While this framework for understanding nationalism in North Cyprus acknowledges the 
complex layers of the negotiation of national identity, the clearly defined and neat 
separation of identities into categories of civic and ethnic implies that each of these 
identities excludes the other. Instead I argue that these national identities are more 
                                                        
1 I use the term Turkish Cypriot for clarity in this introduction, but before they embraced 
Turkish nationalism they self-defined as the Muslim community of Cyprus (Bryant 2004; 
Michael 2014).   
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nuanced and should not be separated when examining the production of national 
identities in Cyprus. This thesis will reframe the discussion regarding the construction 
and imagining of a community in the TRNC by examining how national identity is 
continuously negotiated and changing depending on the given context. To examine the 
production of national identity in this way, I will use Cohen’s (1985; 2001) notion of 
boundary. Cohen argues that the boundary defines the identity of a community. He 
argues that the community “…hinges crucially on consciousness” and that the 
“…consciousness of community is, then, encapsulated in perception of its boundaries, 
boundaries which are themselves largely constituted by people in interaction” (Cohen 
2001, 13). In using this notion of boundary, this dissertation will examine the ways in 
which Turkishness and Cypriotness are negotiated within different contexts and 
demonstrate that they are overlapping and entangled identities.  
 
To evaluate this negotiation, I will examine not only the production of national identity 
by the TRNC state, but also the ways in which these boundaries of national identity are 
negotiated and reproduced by the Turkish Cypriots. How do Turkish Cypriots construct, 
negotiate, and experience Turkishness in everyday life? In examining how Turkishness is 
negotiated in everyday lives, I will deconstruct Turkish and Cypriot nationalism to 
demonstrate that although these dichotomies exist in politics, they do not translate as 
dichotomies in everyday constructions of belonging. This dissertation’s purpose is three-
fold. First, to demonstrate that Turkish Cypriots construct and negotiate different 
understandings of their national identity and sense of belonging apart from the state 
constructions of national identity. Second, to demonstrate that this sense of belonging is 
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constructed by shifting and malleable boundaries through daily interactions. Third, this 
dissertation posits that these everyday negotiations produce a distinct Turkish Cypriot 
demotic nationalism from ‘below’.  
 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature on nationalism in both Turkey and 
Cyprus and on the constructions and fabrications of national identity. The first part of this 
discussion focuses primarily on examining the competing forms of Turkish nationalism 
in Turkey, to include Kemalism, the founding ideology of Turkey. In this discussion, I 
specifically draw attention to the different ‘official’ constructions of ‘modernity’ 
underlying these competing nationalisms and the corresponding conceptualizations and 
constructions of ‘Turkishness’. The second part of this discussion examines the 
emergence of Turkish and Cypriot nationalisms in Cyprus. Following from this 
discussion, I will propose that a productive way to investigate how Turkish Cypriots 
construct notions of national belonging is by examining the ways in which Turkish 
Cypriots negotiate boundaries of Turkishness. In addition to the literature review, this 
chapter will also provide the methodology for this research. By outlining the relevant 
theoretical perspectives, this chapter will provide a framework for the examination of the 
construction and negotiation of national identity in the TRNC.   
 
Chapters 3 and 4 will examine state constructions of national identity through institutions 
such as compulsory military service, national parades, and heritage projects. Chapter 3 
uses an analysis of the 40th anniversary of the “Peace Operation” as an entry point into 
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understanding the relationship between Kemalist constructions of Turkishness and the 
military in the TRNC. Through this examination, this chapter will demonstrate a paradox 
that arises; although Turkish Cypriots have embraced Kemalism, they simultaneously 
have been deprived of their sovereignty and denied the promises of a modern Turkish 
future.  
 
Chapter 4 will examine the shaping of national identities in the TRNC by looking at 
urban heritage regeneration in the Walled City. Specifically, this chapter focuses its 
analysis on the Asmaalti Project, an EU-funded, city-led effort to preserve the historic 
Asmaalti area of the Walled City in Lefkoşa. This chapter will demonstrate the 
differences in the desired function of this city space amongst the TRNC Lefkoşa 
municipality, the EU, the UN, and the residents of Lefkoşa. Through an exploration of 
the competing visions of the reconstruction of the Walled City by different agencies, one 
can gain insight into the competing visions of a future TRNC. This chapter will 
demonstrate that through these negotiations over the construction of the identity of the 
space, Turkish Cypriots articulate their longing for an unattainable modern future and 
simultaneously construct social boundaries.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate that Turkish Cypriots are ambiguous about their 
Turkishness. These chapters will highlight that Turkish Cypriots are constructing their 
own demotic nationalism from ‘below’, which privileges this ambiguity over state 
constructions of national identity. Chapters 5 and 6 will examine more closely the ways 
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in which this demotic nationalism is articulated by analyzing how Turkish Cypriots 
construct, negotiate, and experience Turkishness in the practices of everyday life.  
 
Chapter 5 examines Dereboyu, a popular street in Lefkoşa, and argues that Dereboyu is a 
socially constructed place where Turkish Cypriots can perform their secular heritage. 
Through an analysis of the everyday life of residents and staged protests held on 
Dereboyu, I will demonstrate that this street is a place where Turkish Cypriots feel they 
can occupy a modern space. It is a place where their Kemalist constructions of 
Turkishness are embodied and alternative definitions of Turkishness are questioned as 
being out of place. It is also a space where boundaries of Cypriotness are constructed and 
negotiated through everyday practices. This chapter will argue that although Turkish 
Cypriots see Dereboyu as a place where their modernity is realized, they remain acutely 
aware of the limitations of this modernity due to their country’s illegal status.  
 
Chapter 6 will argue that a demotic expression of nationalism manifests itself through the 
practice of gambling.  This chapter will examine both gambling in the home and in the 
casinos in North Cyprus by untangling and inspecting the differing practices of gambling 
within these spaces. This chapter will also examine the discussions about gambling and 
how they reflect the debates regarding different constructions of Turkishness. What can 
be realized through the examination of behavior in the casino is a better understanding of 
how Turkish Cypriots perceive themselves in relation to Turks and Greek Cypriots. 
While the activity of gambling works to construct and embrace a Turkish Cypriot 
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identity, I will demonstrate that it simultaneously acts as an activity that engenders the 
resurgence of Cypriotness.  
 
Chapter 7 will synthesize the arguments made in these chapters to conclude that 
examining negotiations of ‘Turkishness’ by Turkish Cypriots provides for a more 
nuanced understanding of their construction of national identity and sense of national 
belonging. More specifically, by analyzing the pliable and shifting boundaries of 
‘Turkishness’, it will be seen that Turkish Cypriots are not shifting between Turkish 
nationalism and Cypriot nationalism, but rather they are constructing their own demotic 
nationalism from ‘below’.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Methodology  
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2.1. Chapter Outline 
The first part of this chapter (Section 2.2) will provide a literature review of the 
emergence and competing forms of Turkish nationalism in Turkey (Section 2.2.1) and 
their spread to Cyprus (Section 2.2.2). This discussion demonstrates that Turkish 
nationalism appeared in Cyprus not through imposition by Turkey, but rather evolved in 
response to historical events on the island. As such, this section will demonstrate that a 
very specific and unique Turkish Cypriot understanding of ‘Turkishness’ was constructed 
under these conditions, which included a specific Turkish Cypriot perspective of 
modernity. Following from this, Section 2.2.3 will illustrate the rise of Cypriot 
nationalism on the island. This section will demonstrate that although Turkish 
nationalism declined with the rise of Cypriot nationalism, Turkish Cypriots did not 
correspondingly abandon their Turkish identity. Intertwined with this literature review is 
the historical background of Turkey, Cyprus, and the TRNC necessary for understanding 
the body chapters of this thesis.  
 
After this discussion regarding the emergence and contested negotiations of Turkish 
nationalism and ‘Turkishness’, Section 2.2 will conclude with a theoretical justification 
of why ‘Turkishness’ is used as an analytical lens (Section 2.2.4). This section will 
demonstrate that the choice to use ‘Turkishness’ arose specifically from the context of 
my field research, at which time post-Taksim protests and the election of Prime Minister 
Tayyip Erdoğan as President of Turkey led Turkish Cypriots to renegotiate the meaning 
of belonging to the Turkish nation. In conversation with the literature on nationalism and 
constructs of belonging in Cyprus, and drawing heavily on Cohen’s (1985) notion of 
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boundary, it will further be argued that that the use of ‘Turkishness’ as an analytical lens 
enables one to examine the continuously shifting social boundaries, rather than accept 
artificially constructed notions of  ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ identity.  
 
This chapter will conclude with Section 2.3, which will provide a detailed account of the 
methodology and research methods used to conduct this research.   
 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Competing Turkish Nationalisms and the Construction of ‘Turkishness’ 
Turkish nationalism first emerged in the Ottoman Empire during the late 19th century in 
response to its disintegration (e.g., Akçam 2004; Azarian 2011; Balkılıç and Dölek 2013; 
Çinar 2005; Deren 2002; Kadioğlu 1996; Kasaba 1997; Keyder 1997). Fearing the total 
collapse of the Empire, Ottoman intellectuals and elites believed that the Empire’s only 
chance of survival was to adapt to more “modern” and “western” modes of governance. 
To achieve these more “modern” and “western” modes of governance, Sultan Mahmut II 
and his successors enacted a series of reforms, known as the Tanzimât (reorganization) 
reforms. These reforms radically changed the governing structure from one based loosely 
on theocratic principles, to one that was reorganized around the ideals of the modern 
nation state (Baran 2010). More specifically, these reforms abolished the Ottoman millet 
system and replaced it with a centralized government and additionally, reformed and 
constructed new government institutions. Baran (2010) argues that the emphasis placed 
on secularizing state institutions and on the “westernization” policies promoted during 
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this reform period set way for the early roots of Kemalism—the founding ideology of 
Turkey—to take form.   
 
Some contemporary elites of the time believed these reforms put too much weight on 
European values and disregarded Islamic and Ottoman values (Ahmad 1993, 28-29). 
These elites formed a political group called the ‘Young Ottomans’ (Turkish: ‘Yeni 
Osmanlılar’) and through pamphlets and journals protested against the monarchy and 
called for the creation of a modern nation state that was grounded more in Ottoman and 
Islamic values and less in European ones. These writings are best exemplified in the 
Young Ottoman, Namik Kemal, whose writings synthesized notions of ‘Westernization’ 
with Islamic principles. Namik Kemal’s writings popularized the word and concept 
‘fatherland’ (Turkish: ‘vatan’), which he defined as the entire Islamic world rather than 
just the existing Ottoman territories (Mardin 2000, 331). Although the Islamic faith 
played an important role in his ideologies, his vision of the ‘fatherland’ was inclusive of 
non-Muslims. He promoted an inclusive Ottoman nationalism by creating an Ottoman 
citizenship in which all citizens would be considered equal (Mardin 2000, 329-331).  The 
Young Ottomans also believed that the reforms were not enough to solve the problems of 
the Ottoman Empire and that it was necessary to have a constitutional administration. 
 
Although the protests led by the Young Ottomans eventually led to the Empire’s first 
Constitution in 1876, Sultan Abdülhamid II soon restored his absolute monarchy and 
dissolved the parliament. However, the Tanzimât reforms and the Young Ottoman 
writings had already planted the seeds for debates about the nation and identity (e.g., 
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Aktürk 2007; Baran 2010; Belge 2010, 28; Bozdağlioğlu 2008). Al (2015) and Yeğen 
(2004) demonstrate that Article 8 of the 1876 constitution laid the framework for the 
debates about what the definition of ‘Turk’ should be in the later 1924 Turkish republic 
constitution. Article 8 of the 1876 constitution defines ‘Ottoman’ as, “…whatever 
religion or sect they are from all individuals subject to the Ottoman State, without 
exception, would be called Ottomans” (Al 2015; Yeğen 2004). Al and Yeğen note that 
when the definition of a national people was introduced into the 1924 constitution it said, 
“The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would be called Turkish” (Al 
2015, 93; Yeğen 2004). “Citizenship,” Yeğen and Al state was only added later after a 
discussion on the differences between Turkish citizenship and Turkish nationhood 
(Yeğen 2004, 59; Al 2015, 11). Although Turkish citizenship was legally defined, in 
practice there was an observable difference between being a Turkish citizen and being 
Turkish; non-Muslims within Turkey could be Turkish citizens, but not Turks, while 
many living outside Turkey could not have citizenship but were considered Turks (Al 
2015; Yeğen 2004).  
 
After the dissolution of the 1876 constitution, a political reform movement, the “Young 
Turks” (Turkish: Genç Türkler; Jön Türkler), rallied around opposing the regime of 
Abdülhamid II to reinstate both the constitutional monarch and the 1876 constitution. In 
1908, steered by the Young Turks ideology, the military restored the constitutional 
monarch and the 1876 constitution. The Young Turks united around the concept of 
Turkism as the way to modernize the Ottoman Empire. The concept of Turkism is best 
exemplified by the passionate writings of the Young Turk Ziya Gökalp. Through these 
15 
 
writings Gökalp promotes the cultural and political unification of all Turkish-speaking 
peoples (Gökalp and Berkes 1981). Turkism was an alternative nationalism to other ideas 
espoused at the time such as Islamism and Westernism. Differing definitions of a 
‘modern’ Ottoman Empire brought forth new ways of thinking about Turkish identity, 
thereby laying the groundwork for Atatürk’s use and expansion of the term, ‘Turk’ (e.g., 
Baran 2010; White 2013, 28). While the term ‘Turk’ existed during Ottoman times, 
intellectuals and elites of the Ottoman Empire did not care to be called ‘Turk’ because of 
the negative connotation associated with the word (Azarian 2011; Kushner 1977; Lewis 
1968). The efforts of the Young Turks sought to reclaim the word and take pride in being 
Turkish. Zürcher highlights that the Young Turks “…romantically idealized the 
Anatolian peasants as the ‘real Turks,’ whose virtues they believed should be 
rediscovered and adopted by the Ottomans” (Zürcher 2000, 154). The continued 
negotiation of Turkish identity will be more fully explored, but it should be noted that in 
Turkey today, the term “Young Turks” continues to define members who seek radical 
reform in Turkish society. For example, the organization’s name has been re-used for a 
popular online talk show, ‘The Young Turks’, which is hosted by Cenk Uygur and is 
known for its left-leaning views on Turkish politics. 
 
Although the rise of Turkish nationalism during the decline of the Ottoman Empire 
brought about debates about what it meant to be a modern nation and what it meant to be 
a ‘Turk,’ it should not be construed that Ottomanism and Islam were gradually discarded 
for Turkish nationalism and secularism. The Ottoman Empire did not change from an 
‘Islamic’ and ‘non-European’ Empire to a more ‘secular’ and ‘Western,’ nation-state. 
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Zürcher (2010) discusses in detail the debates held amongst Islamists and Westernists 
about the degree to which they wanted to  ‘westernize’ the empire and points out that 
many Islamists would accept aspects of westernization, while many Westernists would 
also be willing to adapt their ideals with Islamic doctrine (Zürcher 2010, 216). Gülap 
(2005) further demonstrates that there was not a unilateral steady progress towards 
‘secularization’ and illustrates that in many ways the new form of Turkish nationalism 
was less about incorporating aspects of ‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’ and more 
about being inclusive of ‘Islam’ and promoting a Turkish Muslim identity. These 
analyses allow for a complex reading of the emergence of Turkish nationalism by 
showing that not only was the ‘secular’ nationalism not purely secular, there were also 
multiple ideologies of Turkish nationalism emerging and competing for power.  
 
In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, aided by the army led by officers connected to the 
Young Turks, pushed out the European powers occupying the Ottoman Empire and 
established the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk and the new government believed the only 
way for the new Turkish state to be powerful and respected was to completely dispose of 
the Ottoman system and to move towards ‘modernization’ and ‘westernization’ (e.g., 
Ahmad 1993; Azarian 2011; Çağaptay 2006; Kadioğlu, 1996). To achieve this vision, 
Atatürk and the new government developed a reform program that was designed along 
six principles which are the foundation of Kemalism and the platform of Atatürk’s 
political party, the Republican People’s Party (Turkish: Cumhurriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). 
These six principles, known as the six arrows, are: republicanism (cumhuriyetçilik), 
statism (devletçilik), populism (halkçilik), reformism (sometimes also translated as 
17 
 
revolutionism) (devrimçilik), nationalism (milliyetçilik), and secularism (laiklik). These 
principles were incorporated into the Turkish constitution, where they have remained 
despite constitutional reform (in 1937, 1961, 1983, and 2001) (Glyptis 2007, 18). 
Employing these principles, Atatürk enacted a series of radical reforms that 
fundamentally changed the way people in the region were accustomed to living (e.g., 
Azarian 2011, 77; Pope and Pope 2011, 61). These new reforms revolved around the 
separation of religion from state affairs (e.g., the closure of Shari’a law courts, the 
abolition of religious schools, confiscation of property belonging to religious institutions) 
and also the enforcement of a more western, public lifestyle (e.g., the banning of the fez 
and other Islamic apparel, and the adoption of the Latin alphabet and western calendar). 
Public life was to be the space in which ‘Turkishness’ and Turkish culture was redefined 
(White 2013).  
 
These reforms to construct a modern Turkey did not immediately take hold in the 
practices of everyday life. In particular, most citizens were not unified under the new 
Turkey because they still possessed various different cultural backgrounds and tribal 
loyalties (e.g., White 2013, 25; Kasaba 2009; Eissenstat 2004, 238; Pope and Pope 2011; 
Kadioğlu 1996). Atatürk and the nationalists sought to foster unification by enhancing the 
development of a new national identity—a new ‘Turk’ (e.g., Kadioğlu 1996; Baran 2010; 
Pope and Pope 2011; White 2013). This question of how this new national identity would 
be constructed was fiercely debated (Eissenstat 2004; Çağaptay 2007). Atatürk and the 
nationalists first had to instill a sense of pride in the term ‘Turk,’ since previously the 
term was thought of in a derogatory way by both Ottomans and Europeans alike (Baran 
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2010, 10). To achieve this, Atatürk used archaeology to construct a new Turkish 
historical narrative that would be both a source of pride in a Turkish past that a new 
identity could be based on, as well as aid in establishing validity to their newly formed 
state (White 2013, 26). Thus, as suggested by the Turkish scholar, Tanyeri-Erdemir and 
quoted by White, “…the purpose of constructing a new identity was to create ‘a common 
ground for all the citizens of the newly established nation-state’ and to help intellectuals 
‘to imagine ‘Turkishness’ as a general inclusive concept’” (White 2013, 27). This 
entanglement between building a nation and building a national identity emphasizes not 
only the fabricated nature of both but their inseparability from one another. Almost 
immediately as it was attempted, there was an increasing inability of the state to control 
this definition of Turkishness and therefore shape what Turkish national identity would 
be. As will be explored later on (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) this entanglement between 
national identity and nation building remains present today not only in Turkey, but in the 
TRNC too.  
 
It is quite clear that Atatürk and other contemporary nationals of the time—scholars, 
poets, and journalists — manufactured the idea of the ‘Turk’ to promote a new unifying 
identity (e.g., Baran 2010; Kushner 1977). Early definitions of ‘Turk’ were based on a 
shared sense of history and territory. An early definition of ‘Turk’ written by Atatürk 
states, “The Turks are those people of Turkey who founded the Turkish Republic” (Pope 
and Pope 2011, 58). His definition was not based on religion and did not exclude non-
Muslims so long as they, like Muslims, adopted the Turkish language, Turkish names, 
and accepted the nationalistic ideals of Turkism (White 2013). Within a few years, 
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however, this definition shifted from a more civic understanding to a more ethnic one and 
the focus became much more about Turkish lineage and blood (Pope and Pope 2011, 58; 
White 2013, 28). This shift became subject to public debate when in 1924 the Grand 
National Assembly legally differentiated non-Muslims speaking other languages as 
‘Kanun Turku’ (English: Turks-by-law), thus “…opening an institutionalized gap 
between Turks-by–citizenship and Turks-by-nationality” (White 2013, 32). Even today, 
notions of Turkishness remain embedded within the law, with the most prominent 
example being Article 301 of the Turkish penal code. By this Article it remains against 
the law to insult Turkishness, although the official definition of Turkishness has 
undergone significant change since Atatürk’s time. 
 
From the founding of the Republic of Turkey there was resistance to the Kemalist 
philosophical underpinnings of the nation. The resistance never dissipated, but it was not 
until the 1950’s when the first multi-party elections were held that the more conservative 
opposition groups gained position and power enough to have a significant impact on the 
design of the Turkish nation-state (Al 2015; White 2013). Political debates about national 
identity only increased between the 1960s and 1980s when three military coups took 
place in order to protect the Kemalist secular values from the leading parties of the time 
which supported more pro-Islam policies. The succession of military governments in 
these decades almost inevitably lead to an attempt to more uniformly define Turkish 
citizenship (Al 2015; White 2013). Article 66 of the 1982 constitution redefined the 
relationship of citizenship and Turkishness by defining all those holding citizenship as 
Turkish (Al 2015, 94). As such, Turkish scholar Ergun Özbudun (2012), as quoted by Al 
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(2015) argues that “…the most fundamental problem facing the present-day Turkish 
democracy is to reconcile this social pluralism with an authoritarian state tradition that 
seeks to impose an artificial homogeneity, even uniformity, on the society” (Al 2015, 94; 
Özbudun 2012:70). 
 
Popularity for religious political parties grew during these periods and culminated in 
2002 with the rise of the politician Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the election of the political 
party he created, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkıma Partisi, AKP). 
AKP promotes a new construction of Turkish nationalism that differs from the Kemalist 
vision. The primary difference is that in AKP’s reshaping of Turkish nationalism, Islam 
plays a crucial role in determining the identity of the Turkish nation (Saraçoğlu and 
Demirkol 2015, 306). To reshape an official construction of the identity of the Turkish 
nation, the AKP government has been more inclusive of its Ottoman heritage and has 
enacted more pro-Islamic policies to solidify a new nationalism based on Turkish Muslim 
values. While AKP supporters are enthusiastic about these new changes, the enactment of 
these policies and the heavy promotion of this nationalism has raised concerns by citizens 
and journalists that the AKP government and Erdoğan are ‘Islamifying’ the nation.  
 
Kuru (2006) examines the complexity of secularism found within AKP’s policies and 
nation-building tactics to demonstrate that AKP is not ‘Islamifying’ the nation. Kuru 
(2006, 159) argues that AKP is not an anti-secular Islamist organization, but rather a 
“defender of an alternative mode of secularism”. Kuru (2006) defines this secularism as a 
‘passive’ secularism that gives priorities to religious freedoms and allows them public 
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visibility, which is in staunch juxtaposition to the ‘assertive’ secularism promoted by 
Atatürk and Kemalists.  In Kuru’s definition this ‘assertive’ secularism means, “…the 
state favours a secular worldview in the public sphere and aims to confine religion to the 
private sphere” (Kuru 2006, 137). Although I agree with Kuru’s making complex the 
notion of secularism, I think he downplays the important role religion plays in AKP’s 
policies.  
 
Islamism has been adapted to the Turkish context and plays an important role in AKP’s 
nation-building tactics.  Yeşilada and Noordijk (2010) highlight AKP’s insistence that 
Islam be a central element of Turkish nationalism. Part of the reasoning for such 
insistence can be traced to Erdoğan’s source of inspiration, the writings of Fazıl Necip. 
Fazıl Necip promoted a Turkish nation constructed by both Sunni Islam and Turkishness, 
but prioritized the importance of Islam (Singer 2013, 85). A contemporary of Atatürk, 
Necip was very critical of Atatürk’s secular vision of Turkey and adamantly promoted a 
totalitarian view of the state embedded in Islam. As such, AKP has managed to maintain 
that Islam is an important element of Turkishness, which is opposed to Kemalist ideology 
that downplays the role of religion (Michael 2014, 22). White (2013) successfully tackles 
the dichotomy of the role secularism and Islam play by illustrating the ways Islam and 
secularism are negotiated by arguing that the AKP is promoting a Muslim nationalist 
vision that is “…focused on a structured relationship with the Muslim world in which 
Turkey takes a leading role, as it had in Ottoman times” (White 2013, 48). Through these 
more complex renderings of secularism and Islam, these scholars demonstrate that 
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Erdoğan and the AKP are not ‘Islamifying’ the nation, but rather through negotiations of 
secularism and Islam are ‘Turkifying’ it.  
 
During the 2014 Turkish Presidential election, Erdoğan and the AKP government spoke 
frequently of creating a ‘New Turkey’. While the definition of this ‘New Turkey’ was 
vague, it was made clear that Erdoğan was presented to lead Turkey into this new era. 
The term ‘Neo-Ottoman’, first used pejoratively by the Greeks during the 1974 Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus to criticize the expansionist policies of the Turkey, has since been 
used by academics to characterize Turkish political ideology promoted by the AKP that 
seeks to return Turkey to the glory of the Ottoman era (Karpat 2002, 524). Under AKP 
rule, emphasis has been placed on embracing Ottoman heritage as seen through the 
incorporation of the Ottoman language classes in high school and grandiose celebrations 
of Ottoman historical events, such as the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. This 
renewed focus on the Ottoman heritage is directly opposed to Kemalist ideology which 
sought to sever ties with its Ottoman past. AKP’s new historical narrative to unify 
Turkish peoples extends the concept of Turkishness to be inclusive of people beyond the 
national territory of Turkey. This, coupled with the fact that Islam plays a central role in 
Turkishness effects how the Turkish government relates to Turkish Cypriot peoples. 
While past Turkish governments promoted the concept of a ‘Turkish Cypriot’ identity 
through official discourse, the emphasis by the AKP government is now placed on 
redefining the TRNC population as ‘Muslim Turks’ of Cyprus (Michael 2014).  
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Although President Erdoğan and the AKP government embrace Turkey’s Ottoman 
legacy, it would be wrong to say that this focus on utilizing the Ottoman legacy means 
President Erdoğan and the AKP party are distancing themselves from the nationalistic 
concepts of ‘Turkishness’ as Bozdağlioğlu (2008) claims him to do. For example, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan recently changed part of state protocol by changing the colour of the 
welcoming carpets from red to turquoise in an attempt to imbue Ottoman characteristics 
to the Turkish state. The colour red has unmistakable nationalist connections to Turkey as 
it is the colour of the flag and is referenced in the Turkish national anthem. Turquoise, 
although it does not have the same recognizable associations as the colour red, is 
identifiable with the coveted Ottoman Iznik pottery and Iznik tiles that decorate famous 
mosques in Turkey. Given these colour associations, it could be argued that this changed 
state protocol is an example of fabricating a new Ottoman identity; whereby the 
replacement of the red carpet with the turquoise carpet is an attempt to erase the Turkish 
past to make way for an Ottoman future. Instead, I argue that this change in state protocol 
is an example of trying to fabricate a new Turkish identity, albeit a Turkish identity 
unified in a pride of an Ottoman past.  Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç said, “…A 
turquoise carpet instead of a red one is a better representation of our culture. The colour 
is unique to us, and well chosen” (Sunday’s Zaman, 19 Nov 2013). This was not the only 
example of turquoise replacing the colour red. Additionally, the national football team 
now wears a turquoise and white jersey for away games (instead of the traditional red and 
white) and Turkish Airlines aircrafts are decorated with turquoise furnishings, including 
the stewardesses’ uniforms. This seemingly innocent change in colour is one way in 
which the AKP government is changing the official perception of Turkishness; from one 
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in which Kemalists are closely associated with the red of the flag to an emphasis on the 
understanding of Turkishness with the turquoise colours of the Ottoman past. 
 
The rise of the AKP presents an important moment in Turkish history in which another 
shift in Turkish nationalism occurs creating a tension between the Kemalist definition of 
Turkish nationalism and AKP’s definition of Turkish nationalism. White has labelled this 
new Turkish nationalism, Muslim nationalism, which instead of being defined by a 
“…blood-based Turkish ethnicity and a defined territory, like Kemalism, AKP’s 
redefining of Turkish nationalism is based on cultural Turkism and imagines the nation as 
having more flexible Ottoman imperial boundaries” (White 2013, 19). However, 
although Kemalist ideology is weakened in the government sphere, it has re-emerged in 
new ways. Özyrüek (2006) and Senay (2013a; 2013b) argue that Kemalists viewed the 
entrance of political Islam into the public sphere as an Islamification of Turkey and in 
response Kemalism found a new place in the private sphere. Examining this fear, White 
discusses the way Turkish people negotiate social boundaries and illustrates that the 
maintenance of a national identity requires constant attention; “There is no neutral self. A 
sip of whisky, like a drop of blood, is a highly charged cultural marker of social class, 
lifestyle, and political values; it takes its power and meaning from the particular national 
narrative and accompanying cultural tradition with which the individual identifies” 
(White 2013, 132). It becomes evident that there is not a single fabricated definition of 
Turkishness, but multiple intersecting definitions (White 2013). These definitions are 
fluid; not only continuously re-negotiated over time but also negotiated in time.  
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AKP’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ vision, which is looking to construct a future Turkey that 
resembles in part a renewed, modern, Ottoman Empire redefines the relationship between 
Turkey and North Cyprus. During the time of my field research, the relationship between 
the Turkish Cypriot citizens of North Cyprus and Turkey was quite strained. Much of this 
strain came from conflicting views on policies promoted by the AKP government and the 
TRNC government, such as the funding of the building of religious schools on the island 
and the construction of an undersea pipeline to supply water to the TRNC from Turkey. 
Examining the opposing views on these issues provides insight into the conflicting views 
about how Turkey and North Cyprus both see the future of the island. The government of 
Turkey views North Cyprus as part of the larger Turkish nation whereas most Turkish 
Cypriots desire a future more independent from Turkey. This point of contention speaks 
to greater issues about where North Cyprus is situated within this new framework of 
Turkish nationalism. The histories and policies promoted by Turkey and implemented by 
the TRNC government are either accepted or rejected by the inhabitants. Examining these 
acceptances or rejections sheds insight into how citizens negotiate understandings of their 
own national identity and negotiate boundaries of “Turkishness”. These definitions are 
then negotiated between and among the inhabitants of North Cyprus. 
 
This brief review of the emergence and continued negotiations of Turkish nationalism 
demonstrates that there are different and competing ideologies about Turkish nationalism. 
Thus far, however, much of this discussion about constructions of Turkish nationalism 
and Turkishness has been approached only from analyzing top-down constructions of 
Turkish nationalism which does not provide a complete picture. Exploring the everyday 
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practices that construct Turkishness gives greater voice to the people in the construction 
of their own nationalism and thereby gains greater insight into the ways that Turkish 
nationalism is constructed. One such approach to everyday practices in the construction 
of nationalism is Billig’s (1983) theory of banal nationalism. In his book Banal 
Nationalism, Billig turns the discussion away from governments and elites to instead 
focus on the ways in which people construct nationalism through everyday practices, 
such as flying the national flag outside one’s home. He suggests that nationalism is 
continuously ‘flagged’ through routine symbols and habits of language. An important 
aspect of banal nationalism that he stresses early on is that these everyday practices are 
not benign merely because they are banal. Instead, he echoes Ardent (1963) and argues 
that “…banal nationalism can hardly be innocent: it is reproducing institutions, which 
possess vast armaments. As the Gulf and Falkland Wars indicated, forces can be 
mobilized without lengthy campaigns of political preparation. The armaments are primed, 
ready for use in battle. And the national populations appear also to be primed, ready to 
support the use of those armaments” (Billig 1983, 7). Through this definition he gives 
weight to the everyday practices, making them as important as those of more official 
constructions of nationalism.  
 
Although not as common as the state-centric approach, there are scholars of Turkish 
nationalism who use Billig’s approach to nationalism as well as other grassroots 
approaches. White (2013), Özyurek (2006) and Senay (2013), discussed above, provide 
good examples of how nationalism can be reproduced in private spheres. Köse and 
Yilmaz (2012) explore the concept of banal nationalism by examining themes and 
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symbols found in the Turkish media that reveal the ways in which central attributes of the 
nation have been disseminated within the daily news. Their findings indicate that the 
constant transformation of nationalism is being reproduced in an unnoticed way every 
day. However, while this approach gives weight to the importance of everyday practices 
of nationalism and gives more voice to the people, its focus is on ways in which the 
official construction of nationalism has been filtered into everyday practices of 
nationalism. What if the people’s construction of Turkish nationalism is different than 
that of the official construction? Çinar (2005) explores these variables thorough an 
examination of different daily practices in Turkey to argue that nationalism is negotiated 
between the people and the state.  
 
Papadakis (1998) examines this negotiation of nationalism between the people and the 
state through his ethnographic research in Cyprus. Papadakis (1998) demonstrates how 
nationalism is internally contested among Greek Cypriots. He argues that there are two 
models of nationalism, the ‘Greek’ model and the ‘Cypriot’ model. Each of these models 
of nationalisms construct different definitions of belonging, with the Greek model 
fostering a sense of ‘Greekness’ and Cypriot model fostering a sense of ‘Cypriotness’.  
Examining two political parties and their supporters he shows how ‘grand narratives’ are 
linked with personal histories. Through this examination he demonstrates that 
nationalism is not only inherently contested, but is a dialectical process between ‘above’ 
and ‘below’. Focusing on this dialectical relationship he critiques both top-down 
approaches to nationalism and those approaches which assume nationalism from below, 
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such as Smith’s (1986) view that nations are based on primordial cultural groups, which 
he defines as ethnie.  
 
Askew (2005) through her research on musical performance in Tanzania also highlights 
this dialectical approach. She argues that the construction of nationalism is a negotiation 
between the state and the people, rather than being enforced by the state and passively 
accepted by the people. In her own words, “Rather than an abstract ideology produced by 
some to be consumed by others, nationalism ought to be conceptualized as a series of 
continually negotiated relationships between people who share occupancy in a defined 
geographic, political, or ideological space” (Askew 2005, 12). Askew argues against 
state-centric constructions of nationalism by demonstrating that this approach gives too 
much power to the nation-state and downplays and neglects the voice of the people. 
While the influence of political groups in power, foreign and domestic policies, and 
reform laws should not be overlooked or disregarded, it is important to also consider the 
active voice and actions of the people. By making this argument, her theory both 
emphasizes the continually changing nature of nationalism and avoids the top-down 
approach to nationalism by instead considering the construction of nationalism as a 
dialogue.  
 
Performance is central to Askew’s theory of nationalism. Analyzing the works of 
performance theorists she constructs a theory on the politics of performance to argue that 
“…performance is actively employed in the negotiation of power relations” (Askew 
2005, 21). She further argues that this performance is dialectic, whereby both the 
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‘performer’ (the state) and the audience (the public) are active performers in the 
performance (the production of culture). This dissertation will employ Askew’s (2005) 
and Papadakis’ (1998) understanding of the dialectic relationship between the people and 
the state in the negotiation of power relations.  
 
2.2.2 Emergence of Turkish Nationalism and defining of “Turkishness” in Cyprus  
As a product of the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus a new group of people, the Turks, 
settled on the island. As demonstrated by Nevzat (2005) Turkish nationalism was only 
able to emerge because this group of people were on the island. There are controversies 
surrounding the actual ethnicity of these settlers, which is a subject for later discussion. 
Regardless of whether they were of Turkish descent, the belief that these settlers were 
Turkish formed a “…powerful basis on which to later form the “imagined community” of 
the Turkish “nation” in Cyprus” (Nevzat 2005, 49). At the end of the Ottoman Empire’s 
rule in Cyprus the ideas of Turkish nationalism and notions of Turkishness were widely 
circulated. As in Turkey, these ideas were spread via books and conversations. Nevzat 
gives examples of the book, “Turkification,” by the Turkish nationalist, Alp Tekin, read 
in the Nicosia-based Turkish club, “Birlik Ocaği” (Nevzat 2005, 100). 
 
Although the seeds of Turkish nationalism were planted prior to British rule, it is 
generally argued that Turkish nationalism grew stronger during British colonial rule in 
Cyprus (1878-1960) and was heightened during the early days of independence (e.g., 
Hatay 2008; Killoran 1998; Kizilyurek 1989). Turkish nationalism emerged and grew 
during this period due to a combination of interrelated historical processes.  One reason 
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for the passionate embracing of Turkish nationalism by Turkish Cypriots was the parallel 
growth of Greek nationalism on the island. Greek nationalism taught through Greek 
Cypriot educational institutions promoted the idea of enosis. Enosis is the desire for the 
unification of Cyprus with Greece that served as the impetus for a Greek Cypriot 
movement that emerged both in response to colonial rule as well as part of the larger 
‘Megali Idea’, a PanHellenic movement aimed at unifying Greek people in lands that 
were historically considered to be Greek. After negotiations with the British to achieve 
enosis failed, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Greek: Εθνική Οργάνωσις 
Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών, EOKA), under the leadership of General George Grivas, was 
established with the aim to end colonial rule and achieve enosis (Novo 2012, 416). The 
British administration condemned the new EOKA organization for its violent approaches 
to achieve enosis. Seeing this violence, the Turkish Cypriots became increasingly fearful 
of the possibility of living under Greek rule.  
 
Lacher and Kaymak (2005) argue that Turkish Cypriots embraced Turkish nationalism in 
response to the Greek Cypriots’ cry for enosis. Fearing that what happened in Crete 
would happen in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots rallied behind a movement called taksim, 
which sought the partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish sides (Loizides 2007; 
Kizilyurek 1999).2 Slogans such as “Partition or Death,” (Turkish: ya taksim, ya ölüm) 
were used to build support for the cause (Isachenko 2012, 39). The rise of the Taksim 
movement had implications for how Turkish Cypriots understood and perceived their 
                                                        
2 Under Ottoman control, the protests for enosis were stopped, but after Crete gained their 
autonomy, the European powers safeguarded the ‘Greek majority rule and the Turkish 
minority rights’ by agreeing to the union of Crete with Greece after the first Balkan War 
(Markides 1998, 2001).  
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relation to Turkey. This nationalistic attachment to Turkey imagined the island as 
Turkish. Turkey too promoted this viewpoint, with PM Adnan Menderes calling Cyprus 
an “extension of Anatolia”. The December 1949 demonstration, wherein 15,000 islanders 
demanded that Cyprus be returned to Turkey if Britain decided to leave the island, was a 
historical event illustrating this passionate nationalistic attachment to Turkey (Loizides 
2007, 175).  
 
Attalides (1979), Markides (2001), and Killoran (1998) argue that the British used the 
divide-and-rule strategy to cultivate and encourage the nationalistic division between the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. While the Greek Cypriots supported the political 
goal of enosis, many initially disagreed with EOKA’s violent tactics, most notably, the 
Greek Cypriot communist party, The Progressive Party of Working People (Greek: 
Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, AKEL) (French 2015, 114). On 1 April 1955, 
EOKA launched attacks against British military targets, radio transmitters, and police 
stations, starting what is known today as the Cyprus Insurgency (1955 to 1959).3 In order 
to put a halt to the EOKA insurgency, the British expanded the numbers of the Cyprus 
Police Force (CPF). Against the advice of senior colonial officials, recruitment for the 
                                                        
3 The Cyprus Insurgency predominantly consisted of a military campaign led by the 
EOKA to end British colonial rule so that enosis could be achieved. In the beginning 
EOKA’s primary targets were military installations and British soldiers. The Greek 
government was alleged to have clandestinely supported EOKA with arms, money and 
propaganda. The EOKA was also supported by the Greek Orthodox Church through 
financial support, recruitment, and campaigns garnering international support (Novo 
2013). 
32 
 
CPF consisted predominantly of Turkish Cypriots4, which only served to deepen tensions 
between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Eventually, because of the 
Turkish Cypriots’ disapproval of enosis and their support of the British, EOKA declared 
Turkish Cypriots an enemy. In response, Turkish Cypriots, with the support of the 
Turkish government, organized their own resistance movement, the Turkish Resistance 
Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, TMT) to protect both their ideals and their 
people. It was during this period that authorities erected a barricade to divide Greek and 
Turkish neighborhoods. Throughout the following year more violence, bloodshed, 
bombings, and lootings continued. As a result, many Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots fled from their homes to separate protected enclaves, thus widening the division 
of the two communities with a physical separation. This line of demarcation was known 
as the “Mason-Dixon Line,” which preceded the 1963 “Green Line” that divides the 
island today (Hatay and Bryant 2008, 444). 
 
While these events certainly played a part in the embracing of Turkish nationalism by 
Turkish Cypriots, this argument renders Turkish nationalism as something imposed from 
above and adopted by Turkish Cypriots in response to external forces. Bryant (2004) also 
cites the British colonial rule as the point for emergence of Greek and Turkish 
nationalism in Cyprus; however, her reasoning for citing the British colonial rule is very 
different. Instead of arguing that these nationalisms developed as a result of the divide-
                                                        
4 To quote Novo, “By 1958, of the approximately 4,900 men in police uniform, less than 
one-fifth were Greek Cypriots, although they represented almost four-fifth of the 
population” (Novo 2012, 427). It is also worth noting that many of these Turkish 
Cypriots were available to join the auxiliary forces because EOKA had put pressure on 
Greek Cypriot employers to hire only Greek Cypriots (Bryant 2012, 6).  
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and-rule strategy, she contends that, “…the ideologies of freedom that emerged under 
British rule allowed Cypriots to imagine a better future for themselves and their children 
were necessarily imagined in nationalist terms” (Bryant 2004, 3). She argues that these 
nationalisms did not merely develop as a result of Turkish and Greek nationalistic 
propaganda, but developed in conjunction with the Cypriots’ encounter with modernity 
under British colonialism. This perspective gives more empowerment to the Turkish 
Cypriots in imagining their own political community, rather than making Turkish 
Cypriots victim to the political will of the British colonists.  
 
The belief that the Turkish government could rule over Turkish Cypriots gained 
momentum. The Turkish Cypriots, although predominantly Muslim, were also greatly 
influenced by the Kemalist ideologies being promoted by Atatürk and the Young Turks. 
Turkish Cypriots enthusiastically adopted Atatürk’s ideas about the separation of religion 
and state, and implemented his restrictions on religion (Killoran 1998, 187; Kizilyurek 
1989, 25; Volkan 1979, 74). Atatürk was not only seen as Turkey’s leader, but a leader 
for Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots kept close track of developments in Anatolia 
through their press and reported enthusiastically about Atatürk’s military successes 
(Nevzat 2005, 344). Nevzat gives one example of an image of Atatürk printed in a 
journal with the caption “Our Commander-in-Chief Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa” (Nevzat 
2005, 267).  
 
The adoption of Atatürk’s reforms coincided with the reformation of educational 
institutions in Cyprus. During this time, although Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
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retained control over their own schools, British administrators repeatedly tried to reform 
different aspects of the school such as advocating for the instruction of the student’s 
‘native’ language (Bryant 2004, 140). Bryant argues that although this was an important 
part in the nationalization of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, it’s not all that was at 
work in creating the different national communities (Bryant 2004, 140). To make this 
argument, she makes the distinction that schools were not sites for production where one 
acquires knowledge, but rather schools were sites where one became a “master of a body 
of knowledge that had come to represents the traditions of the community” (Bryant 2004, 
141). This argument highlights the way in which the emergence of nationalism affected 
the imagining of the political body and the resultant social and cultural boundaries that 
were constructed and negotiated. The implications of this nationalist movement re-shaped 
the Turkish Cypriots’ understanding of national belonging and helped in the construction 
of a new identity. More specifically, Turkish Cypriots started to identify themselves 
primarily as ‘Turks’ and placed less emphasis on their Muslim identity (e.g., Bryant 
2004; Killoran 1998).  
 
To return to the historical narrative, on 16 August 1960, the independent Republic of 
Cyprus was formed under the guarantor-ship of Greece, Turkey and Britain, with 
Archbishop Makarios elected as its first president. The new constitution was framed by 
the ethnic composition of the island, requiring a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish 
Cypriot Vice President—each to be elected by their own community and each guaranteed 
equal veto powers. The government and civil service would be set at a 7:3 ratio, with 
Greek Cypriots guaranteed 70% of the positions and the Turkish Cypriots guaranteed 
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30% of the positions. Although this constitution embodied these consociational principles 
of guaranteed group representation, by 1963 disputes over separate municipalities caused 
tension in the newly formed government between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots (Markides 2001). That same year, Makarios proposed to revise the constitution 
with thirteen new amendments. Turkish Cypriot leaders rejected these amendments, 
arguing that they favoured the Greek Cypriots and only served to weaken the Turkish 
Cypriot wing of the government. As a consequence of the tensions, violence erupted 
again on the island on 21 December 1963, a date today known by Turkish Cypriots as 
‘Kanlı Noel’ (English: ‘Bloody Christmas’). Thus was set in motion a series of violent 
events that eventually resulted in the deployment of the United Nations Peace Keeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICP) (March 1964) to act as a buffer between the two 
communities.5 Subsequently, more Turkish Cypriots, some 25,000 in number, fled their 
homes and moved into military-protected enclaves, which were dispersed across the 
island (Trimikliniotis 2012, 35).   
 
On 21 April 1967 a military junta seized power in Greece and applied more pressure on 
Makarios to achieve enosis. Although Makarios desired enosis, he realized it was not an 
attainable goal given the current internal political problems on the island (Papadakis 
1998). Believing Makarios to have completely abandoned enosis, Grivas, with active 
support from the military junta in Greece, established the ultra-right wing organization 
EOKA-B with the intention of overthrowing Makarios and achieving enosis. Although 
EOKA was supported by the majority of Greek Cypriots during the fight for 
                                                        
5 To this day, the UNFICP is still active on the island.  
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independence, EOKA-B did not garner that level of support, with the population instead 
rallying behind Makarios. Unexpectedly, Grivas died of a heart attack leaving EOKA-B 
under the control of the military junta in Athens. On 15 July 1974, the military junta in 
Athens, the EOKA-B and the National Guard were successful in carrying out a military 
coup, thereby overthrowing Makarios and replacing him with Nikos Sampson 6 . In 
response to the coup, on 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded the island, claiming their action 
was compliant with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Internationally, this invasion has been 
interpreted as both legal and illegal; however, the second-wave of Turkish invasions on 
14 August 1974, is internationally regarded as a clear violation of the Treaty.  
 
In the present-day, these years of inter-communal fighting have been placed in different 
historical narratives by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot governments. Papadakis 
(1994) illustrates how these differences are expressed through the exhibitions in the two 
national museums, located on each side of the divided city of Nicosia (Papadakis 1994). 
Both named ‘The Museum of National Struggle,’ the museums date the beginning of 
these struggles at different moments, with the museum in the RoC focusing primarily on 
the period between 1955 and 1959 and the museum in the TRNC focusing on the events 
between 1963 and 1974, as well as other events after 1974. The Museum of National 
Struggle in the RoC valorizes the EOKA’s military campaign to free Cyprus from 
colonial rule while simultaneously demonizing the British and their Turkish Cypriot 
                                                        
6 Nikos Sampson was an EOKA member known notoriously throughout Cyprus for his 
participation in multiple assassinations during both the Cyprus Insurgency and the period 
of intercommunal violence. Today, his historical legacy is disputed within the RoC, with 
many Greek Cypriots seeing him as a hero for his unwavering dedication to the struggle 
for independence, while others view him as a traitor for his involvement in the military 
coup carried against Makarios.  
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collaborators. The Museum of National Struggle in the TRNC, however, devotes most of 
the exhibition demonizing the atrocities committed by the EOKA and valorizing the TMT 
and their protection of the Turkish Cypriot peoples.  Papadakis (1994) illustrates that 
while these museums contest the historical narratives, they are simultaneously depicting 
contested perceptions of the island’s future. The narrative as told through the RoC 
museum’s exhibition denies the legitimacy of the TRNC and makes the argument that 
their government is the only true, legal political entity, whereas the museum in the TRNC 
emphasizes the right of Turkish Cypriots to their own government. 
 
While the official history of the intercommunal years is contested between the Greek 
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, it is important to also illustrate that this history is 
contested internally within the TRNC. Navaro-Yashin (2012) demonstrates that in 
‘official’ representations the TMT fighters are presented as unconditional heroes who 
saved the Turkish Cypriot people from the violence of the EOKA military. These official 
constructions of TMT fighters as defenders of Turkish Cypriots and champions of 
Turkish Cypriot nationalism as well as promoters of tighter bonds with Turkey are 
contested by some Turkish Cypriot people that lived through those times. While actions 
of the TMT are generally regarded as positive among Turkish Cypriots, Navaro-Yashin 
discovered through her personal and informal conversations with Turkish Cypriots that 
many “…would recount stories of Turkish Cypriots murdered by the TMT or speculate 
that their official “martyred” relatives had in fact been assassinated by the TMT and not, 
as officially claimed, by EOKA or by Greek-Cypriots” (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 64). 
Through her conversations with Turkish Cypriots, one can see the way in which the 
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history of the TMT organization is internally contested between the “official” narrative of 
the state and the “unofficial” private histories of the people, and also between peoples 
along political divides of left and right.  
 
Although initially Turkish Cypriots saw the 1974 “Peace Operation” as the motherland 
Turkey aiding in the transformation of “…the Turkish Cypriots from a marginalized 
minority to a secured people with a ‘state’”, this soon changed (Loizides 2007, 177). It is 
argued that enthusiasm for Turkish nationalism decreased almost immediately after the 
self-proclamation of the TRNC (e.g., Hatay 2008; Killoran 2008; Bryant 2004). The 
confrontation of Turkish Cypriots with the reality of being an unrecognized state and the 
heavy reliance on Turkey to make their own decisions economically and politically 
continued to grind away the nationalistic feelings that diminished over the years as a 
result. In addition to their international isolation, scholars list economic stagnation 
(Loizides 2007), Turkey’s interference in Turkish Cypriot community affairs (Navaro-
Yashin 2012), and the colonization of Cyprus by Turkish settlers (Hatay 2008; Navaro-
Yashin 2006) as other factors in the decline of their once unwavering allegiance to 
Turkey. In this way, Turkish nationalism declined because of an increasing failure to gain 
external recognition and a wide-ranging skepticism as to the quality of the TRNC’s 
sovereignty (Kaymak and Lacher 2005).  
 
To summarize, Turkish nationalism was not merely implanted onto Cyprus by Turkey, 
but it arose and adapted in response to historical events on the island. As such, very 
specific understandings of ‘Turkishness’ developed that included very Turkish Cypriot 
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perspectives of modernity. These ideas were heavily influenced by Atatürk’s ideals of 
secularism as well as by notions of British modernity (Bryant 2004). As will be argued in 
the next section, although Turkish nationalism declined, reified constructions of 
secularism retained a central role in the construction in the nationalist imaginings of the 
Turkish Cypriots.  
 
2.2.3 Rise of Cypriot Nationalisms and “Cypriotness” 
After the events of 20 July 1974, different structures were established to govern and 
administrate the Turkish Cypriot community, the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot 
Administration (1974) and the Turkish Federated State (1975). After eight years of failed 
negotiations, on 15 November 1983, the north self-proclaimed their independence under 
the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish: Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk 
Cumhuriyeti, TRNC), with Rauf Denktaş elected as the TRNC President (1983-2005). To 
this day, Turkey is the only state to recognize the TRNC, with the rest of the international 
community viewing the territory as a Turkish militarized occupied zone and relegating 
the President’s status to that of a Turkish Cypriot leader.7 Since its inception the TRNC 
has in many ways been seen as an extension of the Turkish state. Nowhere was this 
imagined nation more visible than in the rapidly changing landscape. After 1983, 
geographical place names were changed into Turkish names, Atatürk busts and statues 
were erected in public squares, Turkish flags were flown on buildings, slogans such as 
                                                        
7Citing the Loizidou v Turkey [1995] (No. 40/1993/435/514), the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Cyprus v Turkey [2001] (No. 
25781/94) ruled that Turkey was responsible for 14 violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols. Through these court cases, the ECtHR 
held that due to the large number of troops engaged in active duty on the island, that the 
Turkish army exercises effective control over northern Cyprus.   
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“how happy to say I’m a Turk” were engraved on the hillsides, and a large Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot flag was drawn onto the side of the Beşparmak (English: Five-finger) 
mountain range (e.g., Hatay 2008, 150; Navaro-Yashin 2012; Ramm 2006). All of these 
national symbols reflected the ideology that the new TRNC was Turkish. The Turkish 
Cypriot leader, Denktaş, further perpetuated this ideology by frequently referring to both 
Turkish Cypriots and those from Turkey as ethnically and culturally indistinct from one 
another. Most famously he remarked, “The only true Cypriots are the wild donkeys of the 
Karpaz peninsula” (Lacher and Kaymak 2005, 155).  
 
Educational institutions taught the history of the TRNC alongside the official historical 
narrative of Turkey (Papadakis 2008; Navaro-Yashin 2012). Navaro-Yashin 
demonstrates through her research that when Turkish Cypriots learn about the founding 
of their nation, they are presented with contradictory references to their ‘state’ with the 
foundation being referenced to as either the ‘TRNC,’ the ‘Republic of Turkey,’ or the 
‘Republic of Cyprus’ (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 112). To quote Navaro-Yashin, “On the one 
hand Turkish Cypriots are taught to revere the ‘independence of the TRNC,’ but on the 
other hand they encounter ordinary references to ‘Turkey’ as their ‘state’” (Navaro-
Yashin 2012, 112). This ambiguity surrounding the nation’s founding is exemplified by 
the TRNC’s celebration of both 29 October (Declaration of the Republic of Turkey) and 
15 November (Declaration of the TRNC) as national public holidays.  
 
Papadakis (2008) demonstrates that before 2004, Turkish Cypriot textbooks not only 
promoted a connection between Turkey and Cyprus, but also distanced the island’s 
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history from its Greek connections. This historical distancing from Greece both 
delegitimizes the notion of enosis, as well as fosters a distancing between Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots. One excerpt from a pre-2004 history textbook quoted by Papadakis 
states, “for Greece, Cyprus has no significance at all neither from a historical nor from a 
strategic perspective.” (Papadakis 2008, 13).  Further, these books refer to the Greek 
Cypriots as ‘Rum’ (the Turkish word that also denotes present-day Greeks living in 
Turkey) instead of ‘Yunan,’ (the Turkish word for Greeks living in Greece), thereby 
denying the Greek Cypriots their proclaimed Greek identity and delegitimizing their 
political desire for enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) (Papadakis 2008, 13). These 
pre-2004 text books denied the Turkish Cypriots any relationship with Greek Cypriots by 
both distancing them from Greek Cypriots and by fostering a connection between the 
Turkish Cypriots and Turks from Turkey. 
 
In order to jumpstart the state’s new economy, the TRNC needed people who could work 
the lands and the factories and as a result thousands of settlers from Turkey came to 
Cyprus in promise of land, work, and citizenship (Hatay 2008, 150). The facilitated 
migration ended by the late 1970s, but by that point approximately 25,000-30,000 
persons had resettled on the island (Hatay 2008, 150). Initially the Turkish Cypriot 
community welcomed these settlers without any protests against this facilitated migration 
orchestrated between the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot governments. Over time the 
increasingly large number of Turkish immigrants migrating to the TRNC left many 
Turkish Cypriots feeling that they were being culturally overhauled with an added fear 
that they were outnumbered by settlers from Turkey (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 58). While 
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the TRNC was officially promoting the cultural and ethnic unity of Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriots, privately Turkish Cypriots were creating boundaries against the Turkish 
immigrants. ‘Othering’ the settlers from Turkey by emphasizing differences in their 
appearance and using pejorative names such as ‘Kara Sakal’ (English: Blackbeard) 
Turkish Cypriots pejoratively classified Turks as inferior to Turkish Cypriots (Hatay 
2008, 165; Navaro-Yashin 2012, 57). Even the more ‘objective’ term ‘Türkiyeliler’ 
(English: person who comes from Turkey) contributed to ‘Othering’. When Turkish 
Cypriots use this word to label Turkish settlers who are citizens of the TRNC, it denies 
them access into the imagined community of the TRNC.   
 
Loizides (2007) and Lacher and Kaymak (2005) have shown how this process led to 
alternative forms of imagining the political community, giving rise to Cypriotism or 
Cypriot nationalism on the island. Cypriotness is characterized by an attachment to the 
island rather than Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot poet Mehmet Yaşin highlighted this 
concept by describing the situation on the island as, “We have never been able to adopt 
Cyprus as our motherland, instead of having a feeling of Cypriotness we feel like a 
nomad minority dropped somehow on this island” (Ramm 2006, 528). As will be 
demonstrated, it was not until 2004 that Cypriotism could be pushed as a state ideology in 
the TRNC because up until that point parties and politicians promoting an explicitly 
Turkish nationalist agenda dominated the government (Ramm 2006, 527).  
 
With the rise of Cypriot nationalism, Killoran (1998), Loizides (2007) and Lacher and 
Kaymak (2005) demonstrate that national identity underwent a transformation whereby a 
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Turkish national identity encompassed both notions of ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’. 
Killoran (1998) in her research on women’s gender identity in Turkish Cypriot society 
raises interesting points about the complex negotiations of national identity in North 
Cyprus. She argues that the “…complex negotiations over a national identity (Cypriot 
and/or Turkish), a modern identity (Eastern and/or Western), and a religious identity 
(Muslim and/or secular) result in contradictory messages about gender and sexuality for 
Turkish Cypriot women” (Killoran 1998, 183). Although she recognizes identity to be 
multi-faceted, within each ‘identity’ she examines each as if it was a binary construct 
(i.e., Cypriot/Turkish, East/West, and Muslim/Secular). The use of binary constructs as a 
way to engage with Turkish nationalism is actually quite prominent in the studies of 
Turkish nationalism. Samuel Huntington (1993) famously stated that modern Turkey is a 
‘torn country’ divided along and between binary lines—‘secular’ and ‘religious,’ ‘east’ 
and ‘west,’ ‘modern’ and ‘backwards’. Even today, although prominent scholars on 
Turkish nationalism have dismissed Huntington’s theory about Turkey, these binaries 
between ‘secularism’ and ‘religion’, ‘east’ and ‘west’, ‘modern’ and ‘backwards’ still 
remain a way of engaging with Turkish nationalism and Turkish identity. The problem is 
not so much that these binaries exist, but rather it is a question of how productive it is to 
continue using such binaries as entry points into understanding Turkish nationalism and 
Turkishness.  
 
Vural and Rustemli (2006) categorize different understandings of ‘Cypriotness’ and 
‘Turkishness’ into academic categories of civic and ethno-national identities. They state 
that Cypriots categorize their Cypriotness civically, whereby being ‘Cypriot’ is only 
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experienced as a civic identity. Turning to Sekulic, Vural and Rustemli define this civic 
identity as one which “is based on well-defined territory, a community of laws and 
institutions, a single political will, equal rights for members of the nation and common 
values, traditions or sentiments that bind people together” (Sekulic 2004: 460; Vural and 
Rustemli 2006; 335). They claim then that Turkish Cypriots construct their Turkishness 
along ethno-national lines of identity whereby they base their cultural, ethnic, or national 
characteristics on a common Turkish ethnic background or Turkish culture. However, 
based on my field research, I would argue that these categorizations are no longer, if they 
ever were that neatly packaged. Many Turkish Cypriots, especially when comparing 
themselves vis-à-vis Turkey argue that they are Cypriots ethnically. Likewise, there are 
Turkish Cypriots who see TRNC as a Turkish colony and thereby see themselves as 
civically attached to Turkey. I would argue this is a minority, but a grouping 
nevertheless.  
 
Both Killoran (1998) and Vural and Rustemli (2006) construct very clear binary 
groupings of identity and as such do not allow for fluidity. Constructions of national 
identity are continuously changing and binary constructions do not allow for this 
variability. As will be argued more in-depth in Section 2.2.4, a more productive way to 
examine the negotiation of these national identities is by using the idea of boundaries as 
defined by Cohen (1985), who examines these fabrications along an analogue spectrum 
set apart by defined boundaries that are movable with changing conditions. Cohen argues, 
“…the boundary may be perceived in rather different terms, not only by people on 
opposite sides of it, but also by people on the same side” (Cohen 1985, 12). 
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Lacher and Kaymak attempt to allow for more fluidity to the negotiation of national 
identity by arguing that not only has Turkish Cypriot national identity come to 
incorporate elements of both a “Turk” and a “Cypriot”, but more importantly this 
transformed notion of the self became “…the basis for an increased willingness to 
abandon demands for a more formal sovereignty in exchange for a more substantial form 
of self-determination” (Lacher and Kaymak 2005, 158). They continue to illustrate how 
the construction of these nationalisms were then “…not elite and state-sponsored 
projects, but rather were formed against the seemingly overwhelming apparatuses and 
resources deployed on behalf of the “nationalist” conception of political continuity” 
(Lacher and Kaymak 2005, 159). In making these arguments Lacher and Kaymak (2005) 
argue that identity is something that is continuously being constructed within the context 
of a changing political, cultural, social, and economic scene. Lacher and Kaymak (2005) 
argue that this transition prevailed after the 2004 Annan Plan, as its failure caused 
debates about the nature of the political community.  
 
The UN drafted the Annan Plan with the hopes that the island could be reunited before 
becoming a full member of the EU. In 1998, Cyprus’ consideration for membership 
within the European Union (EU) led to a series of UN-sponsored negotiations between 
the ROC and the TRNC to reunify the island.  Although the Cyprus conflict has been on 
the international agenda, this EU proposal sparked new discussions. Through these new 
discussions the international community agreed on and endorsed the following 
parameters for a Cyprus solution: the “...creation of a federal state; bi-zonal in terms of 
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territory and bi-communal in terms of constitutional aspects; based on political equality 
of the two communities; having one international personality where sovereignty is shared 
between the two communities…” (Sözen and Özersay 2007, 125). Using these 
parameters as guidelines, it was agreed that the Annan Plan would only be put into action 
if both communities supported it. As a result, on 24 April 2004, two referendums were 
held in the ROC and the TRNC asking whether or not they approved of the Annan Plan’s 
proposal for reuniting the island. The TRNC agreed to the referendum, with 65% of 
Turkish Cypriots voting in support; however the ROC disagreed to the referendum; with 
76% of Greek Cypriots voting against the Annan plan (Sözen and Özersay 2007, 125). 
While the Annan Plan was ultimately rejected on 1 May 2004, the ROC became a full 
member of the EU. However, only the ROC was granted EU membership status, while 
the TRNC was not recognized.8  
 
The 2004 Annan plan changed the political imagination of the Turkish Cypriots. That 
same year saw the rise of the left-wing CTP (Republican Turkish Party). The CTP 
promoted a new historical narrative through a revision of the TRNC history books 
(Papadakis 2008, 17). Papadakis (2008) and Mavratsas (1999) examine the change in 
rhetoric and images incorporated in these new history textbooks. These new textbooks 
placed emphasis on the Cypriot character of the island by using an image of an undivided 
Cyprus on the front cover and using terminology such as “our island” instead of teaching 
that Cyprus was part of Turkey. This new narrative emphasized the similar “Cypriot” 
                                                        
8  However, if a Turkish Cypriot citizen can prove that they, or their family, was a 
residing citizen of the ROC before the partition of the island then they are entitled to a 
ROC passport and therefore EU citizenship rights.  
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background of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots living on the island by using the 
words “Kıbrıslı Türkler” (Turkish Cypriot) and “Kıbrıslı Rumlar” (“Rum” Cypriot) to 
refer to each population respectively (Papadakis 2008, 18; MEKB 2005, 59). In doing so, 
these schoolbooks distance both Turkish Cypriots from Turkey and Greek Cypriots from 
Greece. This shift in the TRNC historical narrative highlights the internal contestation of 
history between right-wing political communities, who promoted a deep connection with 
Turkey, and the left-wing political communities, who promoted a narrative of a Cyprus 
which is more independent from Turkey. These different internal understandings of the 
past were deeply embedded in current understandings of the political future of North 
Cyprus. The post-2004 textbooks in the TRNC promoted a reunified Cyprus. The new 
textbooks even went as far as to criticize the older textbooks for “teaching that Cyprus 
was a Turkish homeland” and instead changed the narrative to focus on Cyprus as the 
homeland by using the terms “our island” or “our country” (Papadakis 2008, 17; MEKB 
2005, 65). Although this was the “officially” promoted view in the contemporary Turkish 
Cypriot textbooks, the pre-2004 narrative is still active and found within the Turkish 
Cypriot society. 
 
As 2004 created a new way of conceiving and understanding the self and political 
community, this dissertation will argue that another understanding of the self and of 
political community has been negotiated and continues to be negotiated in North Cyprus 
since AKP rose to power, particularly after the Gezi Protests when debates about the 
nation’s identity were inflaming the Turkish Cypriot public. As said previously, the AKP 
reconceptualised Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity by minimizing the 
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legacy of Atatürk and redefining and embracing Turkey’s Ottoman heritage. During my 
field research, events in Turkey were closely followed because Turkey had great 
influence over the affairs of the TRNC. This thesis will demonstrate that Turkish 
Cypriots have embraced Kemalist values to such a degree that they feel it necessary to 
defend them against AKP’s perceived assault on secularism. Turkish Cypriots interlace 
their understanding of Kemalist secular values with their vision and construction of 
modernity. By examining the ways in which boundaries of Turkishness are negotiated 
this dissertation will highlight the nuances and complexities of Turkishness and its 
relationship with modernity in North Cyprus. Critically engaging with the ways in which 
Turkishness is continuously and actively being negotiated between the people and the 
state will highlight the internal contestations of Turkish nationalism. 
 
2.2.4 Why ‘Turkishness’?  
While this chapter has thus far outlined how notions of Turkishness have been 
constructed and shaped over time in Turkey and North Cyprus, what remains to be 
questioned is why ‘Turkishness’ should be used as a frame of analysis for exploring how 
Turkish Cypriots negotiate understandings of belonging. In what ways will examining 
Turkishness be a productive lens through which to explore and deconstruct notions of 
nationalism in North Cyprus? I will argue in this section that Turkishness is a dynamic 
and constructive way to frame the argument of this dissertation because the term enables 
one to examine the continuously shifting social boundaries rather than accept artificially 
constructed social identities, such as ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ identities, as proposed by Vural 
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and Rustemli (2006). Furthermore, I will argue that this choice of analysis arose through 
insights gained during my field research.  
 
The existing literature on nationalism in Cyprus has centered primarily on notions of 
conflict and the ‘Cyprus Problem’. Through the examination and deconstruction of 
nationalism, this literature has sought to explain how the division of the island came 
about, and the reasons why that division continues to be perpetuated and remains in place 
today. Part of this discussion centers on the ethnic and cultural divisions between the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots through an examination of the emergence and 
construction of separate Greek (Cypriot) and Turkish (Cypriot) nationalisms (e.g., Bryant 
2004; Loizides 1998; Papadakis 1998). Examining these constructions of Turkish and 
Greek nationalism on the island, scholars demonstrate the ways in which these 
nationalisms promote closer ties between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with their 
respective ‘motherlands’ of either Greece or Turkey.  
 
Peter Loizos (1975) conducted what is considered to be the first anthropological 
examination of the dialectal relationship of the micro-politics of the village and the 
macro-scale politics of the state, thus setting a foundation on which later research on the 
island would be built. Through the ethnographic field research he conducted both before 
and after the 1974 invasion, he delved deeper into the question of how Greek Cypriots 
formed and imagined their political communities. Specifically, he examined the political 
platform of enosis and illustrated how an ethnic Greek nationalism was cultivated 
amongst the Greek Cypriots (Loizos 1974). His analysis highlighted the ways in which 
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Greek nationalism “meant very different things, at different times, to different categories 
of people…,” as well as revealed the ways in which Greek Cypriots constructed notions 
of national belonging built on the notion of a Greek ethnic identity.  
 
This focus on the construction and reproduction of an ethnic nationalism based on ethnic 
ties to the motherland continued to be an area of active research in Cyprus. Through 
comparative analysis Papadakis (1994) illustrates the ways in which Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots constructed ethnic notions of belonging. Through his examination of the two 
Museums of National Struggle situated on either side of the buffer zone in Nicosia, 
Papadakis (1994) demonstrates how the different historical narratives articulated in each 
of these museums are framed as national struggles. As such, Papadakis (1994) elucidates 
how these museums articulate the histories of Cyprus as the histories of the “Greeks in 
Cyprus” and the “Turks in Cyprus”, respectively. Analyzing the different narratives 
presented in these museum exhibits, Papadakis (1994) demonstrates how notions of 
belonging are formed around ethnic and cultural ties to Greece and Turkey, respectively.  
 
Social scientists (e.g., Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Loizides 2007; Peristianis 2006 
Mavratsas 1997) have also problematized notions of a monolithic ‘ethnic’ identity by 
shedding insight into alternative modes of belonging experienced by Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots by examining the emergence of civic nationalism on the island. As noted in the 
previous section (2.2.3), Lacher and Kaymak (2005) demonstrate through their political 
examination of North Cyprus that this alternative mode of belonging was structured 
around a collective ‘Cypriot’ identity, wherein Turkish and Greek Cypriots were 
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territorially tied to the island, not to an ethnic past. Loizides (2007, 178) illustrates the 
ways in which this alternative form of belonging was conceptualized and promoted by 
the political elite as a more ‘peaceful’ and a less exclusive way of imagining the 
community compared to the ‘ethnic’ identities promoted by Turkish and Greek 
nationalism. While ethnic nationalism provided researchers with a lens to examine the 
conflict and division of the island, and the ways in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
created exclusive communities of belonging, examinations of civic nationalism gave 
researchers insight into the ways in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots re-imagined their 
respective political communities independent from their respective motherlands and 
constructed notions of belonging based on notions of a common ‘Cypriot’ identity.  
 
Recent research has been critical of the monolithic narrative constructed about 
Cypriotism by deconstructing notions of Cypriotism to demonstrate that it is not always 
necessarily as inclusive as it is purported to be (e.g., Hatay and Bryant 2008a; 
Panayioutou 2006; Ramm 2006). Hatay and Bryant (2008a, 431) show that Cypriotism is 
not a monolithic concept by showcasing how it is conceived of in different ways by the 
Greek Cypriots in the south and the Turkish Cypriots in the north. They demonstrate that 
both communities understood Cypriotism as a way to critique what Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots interpreted to be the imperialist nationalisms of Greece and Turkey, 
respectively. As such their constructions of Cypriotism also did not necessarily imply a 
common ‘Cypriot’ identity for the island. Additionally, Panayiotou (2006) demonstrates 
that ‘Cypriotism’ was even constructed differently internally within the Greek Cypriot 
community. Through an examination of the rhetoric used by two RoC leftist political 
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parties, AKEL and CTP, during Annan Plan referendum debates (pp. 45-46), 
Panayioutou (2006) illustrated the different underlying strains in their construction of 
Cypriotism. AKEL’s rhetoric about Cypriotism was anti-imperialistic and promoted a 
‘no’ vote because they wanted to defend the “hard-won independence of the island,” 
while CTP endorsed a ‘yes’ vote through the promotion of bi-communality and ethnic 
pluralism (Panayioutou 2006, 278).  It follows from these findings that notions of 
community based on ‘civic’ identities can be just as problematic and divisive as ‘ethnic’ 
identities.   
 
With these new insights into the existence of two forms of nationalism on the island, 
subsequent research was conducted to examine the way in which Turkish Cypriots and 
Greek Cypriots try to negotiate different forms of national belonging (e.g., Peristianis 
2006; Vural and Rustemli 2006). These discussions have mainly centered on ways in 
which Cypriots ‘fluctuate’ between their ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ identities. For example, 
Peristianis (2006) explores the way Greek Cypriots try to balance loyalties by fluctuating 
between ‘Greek’ ethnic identities and ‘Cypriot’ civic identities through an examination of 
survey questionnaires about identity, supplemented with in-depth interviews. However, 
while he successfully articulates a more nuanced understanding of nationalism in the RoC 
and a more nuanced understanding of the construction of national identity by arguing 
against a singular dominant concept of ‘ethnic nationalism’ and ‘ethnic’ identity, to do so 
he constructs the notion of a binary national identity that hinges on a dichotomy of ‘civic’ 
and ‘ethnic’. Similarly, as stated previously (Section 2.2.3), Vural and Rustemli (2006) 
also attempt to illustrate the ways in which identities ‘fluctuate’, however, to do so they 
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separate ‘Cypriotness’ and ‘Turkishness’ into categories of ‘civic’ and ‘ethno-national’. 
Thus, while these efforts acknowledge the fault of a singular concept of identity, the 
concept of fluctuating between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ identities uses a binary construct to 
describe a multifaceted experience. Further, their analysis offers little to explain how 
‘Turkishness’ can be constructed as a ‘civic’ identity, or ‘Cypriotness’ can be constructed 
as an ‘ethnic’ identity.  
 
While the large scale political projects of nationalism in Cyprus are fashioned with 
constructs of ethnic pasts or attachment to island territory, the ways in which they are 
(re)negotiated and (re)produced by Greek and Turkish Cypriots are not along these binary 
lines. Thus in order to understand how Turkish Cypriots negotiate and construct notions 
of belonging in everyday life, I argue that categories of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ identity are 
unhelpful. Instead, in order to move beyond this binary focus, I argue that examining the 
everyday negotiations of ‘Turkishness’ will provide a more productive way to shed 
insight into how notions of belonging are formed. I will argue that by using ‘Turkishness’ 
as a lens it can be seen that not only are the boundaries between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ 
identities more blurred than often assumed because rather than fluctuating between the 
official constructions of ethnic and civic nationalism, Turkish Cypriots are constructing a 
demotic nationalism from ‘below’ which privileges an ambivalence towards their 
Turkishness.   
 
The choice to use ‘Turkishness’ as a lens developed as a direct result of my field 
research, which took place in the atmosphere following the May 2013 Taksim protests in 
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Turkey. During this time, the inhabitants of the TRNC were hotly debating the influence 
of the AKP government in the TRNC, with most articulating frustration over the AKP 
government’s policies while others praised that same government’s strength. These 
debates were not only conveying the people’s opposition to or support of specific projects 
financed and or promoted by the AKP in the TRNC, but were also displaying their 
concerns and desires regarding the future of the TRNC. Through these debates Turkish 
Cypriots were actively questioning what it meant to belong to the Turkish nation under 
AKP’s governance in Turkey, especially considering the impact of that governance on 
daily life in the TRNC. Thus, as in the occasions of the 1974 invasion and the 2003 
checkpoint openings (Bryant 2010), these protests and the seemingly growing power and 
influence of the AKP government in the affairs of the island sparked a catalyst for 
questioning the meaning of belonging in the TRNC under a Turkey governed by the 
AKP. What became clear is that although there are different political and religious 
orientations amongst and between the Turkish Cypriot citizens, Turkish immigrants, and 
Turkish migrant workers residing in the TRNC, and although their perception of Turkey 
is ever evolving, their ‘Turkishness’ itself is never in question. However, depending on 
the varying historical, political, cultural, and social contexts, the definition of Turkishness 
changes and new boundaries with Turkey are negotiated and constructed. To clarify this 
point, it is necessary to return to the previous discussion regarding Cohen’s notion of 
boundary (p. 35) and address how examining the negotiations of boundaries are 
productive in understanding how Turkish Cypriots construct notions of belonging.  
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Cohen argues that it is the boundary that constructs a shared sense of identity; “…the 
boundary encapsulates the identity of the community and… is marked because 
communities interact in some way or other with entities from which they are, or wish to 
be, distinguished” (Cohen 1985, 12). He continues to demonstrate that while some 
boundaries are more tangible, such as geographical boundaries and those established by 
law, other boundaries are less so as they reside only in the imagination of the community. 
As such, the boundary may be constructed and negotiated differently by people on either 
side of the boundary, as well as amongst those on the same side (Cohen 1985, 12). 
Through this definition of boundary, Cohen contends that a shared sense of identity is 
primarily a process of distinguishing oneself from the ‘other’. His emphasis on ‘othering’ 
differs from the notion of a communal identity being tied to a sense of common 
solidarity, as argued by Arensberg and Kimball (1965) (Cohen 1985, 20).  
 
However, this does not mean that Cohen argues that the possession of a common identity 
by the community is unimportant. It is just that for Cohen it is the perception, not the 
actuality, of what he emphasizes as the ‘commonality’ that is important (Cohen 1985, 20). 
The community’s perception of having communal ways of behaving is necessary, rather 
than the community actually being uniform in its understanding of varying behaviors and 
ideas. Perception is the key to negotiating boundaries, which are created by people in 
interaction with one another. It is this continuing process that shapes the identity of the 
community. Through this discussion, Cohen debunks the argument that to ‘belong’ there 
requires a uniform idea of shared values within a community. Instead Cohen points to the 
idea that someone can be considered a member but have different political and cultural 
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values. For this dissertation, utilizing Cohen’s definition of boundary enables one to 
analyze the different negotiations of Turkishness in order to examine and understand how 
national belonging is unremittingly being shaped and perceived. 
 
The meaning people give to the boundary is what Cohen terms the “symbolic aspect of 
community” (Cohen 1985, 12). Although the symbolism may be unambiguous, it does 
not follow that the meanings given to it are shared; instead, individuals negotiate their 
own understandings. In this way, symbols are not inherently imbued with meaning, but 
rather they offer the flexibility of differing conceptualizations. As such, the orientation an 
individual has to the varying symbols provides their specific understanding and 
experience of their community.  It follows that the fluid and ambiguous nature of social 
boundaries allow for a variety of associations and meanings to be imagined and 
constructed by members both inside and outside the community. In Cohen’s own words, 
“…it is the ambiguity of symbols that makes them so effective as boundary markers of 
community” (Cohen 1985, 55). He contends that the ambiguity allows members to 
communicate to one another about their own community and in doing so shape and create 
a sense of belonging and shared identity.  
 
With this definition, Cohen demonstrates that this symbolic process of boundary 
maintenance constructs a sense of belonging (and simultaneously a difference from 
others) for the members of a community. This notion of boundary allows for fluidity in 
the construction of identity and belonging, whether in the form of ‘ethnicity’ or of 
‘locality’ (Cohen 1985, 108), which differs from the dichotomous notion of ‘civic’ and 
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‘ethnic’ identities. The caged definitions of ethnic identity (belonging assumed through 
blood, national loyalty, or both) and civic identity (belonging assumed through acultural 
definitions of territory (Brubaker 1998)) do not illustrate the fluid ways in which 
belonging is constructed in everyday life. As stated by Cohen, “It is not our task to define 
ethnicity, but only to see if its various analyses offer us any clues to people’s inclination 
to give primacy to their community memberships over their higher-scale attachments” 
(Cohen 1985, 107).   
 
In Cohen’s discussion, ‘higher scale attachments’ refer to state administrations and 
governments. Cohen illustrates that scholars such as Paine (1985) argue that communities 
define boundaries and assert an ‘ethnic’ identity when they feel that their cultural 
integrity is at stake due to the dominant nationalisms promoted by these higher scale 
attachments (i.e., the state) (Cohen 1985, 104). While Cohen sees some validity to 
Paine’s argument, he reasons that there must be more than (what he terms) ‘ethnic 
activism’ motivating communities to construct boundaries (Cohen 1985, 104). As such, 
Cohen (1985) turns towards Gellner (1978) and Burgess (1978) to demonstrate the 
influence of the scale of the government and its effects on the assertion of one’s identity 
and boundary maintenance. Cohen (1985) argues that due to the large scale of the 
government, it can only operate in one of two ways. Either it operates at such a level of 
generality that it fails to represent small interest groups, or it only represents small 
interest groups and as such alienates a large group of the population. In either situation, 
the majority of people feel that their government is not meeting their needs and 
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consequently these people turn towards a more relatable level of society with which they 
can identify (Cohen 1985, 106-107).  
 
As previously stated this does not mean that all people relate identically with the 
community. Instead, the community provides them with a platform for the political 
formulation of their interests and aspirations. This platform is constructed not only by the 
people, but also negotiated with the state and or higher authorities’ conceptions of how 
such a platform should designed (Cohen 1985, 108). To elaborate, Cohen (1985) provides 
an example of how the UK government recognized ‘official’ Welsh interests by forming 
such agencies as the Welsh Office and the Welsh Tourist Board. In forming these 
agencies, the government provided those who desired to increase local control over 
Welsh affairs with a framework to further control and define their own local interests 
(Cohen 1985, 108). In this way, although community appears to be a grouping of 
individuals with identical views, this construction actually provides a platform for 
individual members to communicate an assorted array of ideas to one another. 
 
In the context of North Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots invested themselves in the ideas of 
Turkishness as espoused by Atatürk, but Erdoğan and the AKP’s new constructions of 
Turkishness and his new vision for Turkey (and relatedly the TRNC) have given them 
pause. They are actively questioning the values of AKP’s new Turkey and whether or not 
this new Turkish nationalism adequately represents their national identity. Turkish 
Cypriots feel that they have no voice in their current affairs because Turkey brushes aside 
their legitimate concerns with the rationale that the TRNC is economically dependent on 
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Turkey. As discussed in this chapter, while political agents in the TRNC promoting and 
supporting Cypriot nationalism call for a rejection of the Turkish identity and an 
embracing of a Cypriot identity, and political agents promoting and supporting Turkish 
nationalism emphasize Turkish Cypriot ties to Turkey and fully embrace a Turkish 
identity, Turkish Cypriots themselves are constructing and imagining their own 
community defined by the continuous construction and negotiation of boundaries. It is 
important to understand how Turkish Cypriots actively construct boundaries of belonging 
in everyday life; this insight will allow for comprehension of how they understand and 
craft their own sense of belonging.  Using Cohen’s definition of boundaries, this thesis 
will examine why and within what contexts the boundaries of Turkishness are 
renegotiated depending on different situational contexts in order to understand how 
Turkish Cypriots actively construct, reconstruct, and understand notions of belonging. 
 
To summarize, rather than accept an artificial distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ 
identity, this thesis will use the term ‘Turkishness’ as it enables one to demonstrate that 
the boundaries of a shared identity can be either ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’, depending on the 
varying contexts. It should be reinforced that this analysis is not an attempt to define 
Turkishness, but rather to exemplify the ways in which Turkishness is multifaceted and 
continuously being negotiated in the present to illuminate how Turkish Cypriots 
understand their national belonging in a ‘liminal’ state that is de facto controlled by a 
Turkish state governed by the AKP. Examining how Turkishness is constructed and 
negotiated allows one to understand precisely how the boundaries of community are 
changing in the present and demonstrate that it is contextual and situational. Illustrating 
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and examining these boundaries will showcase how a demotic nationalism is being 
produced. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, this demotic nationalism 
privileges an ambiguity concerning Turkishness. 
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
I spent one year conducting field research in North Cyprus from September 2013 to 
September 2014. While I travelled all over North Cyprus, I lived in the city of Nicosia 
and conducted most of my daily interactions there. My apartment was situated above a 
rock bar directly across from the TRNC parliament with a view to the entrance of the 
Walled City from my balcony. On the first night in my apartment I quickly realized that 
the proximity of the bars nearby meant that my home would be anything but quiet in the 
night. Over the following days, I also realized that the busy street of Dereboyu below 
filled my spacious apartment with the cacophonous soundscape of Dereboyu including, 
but not limited to, protesters, techno music, televised football matches, drunk street 
fights, feral cats, Turkish Cypriot musicians, car horns, circumcision celebrations, 
national ceremonies, construction work, and political gatherings.  Previously, I had been 
spending my days going to the Walled City because the literature I had read prior to my 
arrival had focused on the official heritage sites in that sector. It came to me that life was 
being lived right under the balcony of my own apartment, life I had barely taken the time 
to notice because I was so concerned with going to the “official heritage” sites. Then and 
there I decided to pay more attention to Dereboyu as a place of study. Nationalism is not 
only constructed and imposed from above, but also consciously and unconsciously 
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practiced in everyday life. As a result, this dissertation explores multiple ‘locations’ 
within the ‘small,’ ‘bounded’ north side of Nicosia. In doing so, this dissertation will 
engage with the microcosm to reflect wider debates.  
 
My field research, like all field research, is also bounded by the time in which I was 
working. The autumn of 2013 to the autumn of 2014 was a time of flux in Turkey and as 
a result also in North Cyprus. This period of time was on the heels of the Gezi protest in 
Turkey, in which the people turned out on the streets of cities around Turkey to challenge 
the AKP government, which provoked a national debate about what it meant to be 
Turkish and what it meant to be part of a Turkish nation. During the period of my field 
research, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was elected to President and proposed policies 
of the AKP government continued to prevail over the opposition. Thus, although the 
voices of those in Turkey had been heard in a way they had never been heard before 
through the Gezi protest, those participating in and supporting this protest felt that they 
had ultimately lost in many ways with the re-election of the very government they were 
resisting. These events were not only very closely followed in North Cyprus, but also 
supported with similar protests in Nicosia (See Chapter 5). The population of the TRNC 
was very invested in the outcome, as Turkey has enormous political, economic, and 
cultural influence on the island. Debates about the future of Turkey were equally about 
the future of North Cyprus. Primary data about how Turkish Cypriots negotiated social 
and cultural boundaries from my time “in the field” should be understood within this 
historical framework.  
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During my time in North Cyprus, I carried out participant observation and semi-
structured interviews. The method of participant observation allows the researcher to 
observe things that one cannot gain from interviews and in many cases might even 
contradict that which is said in the interviews; what people say is not as informative as 
what people do. However, although participant observation allowed me to gain better 
insight into the nuances of everyday life, it is important to reflect upon dialogical 
approach to fieldwork. Therefore a critical approach to my position in the field is 
necessary in order to understand the ways in which my data may have been influenced.  
 
It is not unusual for anthropologists researching in the field to be “othered”, but the 
responses by the inhabitants in each of those places are uniquely contextualized by the 
political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of their country and the personal 
background of those with whom the anthropologist engages. For centuries the island of 
Cyprus has been successively ruled by expanding empires; Greeks, Phoenicians, 
Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, 
Ottoman Turks, and most recently Brits. When discussing the political relationship 
between Turkey and the TRNC, Turkish Cypriots frequently refer to this by inserting this 
historical detail into the fact that they have always been ruled by ‘outsiders’. The stamp 
of illegitimacy upon the government of the TRNC amplifies this feeling of being ruled by 
outsiders and makes them feel as if they have no real say in their own governing. With 
this context in mind, my position in the field was viewed in a very particular way. On one 
dimension I was viewed as an American, and therefore seen as untrustworthy. This 
feeling of distrust stemmed from their negative feelings about the role the United States 
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Government has played in the continued division of Cyprus. The involvement of the U.S. 
government in the Cyprus issue was frequently mentioned to me, amplified by conspiracy 
stories, and as such, I was originally perceived by many Turkish Cypriots to be a CIA 
agent and was told half in jest by one Turkish Cypriot to “Go home, Yankee”.  In this 
way, I was both untrustworthy and I was perceived as an agent of power. Yet, on another 
dimension I was seen as “young female student” and perceived to be non-threatening. 
Turkish Cypriots are well aware of academic interest in their country and many 
commented that they were used to people studying them. The need to build trust is 
crucial. Over time I was able to secure the trust of many, make good friends, and gain 
trustworthy informants. Though I nevertheless felt welcomed into the community, my 
identification as an American had methodological implications on the collection of my 
data. Even amongst my friends and informants there was a continual awareness on their 
part that I was an American, a fact that they made clear through jests and jokes in 
conversation with me. 
 
My initial referrals in North Cyprus came from a friend, who also helped me find an 
apartment in North Cyprus. From there, I primarily used the snowball technique to gain 
further informants, which on a small island where “everybody knows everybody” is very 
effective. To explore casinos in North Cyprus, I asked friends if they knew anyone 
working in a casino in order to obtain informants. These informants would have to agree 
to meet outside the casino on their own time, as they are explicitly forbidden to discuss 
the casinos while at work and could have lost their jobs had they been discovered. This is 
just a single example of the sensitivities that are implicated within any research. Cross-
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cultural complexities abound in Cyprus, where issues of self-determination and 
frustrations about immigration are present in everyday situations. Through the snowball 
technique, I was able to engage with people from a variety of political, economic, 
cultural, and social backgrounds, ranging from senior government officials to illegal 
Turkish immigrants. The common thread that bound all these peoples together within my 
research is that they were all working or living in Nicosia. Following Risbeth and Powell 
(2012) and Schiller and Caglar (2009), rather than reiterate a common ‘ethnic lens’ in this 
research, which can emphasize bounded ethnic identities, I engaged with participants 
from a range of national and cultural backgrounds, but all living in the same geographic 
area.  
 
I employed a relatively open-ended research design. I overtly inserted myself and 
participated in the daily lives of the inhabitants of Nicosia. I performed consented 
informal interviews and recorded my daily observations. I used the snowball technique to 
find my sampling of interviewees; however, practical matters affecting access also 
informed this process. For example, my knowledge of Turkish was minimal and not 
sophisticated enough to conduct in-depth interviews. Therefore the majority of people I 
chose to interview had knowledge of English. However, for those who I interviewed that 
did not speak English, I used the aid of a translator to help me.  
 
With regards to the form of interview, I chose an unstructured method over a structured 
method. The unstructured interview followed the format of a conversation and allowed 
the interviewee to be in conversation with me, instead of merely answering a checklist of 
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questions. However, as noted by Hammersley and Atkinson “…they are never simply 
conversations, because the ethnographer has a research agenda and must retain some 
control over the proceedings” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, 126). Likewise, though 
each interview was unique, it does not mean that each one lacked boundaries, agenda, or 
intention (Andrews 2010, 103). Consent was obtained before recording these interviews. 
Where possible interviews were audio-recorded rather than written to more completely 
capture the full details of the conversation. However, in many cases I was unable to 
obtain consent for an audio-recording because those I asked were wary of being recorded 
and thus I had to write a record of the interview. For some, such as government officials, 
it had to do with the fact that I was American and they feared that I was a CIA agent. For 
others, they were wary of having their opinions recorded on tape.  
 
During field research, a good deal of emphasis was placed on gaining rapport with the 
interviewees. This required a sense of intimacy in the conversation to maximize the 
details and the information gained to be able to detect and understand the nuances within 
the conversation. This ethnographic method accurately gives a sense of the everyday life 
of the people being studied. While one can gain insight into the design of the officially 
promoted nationalism by examining the official discourse, in order to understand that 
nationalism as experienced by the people, with their own needs and value structures, one 
must use a grassroots approach and examine nationalism from the ground up.  While in 
some cases, it is necessary to refer to more “knowledgeable” informants on particular 
topics (for example, obtaining key informants working in casinos, or business owners in 
the Walled City), I focused predominantly on examining interactions between a variety of 
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people who engaged with the various locations of study (e.g., Dereboyu, the Walled City) 
because in order to understand the grassroots interpretation of these events and the impact 
of the official dictates of the government on everyday life, one must engage with the men 
and women that live within the environment. Choosing not to be exclusive of whom I 
interviewed and or engaged with, I sought to capture the spectrum of people in society. 
Doing so enabled me to see how Turkish Cypriots opinions differ and has informed my 
understanding of the ambiguity of nationalism in North Cyprus.  
 
If I am proposing that national identity is neither constructed from ‘above’ by state 
institutions, nor ‘below’ from the people, but rather a continued negotiation amongst and 
between, then where do I ‘locate’ these negotiations? Here I employ Navaro-Yashin’s 
notion of “public life” (Navaro-Yashin 2002). She sets the term as distinct from notions 
of “public sphere,” “public culture,” and “civil society,” all frameworks of which she 
demonstrates assume a distinction between domains of “power” and “resistance”. She 
moves beyond a dichotomy of the “people” and the “state”, by using the “public” to 
represent both the people and the state simultaneously. She continues to demonstrate that 
public life is not a “site” but, “…a category that would allow the study of the political in 
its fleeting and intangible, transmogrified forms” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 3). Therefore, 
she examines the production of the political, not in a specific institution, but in its 
multiple transformations. To examine the production of the political she does not 
categorize her informants into groupings of people, but rather captures the sense of 
movement in public life (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 15).  
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I found early on in my time spent with Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus that a working 
knowledge of the news stories of the day was essential to understanding my informants 
when they discussed politics, and how public events and policies were reflected in their 
lives.  For that reason there is significant reference to newspapers and the stories they 
contained. The citizens of Turkish Cyprus have a keen interest in the news of events of 
the day in Turkey as well as North Cyprus. The sources of their information about current 
affairs are television programs, newspaper articles, social media, and conversation.  I was 
ever mindful that televised media and newspapers were often biased in their reporting by 
the fact that they were either government institutions seeking to direct their particular 
narrative, political organs seeking to sell an ideology, or private organs intent on 
increasing their advertising sales. Some could be said to be a mixture of all these factors.  
The culture of news is an essential component of the study of a people in a city that must 
be used critically. Navaro-Yashin (2002) in her examination of the production of the 
political examines newspapers and media “…not as an object of study, but one important 
agent in the making of public life” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 6). In this context the veracity 
of the story told by the media does not matter as much as understanding how that content 
is interpreted and repeated by the intended audience. The interplay of these elements is a 
large portion of how boundaries of national identity are negotiated.   
 
For such a tiny island, the diversity of newspapers is impressive. Three of these 
newspapers were in circulation before the Turkish invasion in 1974: Halkin Sesi, 
Bozkurt, and Zaman (Şahin 2008, 75). All three newspapers supported the Turkish 
leadership at the time and gave no space to opposition voices (Şahin 2008, 75). As the 
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multi-party system arose, more newspapers were published allowing different political 
ideas to spread (Şahin 2008, 75). Different politicians and religious interest groups used 
these organs of communication to distribute their ideas and communicate with their 
followers. Readers of the newspapers in North Cyprus are well aware of these biases. 
Some Turkish Cypriot newspapers cloak their stories in an attempted objectivity, such as 
Kibris, although it presents pro-government news, while other newspapers embrace the 
subjectivity of their content as their selling point, such as the newspaper Afrika, which is 
known for its anti-Turkey editorial bias.  
 
The display of overt bias resulted in serious and sometimes fatal consequences for some 
Turkish Cypriot journalists. The murder of Kutlu Adalı (journalist for Yeni Düzen) and 
the odyssey of Şener Levant (editor-in-chief of Afrika) provide two well-known 
examples. Kutlu Adalı was a journalist well-known for his contributions to Yeni Düzen, a 
left-wing newspaper in the TRNC. He was very critical of Turkey and the right-wing 
establishment in power (Navaro-Yashin 2012, xv; Loizides 2007, 180). On 6 July 1996 he 
was assassinated outside his home by unidentified machine-gunners. Although 
unidentified, they were assumed by many to be Turkish ultra-nationalists or militants 
associated with the ‘deep state’ in Anakara (Loizides 2007, 180). To-date, no one has 
been arrested or prosecuted.  
 
Another well-known Turkish Cypriot journalist who has been quite critical and blatant in 
his critique of the Turkish Cypriot regime and the Turkish occupation of North Cyprus is 
Şener Levent. His criticisms of the Turkish state and the Denktaş administration in the 
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TRNC caused him to be repeatedly threatened by those governments in various ways in 
attempts to silence him. Levent, who was the first to use the term “Occupation” for what 
the Turkish propaganda called “Peace Operation” was ultimately stripped of his 
newspaper, Avurpa (Europe) and its property was confiscated (Argyrou 2006, 217). 
Levent’s response was to found a new newspaper, which was ironically named Afrika 
(Africa).  In 2002 he, along with his colleague, was arrested, convicted of espionage, and 
sentenced to several months in prison. This lead to an international hue and cry 
spearheaded by Greek Cypriot journalists. Under pressure from international bodies, 
including the EU and the United Nations, the Turkish Cypriot government set these two 
men free later that same year.   
 
It needs to be stressed that Kutlu Adalı’s assassination and the imprisonment of Şener 
Levent are extreme examples of suppression of the freedom of the press contextualized 
by the events that occurred in the mid-1990s and early 2000s. During this time there was 
a rise in conflict between the PKK and Turkey and as a result terrorist activities by 
Turkish ultra-nationalists and organizations associated with the ‘deep state’ in Ankara 
increased significantly in the TRNC (Loizides 2007, 180). However, during the time of 
my field research over a decade later, though newspapers continued to be subjective and 
continued in their promotion of particular views of their specific affiliating political 
parties or blocs, the TRNC press was quite free; journalists could and did say pretty much 
anything. The press was definitely more liberated than in Turkey, and some might argue 
freer than in the RoC.  
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Performing Turkishness: Military Service and 
the Nation  
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3.1. Remembering 20 July 1974 
Replete with episodes of foreign powers treading its shores, the history of Cyprus 
underwent another turning point on 20 July 1974. The significance of the arrival of the 
Turkish Army on that day has been hotly debated across the world and remains in the eye 
of a continuing political storm. The official historiography of the RoC promotes the 
narrative that on 20 July 1974 Turkey invaded the RoC which resulted in the deaths of 
many Cypriot citizens and the creation of a Turkish militarized occupied zone in the 
north of Cyprus that remains to this day. This interpretation of events is formally 
endorsed through actions and decisions made by international organizations such as the 
UN and the European Court of Human Rights; with the exception of Turkey, this 
interpretation is also supported by all the world’s national governments.9 Conversely, 
recalling the harsh treatment the Turkish Cypriots received at the hands of the Greek 
Cypriots, the Turkish government and the TRNC do not see the military actions of 1974 
as an invasion, but instead describe these events as a “Peace Operation” (“Barıs 
Harekatı”) or even a “Happy Peace Operation” (“Mutlu Barıs Harekatı”). As advocated 
by TRNC President Derviş Eroğlu at the 20 July celebration, the military actions of the 
Turkish Army during the “Peace Operation” are rendered as “heroic” actions that saved 
their “Turkish brothers” from the hands of the overwhelming Greek Cypriot majority 
(Eroğlu 2014). Within this narrative, the outcome of these “heroic” military actions 
resulted in the creation of a new independent nation, the TRNC.  
 
Although these narratives oppose one another, both are fabricated to justify the political 
agenda of each respective government. The historical narrative that recognizes Turkey’s 
                                                        
9 Please refer to footnote 8, p.39.  
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actions as an invasion validates the continued legitimacy of the RoC and renders illegal 
the existence of the TRNC, relegating the territory to a militarized occupied zone. The 
contesting historical narrative recognizes the independence of the TRNC, thereby 
representing a distinct political separation from the RoC and the end of its role as the sole 
government of the entire island. These narratives and the political implications 
constructed around the terms “Invasion” and “Peace Operation” are subjective and, as 
such, there can be no ‘neutral’ understanding or description of the event. Because there is 
no ‘neutral’ understanding, the date of 20 July becomes a canvas on which images of 
national identity can be painted.  
 
Referring to Goubert’s (1969) analysis of French society, Gillis (1994) illustrates how the 
French revolutionaries constructed an “Old Regime” in order to break from the past and 
create a new beginning. Similarly, it can be seen that in these constructed narratives about 
20 July both historiographies fabricate a division of time between ‘before’ 1974 and 
‘after’ 1974 in order to form a clear distinction between the past and the present. After 
the “Peace Operation”, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975 – 1983) and later the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (established in 1983) set about circulating their 
historiography through textbooks, museums, and commemorations. For example, 
although already a local museum in 1967, the new and subsequent TRNC administrations 
nationalized the home of Turkish Cypriot Major Dr. Nihat Ilhan as the Museum of 
Barbarism. It was in this home that Greek Cypriots murdered his wife and three children 
during the period of inter-communal violence. A portion of the museum is preserved as a 
crime scene with the original bloodstains on the wall and black tape outlining the bullet 
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holes. The museum serves to remind citizens of the atrocities committed against the 
Turkish Cypriots before 1974. As stated previously (Chapter 2), the new administration 
also constructed divisions between past and present by creating new maps and re-naming 
all the cities and streets in Turkish (Navaro-Yashin 2012). Applying Gillis’ argument 
(1994) it can be seen that through these different mediums past injustices suffered under 
the RoC administration were emphasized in order to justify the 20 July “Peace 
Operation” and look forward to a new beginning under the TRNC. Thus, while the 
museum highlights past injustices, the creation of new place names exemplifies the ways 
in which the TRNC administration attempted to erase the past in order to make way for 
new beginnings.  
 
To use the term coined by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), the TRNC administration also 
created new “invented traditions”. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger an invented 
tradition is “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and 
of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger 1983, 1). The TRNC government made 20 July an official public holiday in 
1984 (one year after the TRNC declared its independence) under codified legislation to 
honor and observe this new beginning. According to Law 49, 20 July became a national 
holiday in the TRNC along with twelve other holidays10. In addition to the three Muslim 
                                                        
10 New Year’s Day (1 January); National Sovereignty and Children’s Day (23 April); 
Labor Day (May 1); Commemoration of Ataturk, Youth and Sports Day (19 May); Peace 
and Freedom Day (20 July); Social Resistance Day (1 August); Victory Day (30 August); 
29 October (Turkish Republic Day); 15 November (Republic Day); Mawlid; Eid al-Fitr; 
Eid al-Adha. 
74 
 
holidays, four more of these holidays were also Turkish public holidays. These national 
holidays were proclaimed both as measures of nation building and to promote closer 
cultural ties between Turkey and North Cyprus. With the creation of a new annual 
calendar commemorating Turkey’s involvement in the birth of the TRNC, in conjunction 
with the changing of street names and creation of new museums, the TRNC 
administration airbrushed over the ‘Cypriot’ past to paint a more Turkish historical 
narrative. 
 
Three of the established public holidays – Peace and Freedom Day (20 July), Victory 
Day (30 August), and the Turkish Republic Day (29 October)—are celebrated with 
military parades on Dr. Fazil Küçük Boulevard because each of these days celebrates the 
anniversary of a military victory. Although not codified into law until 1984, the 
celebration of the anniversary of 20 July by a military parade has been in place since 
1975. According to a Turkish Cypriot who was present at these early parades, they were 
very well attended. Turkish Cypriots cheered and celebrated the coming of their Turkish 
rescuers. These military parades are still choreographed with as much grandeur and 
spectacle, but are received much less enthusiastically by Turkish Cypriots. Although the 
official discourses regarding 20 July 1974, as espoused by the Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot governments, are still unified in their promotion of the day as the “Peace 
Operation” that saved the Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots’ understanding of the 
day is much more varied. Not everyone in North Cyprus subscribes to the official 
narrative propagated by the governments of Turkey and the TRNC.  
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While the majority of Turkish Cypriots are grateful for Turkey’s military intervention in 
1974, the continuing presence of the Turkish military in North Cyprus has become a 
highly contested issue. When referring to the continued presence of Turkey’s military on 
the island, many Turkish Cypriots reinterpret the past actions of the Turkish armed 
forces. Through this position, they view Turkey’s action on 20 July as an invasion 
(Turkish: iştila). The term ‘invasion’ starkly contrasts with the official term ‘Happy 
Peace Operation’ and denies the unifying promotion of Turkishness found in the actions 
the latter name signifies. These Turkish Cypriots do not see the event as a rescue by their 
“Turkish brothers,” but instead view the event as an invasion by a foreign other. This 
contestation over the continued Turkish military presence has challenged the 
historiography and commemoration of 20 July and questions the message that Turkey 
saved the island with its military strength. As such, the idea of being saved by Turkey is 
becoming increasingly less welcomed by the people of the TRNC. The understandings 
and constructions of the historiography and commemorations of 20 July focus on the 
military events and as a result they become interlaced with the constructions and 
understandings of the Turkish military. 
 
Researching the Turkish armed forces in Turkey, Jenkins (2001) and Altinay (2004) have 
illustrated the way in which Turkish military values are deeply embedded within Turkish 
society and demonstrate that because of this, these values play a significant role in the 
ways Turks define what it means to be Turkish. Through an analysis of the ways in which 
the military is presented in the educational institutions and an analysis of the history of 
military interventions in politics, Jenkins (2001) and Altinay (2004) make convincing 
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arguments about the relationship between the military and the Turkish identity. They 
argue that what makes the Turkish military unique is the belief that their purpose as 
soldiers lies in protecting ‘Turkishness’ as defined by Kemalism, the principles laid out 
by the father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In this way, the military’s 
perception of its role is not only to protect Turkey from outside forces that threaten 
Kemalist legacy, but also from those forces that threaten this legacy from within. 
However, while Jenkins (2001) and Altinay (2004) have argued that the military is a 
distinct and unique feature of Turkish nationalism and has been internalized as part of the 
Turkish identity, questions remain. 
 
While Altinay (2004) critically examines the ways in which the Turkish people resist and 
contest the military power and authority in Turkey, she offers little to question the 
internal contestations of the ‘authoritative’ discourse about military authority by the 
government. She does illustrate how the Turkish military lost some of its power with the 
rise of political Islam, but her focus remains on questioning how the authoritative 
discourse has been resisted from ‘below’ and demonstrating how the ‘myth of the 
military nation’ is a product of an authoritative history. However, the authoritative 
discourse is internally contested as demonstrated by the policies of the AKP which try to 
scale back or sever the close ties between the military and the state and to weaken the 
Kemalist vision of the strong bond between the military and the state, also termed the 
‘Military Nation’ (Altinay 2004). Such actions include the passage of a law reducing the 
number of military parades and the government’s conduct surrounding the Ergenekon 
Trials. In the latter, approximately 275 former generals and active duty officers were 
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charged and convicted with running a covert terrorist organization and for plotting a 
military coup to destroy the AKP government. It would be interesting then to explore the 
relationships between notions of Turkishness, the military, and the state, given the recent 
contestation of this ‘authoritative’ discourse promoted by AKP against long-standing 
Kemalist discourses. Understanding these relationships is necessary in order to explore 
how the military presence is understood in terms of Turkishness in the TRNC.  
 
The palpable presence of the Turkish military in Cyprus is often encountered in everyday 
life. Whether driving by one of the many Turkish military bases, seeing the many Turkish 
soldiers milling about the Walled City, or passing by any of the military monuments, the 
presence of the Turkish military cannot go unnoticed. Turkey commands three of its own 
military units on the island of Cyprus and is in de facto command of the Turkish Cypriot 
military unit (Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığ, GKK) and the TRNC police force. This 
control of all military and police personnel on the island was originally seen by Turkish 
Cypriots as necessary for security, but has been increasingly questioned over the past two 
decades. Turkish Cypriots have been giving more public voice to their disapproval of the 
continued presence of the Turkish troops on the island, emboldened by the increase in 
protests in Turkey against the policies of the Erdoğan and the AKP as witnessed by the 
Gezi protest both in the TRNC and Turkey. Turkish Cypriots’ negotiations and 
constructions of Turkishness, I argue, reflect the wider political negotiation of the 
Turkish military presence. More specifically, the Turkish Cypriots’ constructions of the 
Turkish military are a way in which Turkish Cypriots define themselves vis-à-vis Turkey. 
However, how the Turkish Cypriots relate to the military presence on their island is 
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ambivalent and can be used as a metaphor to represent their relationship with Turkey 
through their constructions of both secularism and their sovereignty. To make this 
argument, this chapter will examine the relationship between the military and 
Turkishness in the context of North Cyprus.  
 
To examine the relationship between the military and Turkishness within the context of 
North Cyprus, this chapter will be divided into four more sections. Section 3.2 will 
illustrate the close relationship between Kemalism and the military. In doing so, this 
section will demonstrate the significance of Atatürk for the Turkish Cypriots and 
highlight the problems that arise with the attempts by the AKP government to dismantle 
the close relationship between Kemalism and the military.  Following from this, Section 
3.3 engages more closely with the military structure and culture in the TRNC and by this 
examination will demonstrate that Turkish Cypriots believe they have been denied the 
promises of sovereignty that by their interpretation of Kemalism should be theirs. With a 
better understanding of the relationship between the military, Kemalism, and sovereignty, 
Section 3.4 examines in-depth the 20 July military parade. An examination of this 
military parade illustrates the ways in which the official construction of Turkishness is 
embodied through spectacle. Although Turkish Cypriots assert a ‘Cypriot’ identity to 
contest this official narrative of 20 July, Section 3.5 will conclude that rather than an 
outright rejection of the official constructions of Turkishness, Turkish Cypriots are 
actually much more ambivalent about their Turkishness.  
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3.2 “We are the Foot Soldiers of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” 
July 20, 2014. It is 8:30 on a Sunday morning and armed policemen line Osmanpașa 
Street in the TRNC to both protect and stand witness to one of the day’s first 
ceremonies—the Wreath Laying Ceremony—commemorating the 40th anniversary of the 
“Cyprus Peace Operation.” Although the date, time, and location for this ceremony were 
publicly advertised in various newspapers, only government officials, military personnel, 
and journalists are in attendance. The event is broadcast live on national television so that 
the TRNC population can watch the ceremony from the comfort of their homes. Those 
present are dressed formally, in either business attire or military uniforms, and stand 
gathered around the tall, bronze Atatürk statue situated at the entrance of the Walled City. 
Photojournalists are interspersed throughout the crowd taking photographs seemingly 
every other second. It was apparent that the documenting of the commemoration was as 
important, if not more so, than the commemoration itself. Navaro-Yashin reminds us that 
sovereignty is not something ‘given’ but rather constructed through an “…enactment of 
agency between people and things in a given territory” (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 43). These 
documentations act as tangible proof that legitimizes the official narrative propagated in 
this commemoration both in the present and for future generations.  
 
On this particular occasion Turkish President Abdullah Gül is in attendance, which is 
notable in that his attendance at this celebration will be one of his last acts as President of 
Turkey before Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan will succeed him on 28 August 2014. In 
addition to President Gül, other notable attendees present are TRNC President Derviș 
Eroğlu, TRNC Prime Minister Ozkan Yorgancıoğlu, and TRNC Parliament Speaker Sibel 
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Siber. As part of the ceremony, President Derviș Eroğlu lays a wreath at the Lefkoşa 
Atatürk Statue. Two military men dressed in ceremonial attire assist in this process. With 
choreographed steps, these men carry the wreath decorated to look like the TRNC flag to 
the foot of the Atatürk statue. Once the wreath is placed at the foot of the statue, 
President Eroğlu adjusts the wreath. He only touches it so as to emphasize that it is he as 
a representative of his country who is laying the wreath, not because the wreath actually 
needs adjusting. He then steps away in front of the wreath to have a moment of silence. 
The soldiers too step away from the wreath in tandem back to their positions. This same 
process is repeated with President Gül, with the only difference being that the wreath is 
larger and decorated like the Turkish flag. The larger size of the wreath acts as a visual 
for the relationship between Turkey and the TRNC as ‘motherland’ (Turkish: anavatan) 
and ‘babyland’ (Turkish: yavruvatan), respectively.  
 
Following a moment of silence, the TRNC military band plays the TRNC national 
anthem, which is identical to the Turkish national anthem. Significantly, no one has 
penned a separate national anthem for the TRNC itself. The TRNC national anthem sings 
of the Turkish national flag and the blood spilled for the independence of Turkey and is 
another example of the attempts made by previous governments to construct nationalistic 
ties between Turkey and the TRNC. As the military band plays, the attendees sing in 
unison as the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags are raised up the two flagpoles, which 
stand opposite either end of the Atatürk statue. The civilian attendees stand with their 
arms by their sides, while those dressed in military uniform stand saluting the flags.  
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The ceremony concludes with the signing of “The Special Memorial Book” by the two 
heads of state. In this book, both Presidents write letters to “the GREAT Atatürk” 
thanking him both for his general leadership of the Turkish people and more specifically 
for his ideological guidance in the 20 July 1974 event. As they write, President Eroğlu 
and President Gül stand at podiums facing the statue of Atatürk. The act of writing letters 
to Atatürk and the positioning of their bodies in relation to the Atatürk statue makes it 
evident that this oversized statue personifies in this moment the spirit of the Turkish 
leader to whom these letters of thanks are written. Subsequently, these letters are publicly 
displayed for citizens to see on television and will be available to read in the newspapers 
the following day. The wreaths laid at the feet of Atatürk will remain in place throughout 
the day, serving as a reminder for those passing by the statue to reflect upon the 
relationship between Atatürk and what is being commemorated on this day.  
 
In both Turkey and North Cyprus the military and political leader, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, is glorified and his memory is kept alive in a variety of ways within educational 
institutions, at public holidays, and in visual representations such as monuments. As his 
surname granted to him in 1934 by the Turkish Parliament suggests, he is considered to 
be the “Father of all Turks”. 11  He is considered to be such by Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot people because his generalship and leadership led to victory in the War of 
Independence out of which the Turkish Republic was born and he became Turkey’s first 
President. There are full-length Atatürk statues in each of the major cities of North 
Cyprus and smaller busts of Atatürk in many of the villages. Adil’s (2007) and 
                                                        
11 Under the surname law in Turkey, it is forbidden for anyone else to use “Atatürk” as a 
surname.   
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Sadrazam’s (1990) research on monuments in North Cyprus explains that the Atatürk 
statue where the 20 July wreath laying ceremony is held was the first full-length statue 
symbolic of Turkish cultural identity to be erected in any of the Turkish Cypriot areas of 
Cyprus.12  
 
This statue represents Atatürk’s ideals of modernization by portraying Atatürk in a 
Western suit and coat. The statue was sculpted in Turkey and shipped to North Cyprus 
where a public inauguration was held on the 29th of October 1963 (Adil 2007). The year 
of the inauguration coincided with the beginning of inter-communal violence on the 
island.  Fearing their island would become a part of Greece, Turkish Cypriots fought to 
prevent this union and instead realize taksim, a division of the island and a union with 
Turkey. Having a statue built during this time of inter-communal violence, and at the 
height of a desire to become a part of Turkey, symbolized their unique “Turkish” identity 
amongst the Cypriots and fostered a sense of Turkishness. As explained by Adil (2007) 
this was further symbolized by the Turkish Cypriots’ embrace of the date 29 October. 
This date is the Turkish national public holiday celebrating the day Turkey became a 
Republic following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
                                                        
12 It was the second sculpture overall, with the first being a bust of the Young Ottoman, 
Namîk Kemal (Adil 2007; Sadrazam 1990). 
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At the inauguration of the statue, Erdoğan Mirata13, an active member within the Turkish 
Cypriot community, read a poem he had written entitled, “My Atatürk in Cyprus” (Adil 
2007). In this poem, he spoke directly to the statue of Atatürk and said, 
 
“...What is erected is not a monument / but a command post, / where great 
decision makers will gather…From this statue / courage will flow to our hearts / 
The youth will light their torches / from your eyes / You will be a sacred figure to 
the Cypriot ….You will be the flag of my fight / excitement to our hearts, / Your 
gaze will chase away the foe / The ill intending enemy of Cyprus / will be burnt 
by your spirit.” (Adil 2007, 82).  
 
Through this poem Atatürk is represented not only as a leader and protector, but also as a 
source of inspiration and the embodiment of Cypriot values. With this in mind, the 20 
July wreath laying ceremony at this Atatürk statue is symbolic in both reaffirming loyalty 
to Atatürk’s vision of a Turkish future and serves as a reminder of the continued presence 
of outside threats against which Turkish Cypriots need to protect and defend themselves.  
On 20 July the outside threat is defined as the Greek Cypriots and the RoC. Indeed, as 
will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, the everyday presence of the Turkish Army 
stationed around the island serves as a perpetual reminder of pending threats. However, 
with the rise of AKP in Turkey and their divergence from Kemalist constructions of 
Turkishness (by embracing and promoting Islam as an important aspect of the Turkish 
                                                        
13 Erdoğan Mirata (b. 1930) was, and continues to be, very active in the Turkish Cypriot 
community. During the 1960s many of his poems and writings were published in 
newspapers and magazines. In 1974, he founded the Nicosia City Club [Şehir Kulübü], a 
tennis club for the community of Nicosia. Additionally he is a trained Orthodontist and 
an active member of the Turkish Cypriot Medical Association. Most recently, in 2015, 
Erdoğan Mirata published his autobiography, “Like a joke…memories, reminders” 
[Turkish: ‘Şaka Gibi…Hatıralar, Hatırlatmalar’], which was praised by several journalists 
in the TRNC and by TRNC President Mustafa Akıncı (Presidency of Turkish Republic of 
North Cyprus Website 2016).  
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identity (see Chapter 2)), many Turkish Cypriots are also constructing Turkey as an 
outside threat encroaching on their Turkish Cypriot values. Unlike the Greek Cypriots 
and the RoC, which are seen as an outside threat to invade their land, Turkey has already 
“invaded” their island.  
 
As described in Chapter 2, anxiety about Turkey’s cultural domination over the island has 
been brewing since the early 1980s, when the hopes that Turkish nationalism promised 
were dimmed as the harsh realities of being an unrecognized state took hold (Hatay 
2008). During that time, Turkish Cypriots became more critical of Turkey and vocally 
expressed their disapproval of the growing presence of Turkish propaganda (Navaro-
Yashin 2012). Navaro-Yashin illustrates the Turkish Cypriots’ displeasure by giving an 
example of a public demonstration held against a militaristic statue of Atatürk on 
horseback (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 217). Today, while Turkish Cypriots are still angered at 
the “Turkification” of the island, the definition of this “Turkification” has been 
reconstructed and redefined in response to the AKP government and President Erdoğan’s 
new construction of Turkish nationalism. As such, protests by Turkish Cypriots against 
displays of Turkish nationalism are not protests against Turkish flags or statues, but 
against the rise of political Islam in the public sphere, in the building of more mosques 
and enforcement of mandatory religious education (See Chapter 4).   
 
In these protests, Turkish Cypriots will often invoke Atatürk to legitimize their cause. For 
example, one slogan chanted during organized marching protests in the TRNC against 
then Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP government was, “We are the soldiers of 
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Mustafa Kemal Atatürk!” 14 This slogan originally was popularized in Turkey in 2008 
when the left-wing magazine, Türksolu, published the phrase in an article (Fırat 2008) 
responding to public debates regarding the Ergenekon investigation.15 The author, Gökçe 
Fırat, felt that the possibility of a trial was not merely an attack on Turkish military 
personnel, but an affront to both Kemalism and Atatürk. Thus, he proudly proclaims that 
he is a soldier of Atatürk; that he will defend democracy and Kemalist values. This 
slogan became a catch phrase with left-wing political supporters. During the Gezi 
protests in Turkey, CHP members shouted this chant in attempts to commandeer the 
original protest for their own political advantages. Comically, Gezi protestors parodied 
the slogan with the phrase, “We are the soldiers of Mustafa Keser” (Turkish: “Mustafa 
Keser’in askerleriyiz”), a popular Turkish arabesque singer (Karakayali and Yaki 2016, 
212). Karakayali and Yaki (2016) illustrate that humor like this demonstrates the 
reflective way activists kept the political space fluid and inclusive, thus allowing for no 
one political group to dominate the protest (Karakayali and Yaki 2016, 213). Although 
CHP members in Turkey originally chanted the former slogan in an attempt to politically 
hijack the Gezi Park protests, Turkish Cypriots adopted the phrase as well, specifically to 
protest against the AKP government and Tayyip Erdoğan at organized marching protests 
(Afrika 2013, 3a).  
By invoking an identification with Atatürk’s foot soldiers during the Turkish War of 
Independence, Turkish Cypriots proclaim themselves as part of a country dedicated to his 
                                                        
14 For example, this slogan was chanted was the Gezi Park Protest at Kuğulu Park and 
Dereboyu Street in Lefkoșa, TRNC (Afrika 2013, 3a). 
15  As mentioned previously (p.76), Ergenekon allegedly was a secret organization 
(comprised primarily of members of Turkey’s military and security forces) that sought to 
overthrow the AKP government.  
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legacy and the protection of his ideals. In using this protest chant, they are simultaneously 
defining themselves as Turkish Cypriots against a foreign government and identifying 
with the Turkish citizens who use this protest chant against the AKP government because 
they too are having a non-Kemalist Turkish nationalism thrust upon them. In one way 
Turkish Cypriots are using this chant to dispute Turkey’s new direction in the context of 
their island’s politics and in another way, by sympathizing with the Turkish protesters, 
they are engaging in a transnational Kemalism. These notions of Kemalism are tightly 
intertwined with the complex and evolving relationship between Turkish nationalism and 
the Turkish military. 
 
The formation of the Turkish Republic under Atatürk’s leadership created a Turkish 
military that protects the Kemalist values found within the constitution. All of the 
military coups that have occurred in Turkey since Atatürk’s demise were perpetrated 
under the premise of protecting Atatürk’s ideals. 16  When a non-Kemalist movement 
within the government grew in power, the military stepped in to reinforce Kemalism. By 
invoking Atatürk’s ideals, the military establishment promoted Kemalism as central to 
                                                        
16 In 1960, General Cemal Gürsel led the first military coup and successfully removed 
President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his cabinet. The leadership 
of the coup claimed that they had no intention of staying in power, but rather they wanted 
to remove one democratically elected government and replace it with another (Lombardi 
1997, 205). Their explanation was that the elected government in power was passing 
legislation that relaxed the restrictions on Islam that were put into place by Atatürk. 
Similarly, the coup d’état on 12 March 1971 was also to overthrow a government that 
was not supporting Kemalist values. Prior to this coup, General Memduh Tagmac warned 
“all who may try to destroy the national integrity of the republican regime and Atatürk’s 
reforms,” that “The armed forces, whose mission is to protect the country against any 
danger from without or within, will smash any action directed against the country” 
(Lombardi 1997, 206). In 1980, a third military coup occurred when the newly elected 
Demirel government was overthrown. Again, in this coup the Turkish military perceived 
their role as custodians of Atatürk’s legacy.  
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the government’s purpose and identity and in doing so was able to legitimize their coups 
to their own satisfaction. Thus, the Turkish military perceived their role as custodians of 
Atatürk’s legacy, to protect his Kemalist values, and to reestablish a government that 
would honor and protect those ideals.  
 
In Turkey, the Turkish military is highly integrated into Turkish culture primarily due to 
efforts of past governments. As illustrated by Altinay (2004), the Ministry of National 
Education (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı) has continued the legacy of interpreting and 
privileging the history of Turkey in military terms. Since the ratification of the 1961 
constitution under the military junta, mandatory military service has been required for all 
men; if one evades military service the consequence is imprisonment. It is punishable 
under Article 301 to openly criticize the service. Altinay (2004) and Jenkins (2001) have 
shown that it is no easy feat for the public to resist and fight against the revered military 
culture primarily because even though it is culturally produced it is considered to be a 
‘natural’ phenomenon. Reversing this reverence from ‘above,’ however, is also difficult, 
as the AKP-led government has realized. Since the AKP came into power in 2002, they 
have been promoting policies within Turkey to curtail the authoritative power and profile 
of the military and Atatürk.  
 
In 2012, the AKP government banned institutions (other than the state) from laying 
wreaths at Atatürk monuments on national holidays. This was met with great criticism 
following 20 October 2012 Republic Day, when various confrontations between police 
forces and party members trying to lay wreaths at Atatürk’s statue occurred (Hurriyet 
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Daily News 2012b). Following this resistance, the AKP government relaxed the ban 
stating that institutions that want to lay the wreaths will have to inform the governor’s 
office at least two days in advance (Today’s Zaman 2012). While the wreath-laying ban 
was met with resistance, other regulations were met with less violent confrontations. In 
2012, a regulation was issued by the AKP government stating that the August 30th 
celebration would be the only national holiday to retain a military parade, thereby 
effectively cancelling the traditional military parades held on the remaining public 
holidays of 29 October, 23 April, and 19 May (Hurriyet Daily News 2012a). The 
regulation went on to say that the Turkish President would assume celebratory duties 
formerly performed by the General Chief of Staff who heretofore had received the 
greetings and hosted the receptions at the military facilities. These restrictions were 
designed to curb the army’s high visibility in national celebrations and they exemplify the 
desire of AKP to weaken the connection between the military and Turkishness, as had 
been promoted under Kemalist ideology. These restrictions and forced changes, some 
successful and some not, highlighted the fact that it was just as difficult to resist or erase 
the military reverence from ‘above’ in Turkey. 
 
What does this mean for the TRNC? How do these resistances to the military reverence 
from ‘above’ in Turkey effect Turkish Cypriots’ relation to the Turkish military?  On one 
level, the Turkish military is a relatable entity whereby Turkish Cypriots proudly boast 
that they are the foot soldiers of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Yet, on another level the 
Turkish military is associated closely with the powers of the Turkish government. If 
Erdoğan and the AKP succeed in ending the protection of Kemalism by the Turkish 
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military, they will remove a major barrier to the establishment of a Turkey guided by 
modernization through Islamic values and extend that to the TRNC. Turkish Cypriots see 
secularism as their legacy and in a way that is specific to their understanding of a Cypriot 
future. If the Turkish military no longer protects ideals of Kemalism, then the presence of 
Turkish troops on the island is nothing more than an invader’s occupying force and 
shows the ‘Peace Operation’ as a fantasy serving only the Turkish government.  
 
 
3.3 Military Culture in North Cyprus 
3.3.1 Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces 
The Turkish armed forces in North Cyprus (Kıbrıs Türk Barış Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, 
KTBK) have been on the island since 20 July 1974. The members of the Turkish Cypriot 
community, who no longer wanted to be under the repressive control of the Greek 
Cypriots, initially welcomed their arrival to the island. Today, however, the continued 
presence of the Turkish military on the island is a highly contested subject amongst the 
Turkish Cypriot people. Currently, the KTBK is comprised of an estimated 30,000 
troops. In addition to the 30,000 troops of the KTBK, the island is also home to the 
Turkish Cypriot Security Forces (Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığ, GKK), which is 
comprised of another 9,000 troops. The numbers of Turkish troops on the island are only 
estimates because actual troop strength cannot be confirmed. There is a tension between 
the Turkish soldiers and TRNC soldiers on the island created by their distinction and 
separation. This tension can in part be seen by the organization of the military, wherein 
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the TRNC troops, although a separate military entity, are in fact subordinate to the 
Turkish military.  
 
Although distinct military entities, both the KTBK and the GKK are controlled by the 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) located in Ankara, Turkey. The TGS oversees the Turkish 
armed forces and is responsible for the security policies of both Turkey and the TRNC. 
The KTBK, as part of the Turkish Aegean Army, reports directly to the TGS. The GKK, 
although comprised of Turkish Cypriot soldiers, is commanded by a Turkish two-star 
General under the control of the TGS who also reports directly to the President of the 
TRNC, thus providing direct communication between the Turkish military and the TRNC 
President (Jenkins 2001, 80). Additionally, the Turkish Cypriot police force is part of the 
GKK and subordinate to the TGS. This is noteworthy in that in Turkey the police force is 
part of the Interior Ministry. Veterans of the Turkish military in North Cyprus informed 
me that the dependence of the GKK and the police force on the TGS is vital to Turkey so 
that Turkey can both stay in control and intervene when and if deemed necessary. My 
informants further substantiated their claims by highlighting the fact that the GKK reports 
to a Turkish commander, as opposed to a Turkish Cypriot commander, and that the 
highest-ranking official of the GKK is usually lower than the higher-ranking officers of 
the KTBK military.17  
 
This structure whereby the Turkish Cypriot military is subordinate to the Turkish military 
was established prior to 20 July 1974. Before the self-declaration of independence of the 
                                                        
17 In 2010, however, Salih Cevahir Cem became the first Turkish Cypriot General in 
Cyprus, but he soon afterwards retired.  
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TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organization (TMT) was dependent upon the 
Turkish military for training, equipment, and funds. During the fight against the Greek 
Cypriots the Turkish Cypriots welcomed the Turkish military presence. Today, however, 
the continued presence of the Turkish military on the island is contested. Some Turkish 
Cypriots support Turkey’s military presence on the island, while other Turkish Cypriots 
privately and publicly call for Turkey to leave the island. The large majority of Turkish 
Cypriots fall somewhere in the middle, with an understanding of why Turkey is on the 
island, but wish that the necessity did not exist for Turkish troops to remain. This is a 
subtly different opinion than an outright rejection of the Turkish military presence. Those 
who hold this opinion do not necessarily speak poorly about the Turkish presence on the 
island (except when questioned) nor do they attend public protests against Turkey, but 
neither do they defend Turkey’s military presence on the island.  
 
Regardless of whether or not Turkish Cypriots want Turkey’s military forces on the 
island, most agree that the GKK and the Turkish Cypriot Police Services should not be 
controlled by the KTBK but instead should be separately controlled by the TRNC. As 
stated by my Turkish Cypriot friend Erkan in a conversation about Turkish military 
presence on the island, “As you know Turkey has their own soldiers. Therefore they can 
control them. No problem about that. But GKK and the police services should be 
controlled by ourselves”. When questioned further as to why he thinks the TRNC does 
not have control over their own military and police, he lamented that “Because at the end 
of the day, North Cyprus is a base of Turkish military services and they don’t want to 
give control to someone else”.  
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His sentiment echoed a 2000 proposal by the TRNC Communal Liberation Party (CLP) 
to make the TRNC military and police force independent. CLP proposed to change 
Article 10 of the TRNC constitution. The proposed amendment sought to move the police 
from under supervision of the GKK to the TRNC Interior Ministry, which is the same as 
it is in Turkey and other parts of the world. However, Turkish General Özeyranlı publicly 
decried this proposal stating that such a change in the law would be considered an ‘act of 
treason’ thereby implying that Mustafa Akıncı, Chairman of the CLP, was a traitor 
(Jenkins 2001, 80; Kanli and Alkan 2000). Following General Özeyranlı’s comments, the 
Chairman of the CLP criticized the General’s comments as “absurd” (Kanli and Alkan 
2000). The proposed amendment was ultimately dropped. Despite this, there are still 
many who feel that the military and police force should be under the control of the TRNC 
and not under the control of the TGS.  
 
Debates surrounding the control of the police force reflect issues regarding national 
sovereignty in the TRNC. To examine this further it is first necessary to shed light on the 
concept of sovereignty. Conventionally the principles of Westphalian sovereignty act as a 
precedent for any international definition of sovereignty, although in practice they are 
frequently violated. Westphalian sovereignty considers a state or governing body to have 
the authority to govern its territory without any external interference (Krasner 2004, 88). 
According to the TRNC constitution, de jure sovereignty (or ‘legal’ sovereignty) lies 
with the Turkish Cypriot people. Article 3 of the TRNC constitution (1983) states that 
sovereignty belongs to the “…people comprising citizens of the Turkish Republic of 
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Northern Cyprus, without condition or reservation” and they shall exercise this 
sovereignty “…within the framework of the principles laid down by the Constitution, 
through its competent organs.”18 As such, the “representation of the people” lies within 
the “public powers” of the state (Balibar 2004, ix).19 The clause “without condition or 
reservation” indicates that absolute sovereignty lies solely with the power of the people. 
This claim is repeated in the preamble of the TRNC Constitution (1983), “The Turkish 
Cypriot people, with whom the absolute right to sovereignty rests”.20  Thus although 
Turkey officially recognizes the TRNC as a sovereign nation, the insistence by General 
Özeyranlı to maintain control over the TRNC military units and police forces curtails 
their sovereignty and directly contradicts the official position of Turkey that the TRNC is 
an independent state. Additionally, it should be noted that it is the Turkish military, 
which has a history of upholding and defending Kemalism that maintains control over the 
TRNC military units and police forces against the desire of Turkish Cypriots. Thus, it is 
ironically the ‘Kemalist’ military that is curtailing the sovereignty of the Turkish 
Cypriots. As such, the effectiveness of the claim by the TRNC constitution that the 
                                                        
18  The English translation of the TRNC Constitution provided online by the TRNC 
Ombudsman Office is being used here and throughout this chapter. However, I have also 
provided the Turkish translation in the footnotes. The Turkish translation of the first 
quotation reads, “Egemenlik, kayıtsız şartsız Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti 
yurttaşlarından oluşan halkındır.” (TRNC Constitution, 1983. Article 3, section 1).  The 
Turkish translation of the second quotation reads, “Halk, egemenliğini, Anayasanın 
koyduğu ilkeler çerçevesinde, yetkili organları eliyle kullanır.” (TRNC Constitution, 
1983. Article 3, section 2). 
19 There is a wide literature engaging with how this transfer of power from ‘the people’ to 
‘the state’ can and does occur. One of the most notable authors on sovereignty, Giorgio 
Agamben (1998), explores this transfer of power from ‘the people’ to ‘the state’ by 
engaging with Foucault (1976) through a philosophical exploration of the relationship 
between the physical body and the sovereign. 
20 “KIBRIS TÜRK HALKI Egemenliğin kayıtsız șartsız sahibi olarak” (TRNC 
Constitution, 1983. Preamble). 
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TRNC is a sovereign nation is called into question. This debate over the power of control 
of the police force illuminates the failure of the Westphalian definition of sovereignty in 
the TRNC and exposes the reality of multiple sovereigns.  While a de jure sovereign is 
the legal sovereign, a de facto sovereign is the authority that has the executive powers. In 
the TRNC, Turkey is the de facto sovereign.21  
 
The competing Turkish and Cypriot nationalisms construct different notions of national 
belonging, which result in different conceptualizations of the political and cultural 
relationships between the TRNC and Turkey. As Lacher and Kaymak (2005) note, prior 
to declaring statehood in 1983, “…self-determination was widely seen as something that 
would be pursued within the larger framework of Turkish Nationalism. The ‘self’ in 
question was not the political community of Turkish Cypriots, but the Turkish nation, of 
which the Turkish Cypriots were regarded to be an extension” (Lacher and Kaymak 
2005, 155). This belief was central to taksim, a popular political movement of the time, 
whereby Turkish Cypriots wished Cyprus to be divided into Greek and Turkish sides 
(See Chapter 2). As demonstrated by Bahcheli and Noel (2010), declaring statehood in 
1983 was intended to foster closer relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey and 
strengthen a sense of Turkish identity (Bahcheli and Noel 2010, 145-146). The first 
President of the TRNC, Rauf Denktaş and his political party UBP were primary 
advocates of the idea that the TRNC is an extension of Turkey (Bahcheli and Noel 2010, 
148; Navaro-Yashin 2006, 86). Denktaş frequently promoted the idea that Turkish 
                                                        
21To complicate matters, the RoC claims de jure sovereignty over the entire island, 
including the territory that makes up the TRNC. The role of Turkey as de facto sovereign 
extends beyond the context of TRNC politics, and into direct conflict with the claim by 
the RoC to be the de jure sovereign over the entire island.  
95 
 
Cypriots and Turkish mainlanders were indistinct from one another (Lacher and Kaymak 
2005, 155). This idea of being a part of the Turkish nation with loyalty to Turkey is 
reflected and dispersed throughout the preamble of the TRNC constitution:  
 
“Whereas the Turkish Cypriot people is an inseparable part of the Turkish 
Nation which has lived independent and fought for its rights and liberties 
all through its history…   
Whereas the Turkish Cypriot people has, in the face of events directed 
against its national existence and right to life, and since 1878 when it was 
broken away from its motherland…  
Whereas Turkish Cypriot people has established through the bitter 
experience it had undergone until the year 1974 when the Peace 
Operation, which was carried out by the Heroic Turkish Armed Forces by 
virtue of the Motherland’s natural, historical and legal right of 
guarantorship emanating from the Agreements…” (TRNC Constitution 
1983. Preamble). 22 
 
Bahcheli and Noel (2010) highlight that the conflict between declaring a Turkish Cypriot 
statehood while simultaneously promoting a singular Turkish nationalism was a 
contradiction that compromised both from the beginning (Bahcheli and Noel 2010, 146). 
As a result of this contradiction, the façade of TRNC sovereignty weathered poorly as an 
increasing number of Turkish Cypriots came to doubt whether the new state in fact 
reflected their political will (Lacher and Kaymak 2005, 155). This doubt also raised 
                                                        
22 “Tarihi boyunca bağımsız yaşamış, hak ve özgürlükleri için savaşım vermiş büyük 
Türk Ulusunun ayrılmaz bir parçası bulunan; // Anavatanından koparıldığı 1878 yılından 
bu yana ulusal varlığına ve yaşam hakkına yöneltilen...// Toplumsal hak ve özgürlüklere 
sahip olmadan, bireysel hak ve özgürlüklerin sözkonusu olamayacağını, Anavatanın 
doğal, tarihsel ve andlaşmalardan doğan yasal garantörlük hakkını kullanması suretiyle 
Kahraman Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin sonuçlandırdığı ve Kıbrıs Türklüğüne huzur, barış, 
güvenlik ve özgürlük ortamı içinde yaşama imkanı sağlayan Barış Harekatının yapıldığı 
1974 yılına kadar süren acı deneyimlerle saptamış bulunan...” (TRNC Constitution 1983. 
Preamble).  
96 
 
questions among citizens regarding the amount of power that the TRNC government 
actually had over the affairs of North Cyprus, which resultantly allowed for the 
development of new ways of conceiving their political community (Lacher and Kaymak 
2005, 155). The majority support originally given to pro-Turkish nationalism political 
parties, such as UBP, began to wane as political parties, such as CTP, promoting Cypriot 
nationalism grew in power and influence (Lacher Kaymak 2005, 155; Carkoglu and 
Sözen 2014; Bahcheli and Noel 2010, 146). Those political parties promoting a Cypriot 
nationalism contested Turkish control of the island and instead embraced the idea of a 
TRNC completely independent from Turkey.  
 
In questioning the sovereignty ‘guaranteed’ to them by Turkey, Turkish Cypriots also 
expressed their dissatisfaction over the lack of external recognition. They believed they 
were promised sovereignty with the declaration of statehood, however no country but 
Turkey would acknowledge this sovereignty and the Turkish acknowledgment was 
increasingly revealed to be duplicitous. Turkish Cypriots’ dissatisfaction over non-
recognition illuminates another aspect about conventional sovereignty, which is that 
international recognition is an important aspect of sovereignty. As Anthony Giddens 
(1985) argues, sovereignty is not something that a state maintains on its own, but rather 
sovereignty is only constructed and maintained through the connection and relation 
between states (Giddens 1985, 263). As such, declaring sovereignty is not enough; 
sovereignty needs to be recognized by the international community at large. As has been 
mentioned, the sovereignty of the TRNC is not internationally recognized by any state 
except Turkey. The international community considers the ROC as the de jure sovereign 
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of the TRNC and refers to the territory that makes up the TRNC as the “militarized 
occupied zone of the ROC”. They regard Turkey as the de facto occupier of the territory 
and by this set of terminology, they further emphasize that they do not recognize the 
sovereignty of the TRNC.23 
 
Thus, to reiterate, Turkish nationalism promotes Cyprus as part of the larger Turkish 
nation and Cypriot nationalism contests this notion by promoting the sole recognition of 
the de jure power of a Turkish Cypriot state. What will be demonstrated is that although 
these ‘official’ constructions of Turkish and Cypriot nationalisms promote differing 
understandings of sovereignty, Turkish Cypriots themselves are ambivalent about their 
sovereignty. Before demonstrating this, it is first necessary to consider how sovereignty 
has been conceived of and examined by scholars. The discourse about sovereignty 
discussed thus far presumes the idea that sovereignty is based on a concept of a single, 
governing sovereign. However, as Bryant (2014) demonstrates, although this might be 
how sovereignty is discussed, thinking about sovereignty as something that is ‘all or 
nothing,’ especially in the context of a de facto state, is an outdated and unproductive 
way of conceiving of sovereignty (Bryant 2014, 127). Instead, she suggests that the 
conventional concept of sovereignty needs to be re-examined and engaged with in a way 
that accounts for the complex and changing ways in which sovereignty exists (Bryant 
                                                        
23 They also use other terms to emphasize that the TRNC is not sovereign, for example 
often the TRNC President is referred to only as the Turkish Cypriot Leader, or 
‘President’ is placed in quotes (i.e., “President”) (US State Department 2013). 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the issue of TRNC recognition has played a large part 
in hindering potential peace deals between the RoC and the TRNC because during these 
meetings the TRNC wants to start negotiations from the basis that these are two 
sovereign nations making a deal, but the RoC declines to concede this point.  
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2014, 127). Other scholars share similar views and note that the ability of states to have 
absolute control within their territory and maintain their borders (or more appropriately, 
appearance thereof) has become harder to maintain and espouse with the proliferation of 
international organizations, internet communities, and NGOs (e.g., Hansen and Stepputat 
2006; Bellamy 2003, 167; Petersmann 2003). As such, effective legal sovereignty is 
always an unattainable ideal (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). Bryant (2014) illuminates that 
because sovereignty is often misconceived as ‘all or nothing,’ proposed frameworks to 
legally change the de facto status of states are hindered. As such, in this context, she 
suggests that the concept of sovereignty needs to be reconceived in the context of a 
globalized world; sovereignty needs to be thought of as ‘fragmented’ or ‘disaggregated’ 
(Bryant 2014, 140).  
Navaro-Yashin (2010; 2012) also contests the idea of sovereignty as resting in a single, 
supreme sovereign (whether that sovereign is the ‘state’ or ‘the people’). Instead, she 
argues that sovereignty is a continuing negotiation, contestation, and mediation between 
the terrain, human actors, and devices of measurement (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 44). This 
process, she argues, is the work of sovereignty in and of itself. Examining an official 
catalogue produced by the TRNC Ministry of Settlements, entitled “The Catalogue of 
Geographical Names in the T.R.N.C. Volume-III,”24 Navaro-Yashin (2012) demonstrates 
that political agency is not located solely within the Turkish state, but rather that the 
agency rests in the negotiations conducted “…between people and things in and on a 
given territory” (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 43). To demonstrate this, she illustrates the ways 
in which the TRNC administration systematically changed place names within their 
                                                        
24 Turkish: “K.K.T.C Coğrafı İsimler Katalogu (Cilt-III)” 
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territory to Turkish place names. Although the administration re-named these cities and 
towns in Turkish, the Turkish Cypriots did not fully accept these new Turkish place 
names. She provides several examples of Turkish Cypriots who did not even recognize 
the new, official place names (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 48-50). Instead, Turkish Cypriots 
would often refer to places by the old names. Navaro-Yashin (2012) uses this criticism 
and subversion by Turkish Cypriots regarding the new place names as an example of the 
way in which sovereignty in the TRNC is problematic. Her definition negates the idea of 
a top-down approach to sovereignty and instead demonstrates that sovereignty is 
something continuously negotiated. Using this understanding of sovereignty Navaro-
Yashin (2012) argues that sovereignty in the TRNC is both partial and problematic.  
 
Extending from this idea of a problematic sovereignty, I will argue below that although 
politically particular understandings of sovereignty are promoted (i.e., Turkish 
nationalism fosters the idea that the TRNC is an extension of Turkey and Cypriot 
nationalism fosters the idea that Cyprus is separate and distinct from Turkey), Turkish 
Cypriots construct more ambivalent understandings of sovereignty. Through an 
examination of the military culture and official military parades, I will demonstrate how 
this ambivalence about their sovereignty is constructed.   
 
3.3.2 Barbeque and Bullets 
The number of military sites in North Cyprus might be equaled only by the number of 
picnic sites one can find along the sides of the road. An afternoon outing to one of these 
sites with my Turkish Cypriot acquaintances was illuminating with regard to the 
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relationship that the people on the northern part of this island have with Turkey’s military 
presence on Cyprus. Driving by car from Lefkoșa, Ali, Nefise, Erol, and I met up with 
many of our other Turkish Cypriot friends at Çınar Restaurant, located in Girne 
(Kyrenia). The word Çınar refers to the large trees that were in the area, whose long 
branches provide shade from the sun over the picnic tables. We were having our first 
official ‘mangal’ (barbeque) of the season. We brought meat to grill and vegetables to 
cut. We also brought rakı, a traditional Turkish liquor that tastes like licorice and is most 
commonly diluted with water and ice and served with food.  
 
When we arrived at the picnic site, we sat down at a large table that was surrounded by 
plastic chairs. The tablecloth that was provided by the site had “Çınar hotel and casino” 
written on it and was embellished with the large green leaf found on Çınar trees. I 
questioned my friends what this meant because there was neither a casino nor a hotel in 
sight, just what appeared to be a barbeque site. They informed me that originally it was 
meant to be a hotel and casino for tourists. The prospective developers of the site bought 
the tablecloths believing they could get official permission for the hotel and casino. 
Unfortunately for them, they were denied permission, so they turned it into what is today, 
a canteen (gazino25).  At the time, I did not know what a ‘gazino’ was, so I asked. By way 
of explanation, they provided a military example saying, “In military we use these spaces 
                                                        
25 There are two official definitions for ‘gazino’: 1.) A place where you can eat, watch 
shows, listen to music, and sometimes a place where plays are performed. 2.) A large 
kahvehane (Turkish coffee place) or birahane (beer place, like a pub). There is also 
another definition where ‘gazino’ means ‘casino’. However, usually in Turkey as well as 
in North Cyprus they use the English word ‘casino’ or the Turkish word ‘Kumarhane’ for 
‘casino’; not ‘gazino’. As stated above ‘gazino’ also means ‘a large kahvehane’. At 
kahvehane’s men are known in Turkey to play cards and secretly gamble, thus alluding to 
the definition of a ‘gambling place’ or ‘casino’.  
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to eat food”. Pointing to the stone pavement and small rotundas, Erol commented, 
“Actually, this place looks a lot like a military canteen”. Through this comment, Erol had 
revealed the effect his compulsory military service had on his interpretation of the 
environment.   
 
It is very popular during the summer months for Turkish Cypriots to have mangal 
(English: barbeque). A proper Turkish Cypriot mangal involves a lot of food. The men 
typically barbeque the meat, while the women cut vegetables to make salads and set up 
the table with condiments and other side dishes. As I was helping to prepare salads, 
Nefise rolled her eyes at the conversation the men were having. “These men are always 
complaining about the military,” she tells me. The other women chuckle in agreement. 
Alev comments, “It’s very true!” The women proceed to laugh and comment that the men 
do not have to do anything hard in the military; they just lay around in the sun. In 
defense, the men say, “No, no, no, that’s not true. Don’t listen to them, Katie”. The tone 
of their laughter had a quality in it that suggested that it was probably not as difficult as 
they were making it out to be. Altinay (2004) demonstrates how the military service in 
Turkey provides for a development of a military culture, by which those who have served 
can participate in shared stories, complaints about the conditions, and a “common sense 
of sacrifice”. In the TRNC, the men also complain frequently about their time in the 
military. They enjoy complaining about the service with their male friends and discuss 
the hardships they faced in their military life that was dictated by strict rules and curfews 
and required that they surrender their freedom for a time. 
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All TRNC male citizens are required by law to serve in the GKK for a specified number 
of months, with most men serving the standard 12 months. In the context of the Turkish 
military, Altinay (2004) highlights the importance of military service in the social lives of 
men in Turkey. More specifically, Altinay (2004) illustrates that completing military 
service is an important part of the process of becoming a man and as such is socially 
viewed as an important pre-requisite to marriage and employment. Additionally, Altinay 
(2004) shows how military service introduces those participating in military service to 
different areas of Turkey. In North Cyprus, the location in which soldiers are stationed is 
less significant because North Cyprus is so small that most Turkish Cypriots have seen 
the major cities and villages. Even if they have not, Turkish Cypriot culture does not vary 
significantly from place to place as it does in Turkey. However, military service provides 
a way for those conscripted to make connections with people from other villages and 
cities. Travelling to these provincial locations, and the connections there made, help to 
foster the creation of a national community (Anderson 1983). A few of the men I knew in 
the TRNC met each other through their military service. These introductions can benefit 
them not only in friendship, but also in business. For example, Ali and Mahmut, two of 
the men at this barbeque, became friends during their military service. Now Mahmut, a 
civil servant with many contacts, uses car insurance purchased from Ali’s insurance 
company located in a different city and recommends him to all he meets that need 
insurance. This connection may not have happened otherwise as both men come from 
different places in North Cyprus. Through the acts of meeting new people and bonding 
through common experiences and shared stories from across Cyprus, military service 
provides one way in which the military is viewed by Turkish Cypriots as contributing to 
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the integration of their culture. Yet although a community is being constructed through 
military service in the TRNC, participating in the military does not foster a sense of 
sovereignty  
 
The military culture of the TRNC perpetuated by military service (e.g., service to 
country, complaining, manhood, bonding) is similar to the military culture of Turkey in 
many ways. However, one distinction needs to be noted: the perception and knowledge of 
the GKK. In Turkey, many Turkish citizens do not know that the Turkish Cypriots have 
their own military; some do not even know that the Turkish Cypriots perform military 
service at all. For those Turkish citizens who do know that Turkish Cypriots perform 
military service, very few of those know about the GKK and assume they serve in the 
Turkish Army. Turkish Cypriots know that the GKK is a separate military entity and 
generally disapprove of being subordinate to the Turkish military. My Turkish Cypriot 
contact Erkan spoke of his disapproval of the Turkish Army by making the implication 
that the Turkish soldiers are stationed on his island with their own intentions, “Turkish 
soldiers fight for Turkey”. When I asked him if he felt that he did not properly represent 
his country since Turkey was in charge of his military and not defending what he 
believed to be his country’s rights he responded, “Nope, I always served to my country”. 
When asked who they serve, Turkish Cypriots distinguish their service from the KTBK 
and state that they are a part of the GKK. Although the Turkish military manages the 
GKK, these soldiers are pledging themselves to the TRNC. 
 
104 
 
Under the authoritative discourse, the KTBK are the protectors of Turkish Cypriots as 
well as the protectors of Turkey and Turkey’s possessions, in this case the northern part 
of Cyprus which they occupy. From this multifaceted role arise internal contestations 
regarding the role of the military in the TRNC. Those who identify themselves only with 
the GKK as the domestic defense force are aware that it is not possible to have a GKK 
fully independent because of its reliance on Turkey for funding and the TRNC’s lack of 
international status. This belief reflects the idea that they have always been subject to 
foreign domination and rule from afar and do not have the wherewithal to take their 
political situation in their own hands. Although they believe this, as noted above, they 
still desire an independent GKK and police force. Fewer in number, but worthy of 
mention, are those Turkish Cypriots who are proud to be part of the KTBK, arguing that 
they are part of the oldest military organization in the world. This buys into the 
authoritative discourse that the TRNC is an extension of Turkey.  
 
This awareness of distinctions between GKK and KTBK provides insight into important 
issues about sovereignty and the role of the military. As mentioned previously, Navaro-
Yashin shows how sovereignty is constructed by a network of people engaged with, on, 
and through materialities (Navaro-Yashin 2012, 43). In this way, this military command 
structure highlights her argument that sovereignty is constructed through a relationship 
between materiality and human agency, as there are rules in place that construct this 
command structure. Yet, while there are materialities involved, the military is also a 
practice. Focusing solely on the engagements with materiality ignores a broader 
encompassing of the intangibles used in the practice of the military, such as the meeting 
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of new Cypriots with whom they share service or the ‘feeling’ of separation of GKK. 
Thus, while the distinction between GKK and KTBK can be examined to highlight 
Navaro-Yashin’s (2012) argument, it can also be examined to extend her argument. 
These everyday interactions help to shape their construction of sovereignty, or in this 
case, an absence of sovereignty. 
 
3.3.3 Kismet 
During a discussion with Erkan about the Turkish military, I questioned him about his 
opinion regarding Turkish military bases on the island. My curiosity about the subject 
was piqued because the owner of the bar below my apartment was vehemently against the 
military bases. Erkan responded to my question by explaining to me, “If you look at the 
history of Cyprus, it is filled with wars and different ownerships every hundred years. 
Ottomans, Venedics [Venetians], Lusignans [Franks], British, and others. It is our 
destiny, whether we want it or not. We are always a military base.” His comment is 
historically true. The island has been ruled by expanding empires over the millennia. The 
island’s successive rulers include the Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, 
Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, Ottoman Turks, and most 
recently Britain from which Cypriots later gained their independence in 1960. Today, as 
previously discussed, Turkey now has de facto control of the northern part of the island. 
In addition to the successive rulers of the island, the island is now home to not only 
Turkish military bases, but also British and Greek bases. Erkan’s comment is revealing in 
other ways as well. The presence of military bases is not something that is just physically 
experienced in the landscape, as is described above, but the presence of military bases is 
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also deeply entangled with the imagined community of Cyprus. He said it was fate, or in 
Turkish, Kismet.  
 
Kismet is a noun used in both Turkey and North Cyprus that means fate. In using this 
word, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people express belief in a concept that every event in 
people’s lives is pre-determined. This principle comes from the Islamic belief in the will 
of God. Like the English phrase “It is fate,” it can be used for both positive and negative 
situations. It signifies that circumstances are believed to be beyond one’s own control. 
Erkan’s statement that it is Cyprus’s fate to always be ruled is a sentiment and belief 
structure shared by many Turkish Cypriots living in the TRNC. Holding this belief in 
Kismet eases their frustration in the slow pace of finding a solution to the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’ and the subsequent dependence on Turkey.  
 
Additionally, it is important to note that Erkan uses the plural pronoun “we”. In using 
“we” he is referring to the Cypriot people as a whole. He clarified this point later by 
stating, “Cypriots are unlucky because we were all born in a big warship in the middle of 
the Mediterranean. Not only Turkish Cypriots, but Greek Cypriots as well”. By 
concluding this, he is aligning the plight of his people with the Greek Cypriot people; 
together as Cypriots it is their fate that outsiders will always rule over them. The Turkish 
Cypriot public shares this belief that it is the fate of the island to always be ruled by non-
Cypriots, often citing the strategic location of their island in the middle of the 
Mediterranean. This belief is significant because as seen in the previous section, Erkan 
differentiated himself as distinct from Greek Cypriots through his military service. In the 
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context of military service, he was serving to protect his country against domestic and 
foreign enemies, including Greek Cypriots. He and his people were serving to protect a 
future in which he would remain separate from the Greek Cypriots. Yet, in his comment 
about the fate of Cypriot people, it seems as though he does not want that fate. In this 
way Turkish Cypriots see themselves as united with the Greek Cypriots in that others will 
always rule them. Kismet, determined by the hand of God, is something that cannot be 
manipulated and as such one has to learn to live with the fate one is assigned.  
 
The military culture in North Cyprus in one respect embodies a subjectivity of 
domination. Those serving in the GKK are subordinate to a foreign military power and 
the places they serve on the island are bases that were created as a result of a military 
invasion of their island. This returns us to notions of Atatürk’s military whereby 
territorial expansion and integrity was central. Turkish soldiers are sent off around the 
country to protect citizens from external and internal threats (such as the PKK). As 
Turkish Cypriots see it, Cyprus is occupied by the military of a foreign nation that is 
becoming more alien as AKP’s reconceptualization of its purpose goes forward. Turkey 
promised to protect Turkish Cypriots from ‘foreign’ forces such as the RoC, but now they 
themselves are viewed as the foreign ‘other’. So what does this mean for the Turkish 
Cypriots’ construction of the sovereign when the military designated to protect their 
values of the nation, no longer represent their nation? Although the authoritative 
discourse, as exemplified in the President Eroğlu’s speech at the 20 July parade, is that 
the TRNC is a “sovereign” nation, examining the understanding of the Turkish military 
from ‘below’ illustrates that Turkish Cypriots contest that notion of sovereignty. Turkish 
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Cypriots not only believe that a foreign country rules them, but it is their fate that they 
will always be ruled by a foreign power.  
 
3.4. July 20 Celebrations 
3.4.1 Celebrating Militarism 
The 20 July 2014 military parade followed shortly after the wreath laying ceremony 
(Section 3.2). The military parade officially began with President Eroğlu and President 
Gül, accompanied by the GKK Major-General (Turkish: Tumgeneral), Baki Kavun, 
driving down the Dr. Fazıl Küçük Boulevard in a military jeep. Starting off the military 
parade with those men was symbolic of their leadership of the military and the country. 
The composition of the soldiers participating in the parade included the veterans of the 
Turkish Resistance Organization (Turkish: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, TMT), veterans 
and current members of the KTBK (which is comprised of Turkish citizens), and the 
veterans and current members of the GKK (which is comprised of Turkish Cypriot 
citizens). Within their designated brigades, they advanced on foot, in tanks or other 
armed military vehicles, in jeeps, and on motorcycles or descended by parachute. Group-
by-group, they all came forward accompanied either by Turkish pop music played over 
the loudspeakers or by their own marching chants such as the ‘Turkish Cypriot Fighter’s 
Anthem’ (Turkish: ‘Kıbrıs Türk Mücahitler Marşı’). The large number of foot soldiers 
carrying weapons and soldiers riding in armed military vehicles displayed the military 
might of the TRNC. Under command of the GKK, the TRNC police force also put on an 
impressive show of skill by performing acrobatic stunts on moving motorcycles. As the 
seemingly never-ending line of soldiers advanced down Dr. Fazıl Küçük Boulevard, the 
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military parade portrayed a grand display of military uniformity and might through sheer 
numbers. 20 July marks the day the Turkish Cypriots were saved from suffering at the 
hands of the Greek Cypriots, but the date also represents the start of a set of motions that 
led to the establishment of the TRNC. As such, the military parade encapsulates the 
notion of the inseparability of the military from the independence and sovereignty of the 
TRNC. Because the TRNC is not legally recognized by the international community, the 
parade is not only an attempt by the state to produce and display their sovereignty to the 
citizens of the TRNC, but it is also an attempt to display their strength and legitimacy 
externally.  
 
3.4.2 Flag Ceremony 
After President Eroğlu, President Gül, and Major-General Kavun finished parading down 
the street, the flag ceremony commenced. The flag ceremony during the 20 July parade 
on Dr. Fazıl Küçük Boulevard is a very important event according to the official 
discourse, as exemplified by its listing within the official gazettes. After the arrival of 
President Gül and President Eroğlu, a young boy and a young girl in red sport shorts, 
white shirts and white tennis shoes run down the street bearing flags. The girl holds a 
folded Turkish flag and the boy holds a folded Turkish Cypriot flag. Behind the girl is a 
large Turkish flag held by four children in identical outfits. Behind the boy is an equally 
large Turkish-Cypriot flag, held by four children, again in identical outfits.  The children 
are wearing red and white to symbolize the colors of both Turkey and the TRNC. As they 
are running, a woman’s voice cascades from the loudspeakers to the ears of the 
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participants and the audience. She states, “Blood turns out to be (becomes) the flag,”26 
then speaking directly to the flag she continues, “…you are carried from generation to 
generation by your sons.”27 The crowd gives applause. As choreographed, when her 
words end the children stop running and find themselves in the middle of the stadium 
stands, positioned directly in front of Turkish President Abdullah Gül and TRNC 
President Derviș Eroğlu. The children holding the unfolded flags tilt the flags downward 
to face the presidents. The children symbolize the future and represent the generation 
carrying the flags, performing the narrative that the future is better thanks to the 20 July 
“Peace Operation”.    
 
Preparing the audience, a man’s voice over the loudspeaker announces the performance 
that is about to happen. He says, “The flags from Yavuz 28  Troop Landing Beach 
(Turkish: Yavuz Çıkarma Plajı) carried by our athletes will be given to the President of 
the Republic of Turkey, Abdullah Gül and the President of North Cyprus, Derviș 
Eroğlu”29. The girl and the boy holding the folded flags then walk in tandem to scattered 
applause up to the stand holding the seated military and government officials. President 
Eroğlu and President Gül stand to greet them. The girl holding the flag of Turkey stands 
in front of President Gül, and the boy holding the flag of the TRNC stands in front of 
President Eroğlu. Major (Turkish: Binbaşı) Hasan Efendi, adjutant to the TRNC 
                                                        
26 “Kan bayraklaşır,…” 
27 “…seni nesilden nesile oğulların taşır,”  
28  The forename, Yavuz, references Turkish First Lieutenant Yavuz Sokullu. His name is 
being commemorated as the first martyr of the 1974 “Peace Operation”.  
29 “Yavuz Çıkarma Plajı'ndan atletlerimiz tarafından getirilen bayraklarımızın Türkiye 
Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Abdullah Gül ve Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı 
Sayın Doktor Derviş Eroğlu'na verilmesi.” 
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President, comes to stand directly behind President Eroğlu to witness the ceremony. 
Major Efendi’s presence is both symbolic of the relation between the military and the 
TRNC and ceremonial in that he will receive the flag from President Eroğlu after it has 
been handed to him. It is worth noting that the adjutant to the Turkish president is a 
higher-ranking Colonel, rather than a Major as adjutant to the President of the TRNC. 
The girl then states that the flag she is giving is from Troop Landing Beach and she feels 
honored in giving him the flag, which is the symbol of independence, on the peace and 
independence holiday of TRNC. The girl then kisses the flag, presses it to her forehead, 
and hands it to the President Gül. The audience applauds. As she is handing the flag to 
President Gül, the boy too kisses the flag of North Cyprus, presses it to his head, and 
hands it to President Eroğlu. The kissing of the flag and placing it to one’s forehead is a 
sign of respect for the flag; it is the same action used to greet elderly people by kissing 
their hand and holding it to one’s forehead. President Gül then shakes the girl’s hand and 
greets her with two cheek kisses, a common way to greet people in Turkey and North 
Cyprus. The ceremony is done.  
 
The choreography of this flag ceremony is symbolic and representative of both the 
different relations between Turkey and the TRNC. The quotation spoken over the 
loudspeaker during this performance reinforces the nationalist discourse that the blood 
and nation are one. This is reminiscent of the phrase emblazoned on the Martyrs 
monument where another military ceremony commemorating 20 July was held earlier. 30 
                                                        
30 “What makes a flag flag, is the blood on it. Soil becomes homeland once blood is shed 
for it” (Turkish: “Bayraklari Bayrak Yapan Üstündeki Kandir Toprak, Eger Uğrunda 
Ölen Varsa Vatandir”) 
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Both of these phrases tie together blood and the nation. The Turkish flag is symbolic for 
the nation of Turkey and the red of the flag symbolizes the blood shed for that country 
(Bryant 2002, 516). Additionally, as the quotation suggests, the flags are physically being 
carried by the future generations. Through the blood ties they are suggesting a “natural” 
kinship between Turkey and North Cyprus. Under the AKP’s new ideological shift in the 
notion of ‘homeland’, the ceremony reframes what that kinship means.  Under Kemalist 
ideology, the TRNC was seen as baby country and Turkey was seen as the motherland. In 
this relationship, North Cyprus was seen as a baby country that required nurturance, a 
role provided by Turkey because it had “saved” its children of Turkish descent from 
ethnic cleansing and is now providing them money and sustenance to survive. During the 
foundation of the TRNC this relationship was more or less welcomed, with many Turkish 
Cypriots extending a welcoming hand to those from the mother country. Although 
superficially recognizing the independence of North Cyprus, Turkey’s actions (e.g., 
government speeches, foreign policy, military bases on the island) have always revealed 
that it views the relationship between the TRNC and Turkey as one where the TRNC is 
an extension of Turkey.  
 
Since AKP came to power in Turkey in late 2002, many scholars and journalists have 
analyzed the new policies introduced by AKP as an attempt to make real AKP’s desire 
for a “New Turkey”. While this “New Turkey” has yet to be described with any great 
specificity, it is clear through the policies promoted, proposed, and enacted to date that 
this “New Turkey” is inspired by its Ottoman past and seeks to discard its Kemalist roots 
which have more or less dominated Turkey’s governing system since they were planted 
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in the 1930s. Saraçoğlu and Demirkol show that while Kemalist nationalism perceived 
Turkish territories as a ‘homeland’ that had to be protected from foreign and domestic 
‘enemies,’ AKP’s nationalism promotes Turkey as the successor to the Ottoman 
Empire—as a cultural and political epicenter from which it can influence the surrounding 
regions (Saraçoğlu and Demirkol 2014, 12; Taşpınar 2012, 130). 31 This new vision of the 
‘homeland’ changes the way in which Turkey perceives its relationship with territories 
under its authority. Under AKP’s new re-conceptualization of Turkey as an epicenter, in 
the minds of many Turkish Cypriots the veil of superficially recognizing the TRNC’s 
independence is slowly being lifted, with a greater number of them feeling resentful 
towards this ‘anavatan’ and ‘yavruvatan’ relationship.  
 
Often Turkish Cypriots and local publications will comment negatively on this 
relationship. For example, on a front-page article discussing the water pipes that were 
being laid by Turkey to Cyprus, the newspaper had an image of North Cyprus connected 
to Turkey by an umbilical cord (See Figure 1). This visually comments on the mother-
child relationship and simultaneously references the physical connection between Turkey 
and North Cyprus via the submerged pipelines being laid to bring water from Turkey to 
North Cyprus. The headlines, however, read “BAĞLA ANAM,” meaning, “Tie it [the 
umbilical cord], Mother”. This image provides two commentaries. The first is that 
                                                        
31 This rhetoric was materialized visually on the symbolic date of 29 October 2014, the 
anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, when President Tayyip Erdoğan formally 
inaugurated the new presidential palace, known as ‘Ak Saray’ (English: The White 
Palace). This Palace is larger than the Palace of Versailles with more than 1,000 rooms, 
to include a grand meeting room often likened to the meeting room in the Ottoman 
Palace, Topkapı, in Istanbul. It is here that President Erdoğan greeted foreign officials 
with an army of men dressed in ceremonial Ottoman warrior costumes.  
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Turkish Cypriots literally do not want the pipeline because it makes them even more 
dependent on Turkey, although many Turkish Cypriots are grateful for the much-needed 
water. The second commentary is that they want to stop being “yavruvatan”; they no 
longer want to depend on Turkey for sustenance. This latter commentary is further 
emphasized by the imagery of both countries as alike in size, suggesting that Turkey and 
North Cyprus should be considered as equals, not as mother and child.  
 
Figure 1: Front Page Afrika Newspaper (18 October 2013). 
 
Returning to the ceremony, the flags the children hold in the ceremony are symbolic of 
the flag placed on “Troop Landing Beach”— the beach where thousands of Turkish 
soldiers (i.e. heroes) first landed on the island for the 20 July 1974 invasion. Due to the 
symbolic importance of this beach it was chosen as the location for the Dawn Vigil 
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[Turkish: Şafak Nöbeti] to commemorate the events of 20 July. In this way, they are 
remembering the blood that was shed on that day under the Turkish flag and the ties that 
Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people have. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags are 
utilized to celebrate the 20 July ceremony because it was the beach landing by the 
Turkish Army on that day that allowed the independence of the Turkish Cypriots from 
the Republic of Cyprus. This narrative is repeated throughout the ceremony in different 
speeches, for example, when President Eroğlu stated, “Today, how happy it is that we 
live in a free country under our own flag with the protection of the Turkish military…”32 
As it follows, according to the narrative that is performed in this ceremony put on by the 
Turkish and TRNC governments, the people of both Turkey and the TRNC are all 
Turkish and unified under these flags.  
 
The display of the TRNC flag and the Turkish flag side by side on government buildings 
and national monuments is encountered frequently in everyday life. The flags are even 
inscribed into the Beşparmak Mountain, whereby at night the etching lights up to show 
first the Turkish flag and then the TRNC flag. The flag is a clear symbol of sovereignty, 
promoting the notion that there are two separate countries. However, the presence of two 
flags also acts as a reminder for Turkish Cypriots to question the political sovereignty of 
the TRNC. Reflecting these feelings of disenchantment with their government and legal 
system, in addition to their current international and political standing, are the words they 
use to describe their country such as “Korsan” (English: “pirate country”) and “Muz 
                                                        
32 “Ne mutlu ki bugün kendi bayrağimiz altinda türk askerinin güvencesinde özgür bir 
ülkede yaşiyoruz” 
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Cumhuriyeti” (English: “The Republic of Banana”). These names do not represent North 
Cyprus as a sovereign nation, but instead refer to an illegal entity, a Republic of nothing.  
 
A 2014 court hearing further reflects this questioning of political sovereignty by Turkish 
Cypriots. In 2013, Koray and Cinel Basdogrultmaci were charged with “offences against 
public order and improper behavior” because they had hung 3 Republic of Cyprus flags 
outside of their store in Famagusta (LGC News, 23 June 2013). They had hung these 
flags both in support of the Gezi protestors and as a statement of protest against Recep 
Taayip Erdoğan and his administration. In addition, the couple claimed that they were 
protesting the TRNC’s exclusion from the Mediterranean Games.33 In conjunction to 
hanging these flags, Cinel Basdogrultmaci made the statement, “I do not recognize the 
fake flag of a fake country, these are my flags” (LGC News, 23 June 2013). During the 
court hearing they were asked to apologize for flying these flags. Not only did the couple 
refuse to apologize, they also stated that if they were to be fined they would prefer to go 
to jail rather than pay. Many Turkish Cypriots openly supported their stance, including 
the General Secretary of the Teacher’s Union (KTOS), Sener Elcil, who made a public 
statement to show his support. In his statement Elcil denounced Turkey’s governance of 
North Cyprus, and further, stated that hanging the Republic of Cyprus flag is not a crime 
and called for Turkey to leave the island:  
“…It is clear that the ones who claim they saved us are actually after our 
soil. Like it was not enough that Turkish Cypriots became the minority in 
                                                        
33  The Mediterranean Games is a sporting event that only includes the countries 
surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. The Games that year were held in Mersin, Turkey. 
Although the RoC attended the games, the TRNC was not allowed to compete because it 
is not considered an official country. Because the games were held in Mersin, Turkey 
their exclusion resulted in considerable criticism from the peoples of North Cyprus. 
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their own country and are impoverished and forced to migration with 
migration laws, now are tried at the courts for hanging the Cyprus 
Republic flag. This is clearly an occupation policy. It is also evident that 
while they claim to be pro-solution, in reality they can’t even stand 
Turkish Cypriots’ rights in Cyprus Republic. We urge the ones who 
pulled us off from Cyprus Republic, doomed us to live in this “cowshed” 
system, deceived the community with embargo lies and judge us by their 
cheap nationalistic propaganda to immediately return their Cyprus 
Republic passports and IDs. Holding and hanging the Cyprus Republic 
flag is not a crime. The related trial against Koray and Cinel 
Basdogrultmaci is completely political and Turkish authorities are the 
ones who are responsible….” (LGC News, 7 May 2014). 
 
The hanging of three Republic of Cyprus flags in Famagusta and Ecil’s statement of 
support are actions that deviate from a national narrative in which Turkey ‘saved’ the 
island and instead demonstrate their belief that the military occupation ensured that they 
were deprived of their sovereignty. Likewise, these actions are also indicative of wanting 
a future in which Turkey will not play a governing role. The Turkish Cypriot couple is 
promoting their identity as Cypriot through the nationalistic symbol of the Republic of 
Cyprus flag. While this court hearing is an extreme example, as most Turkish Cypriots do 
not desire to fly the RoC flag, it is representative of Turkish Cypriot contestation over the 
Turkish influence over the island. In flying the RoC flag instead of the TRNC flag, the 
couple used a nationalistic and politically charged symbol to emphasize their defiance. 
Simultaneously, they are using the RoC flag to show support for the Gezi supporters who 
are Turkish citizens; however, these Turkish citizens too are protesting against the AKP 
government and are seeking to protect Kemalist values with which most Turkish-
Cypriots identify with. Through this example, it is clear that Turkish Cypriots are not 
only constructing a ‘Cypriot’ identity, but a ‘Cypriot’ identity heavily influenced by 
Kemalist Turkish values.  
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3.4.3 Performing “Turkishness” 
Following the Flag Ceremony, the 20 July parade exhibited performances of Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot cultural heritage. The men and women of the Turkish Cypriot Dance 
Troupe, dressed in traditional Turkish Cypriot dancing attire, performed a few traditional 
Turkish Cypriot group dances. The women wear a white embroidered scarf covering their 
hair. They wear knee length white dresses that are covered by a red üçetek, a beautifully 
embroidered long dress. Over the red üçetek is a shiny belt. The men wear a white shirt 
that is covered by a vest jacket, blue knee length trousers, and a wide red cloth belt. 
Turkish Cypriot folk dance choreography ranges from dances that are inspired from 
Cyprus island music and dance styles to those that are influenced by Turkish mainland 
music and dance varieties. Folk dancing is celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as an authentic 
cultural art form that survives from an ancient Cypriot past, however, as researched by 
Papadakis and Hatay (2015) and Demeteriou (2015) Turkish Cypriot folk dancing has 
been shaped and constructed to present a particular nationalistic ideal.  
 
The nationalistic ideal promoted through the crafting of Turkish Cypriot folk dancing has 
shifted back and forth between a Turkish national identity and a Cypriot national identity. 
Papadakis and Hatay (2015 and Demetriou (2015) reveal that folk dances taught and 
performed in Turkish Cypriot communities before 1960 (the independence of Cyprus) 
were dances imported from Turkey. The folk dances coming from Turkey were 
themselves being carefully choreographed as part of Atatürk’s modernization of Turkey. 
Inspired by Gökalp’s writings on the relationship between folk and the Turkish nation, 
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the newly established CHP-led government set about cataloguing and preserving Turkish 
songs and dances from rural parts of Turkey which were seen as pure and unadulterated 
expressions of Turkishness (Öztürkmen 1992, 182; van Dobben 2008, 92). It was not 
until 1973 that Turkish Cypriots started to research and shape a Turkish Cypriot folk 
dancing (Papadakis and Hatay 2015, 25). However, after the 1974 Turkish ‘Peace 
Operation’ Turkish cultural influence loomed large in the shaping and defining of 
Turkish Cypriot folk dancing. The inclusion of folk dancing in the July 20 national 
parade is an active performance of Turkishness in order to foster a sense of social 
cohesion amongst the Turkish Cypriots.  
 
Prominent in the parade was a musical performance by the Ottoman Janissary Band. The 
Ottoman Janissary Band is heralded as the world’s oldest military band. During the 
Ottoman Empire, they played on the battlefield to encourage soldiers until combat was 
over. Today, the Ottoman Janissary band is still under the charge of the Turkish Army 
and performs at the Military Museum in Istanbul and at special ceremonies. Atürk (2007) 
demonstrates that although it may seem that the Ottoman Janissary Band performs grand 
songs from the past Ottoman Empire, a large part of the repertoire was actually 
reconstructed during the Republican period. These songs were also practiced and learned 
in Cyprus during the 1920s in musical societies such as Darül-Elhan (Adanır 2015, 97).  
Atürk (2007) further demonstrates that a large number of songs were also written in the 
1950s and 1960s. Recovered from their midnight performance at the Dawn Vigil, the 
Ottoman Janissary Band performed a set of marching songs dressed in traditional 
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Ottoman regalia. One song they played and sang was “Estergon Castle” 34  (Turkish: 
Estergon Kalesi), about the heroic, but ultimately failed attempt at protecting the Ottoman 
castle located in present day Hungary from invaders. The castle in the song is personified 
as a beautiful woman that the Ottomans do not want to lose. Using the metaphor of this 
beautiful woman, they retell the loss of Estergon to the enemy. The enemy gains the 
castle and plants their flag atop it. Like folk dancing, the music performed by this band in 
the parade is used as an agent of nation-building. While the Ottoman Janissary Band has 
played in previous 20 July celebrations in North Cyprus, AKP’s new nationalism 
promoting Turkey as the successor to the Ottoman Empire sets their performance at the 
20 July 2014 event in a different context that seeks to enforce that Turkish nationalism 
upon the TRNC. Turkishness is not just a discourse, but is embodied in spectacle.  
 
3.4.4 Audience  
These various performances of strength, skill, and tradition overwhelmed one’s visual 
and auditory senses. The audience was made up primarily of government workers and 
both Turkish and Turkish Cypriot families who brought their children to the ceremony. 
As with most summer days on the island, the day was incredibly hot. Thus, most of the 
people were crowded within the stadium seating area, which provided shade and some 
comfort. Those that could not sit in the shade stood along the side of the street. Many 
people were queuing for water or soda from the vendor stationed just a few feet away 
from the seating. Though there was some applause during some of the parade events, the 
                                                        
34 The Estergon Castle is known in Turkish folklore for being a place of heroic defence.  
The mayor of Kecioren, an area of Ankara that is known for being very nationalistic, 
made an exact replica of Estergon Castle. 
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degree of enthusiasm did not match the drama staged to stir the crowd. There was a 
larger, more diverse, and more enthusiastic group taking part in April’s celebration of the 
Turkish football team Fenerbahçe’s win of the Turkish League Championship. That day 
in April, men, women, and children of all ages marched down Dereboyu Street waving 
Fenerbahçe flags, chanting songs, clapping, and cheering. It was a stark contrast to the 
polite applauses and absentminded interest found in the parade.  
 
The parade was also broadcast live on TV. Thus, even though there were not many 
people physically in attendance at the parade, it does not mean that they were not many 
watching it from the comfort of their homes. However, out of those questioned, only a 
small fraction were watching the parade on TV. When questioned further as to if they 
were actively watching the parade, only one had a nationally framed response, which was 
that he was watching the parade because it was their national holiday. The others who 
were watching it at home cited that they found the parades “interesting” or “entertaining”. 
When questioned as to why most Cypriots do not attend the parade in person, one 
Turkish Cypriot (27 year old male) commented, “We are Cypriot. We like to eat and 
drink. Not sit under sun for nothing”. Responses like this were the most common, with 
many preferring to enjoy their day off drinking and having a barbeque (mangal).  
 
Some Turkish Cypriots expressed anger towards the parade. A Turkish Cypriot (female, 
mid-20s) referencing the 20 July military parade stated that she did not like “these kinds 
of power shows” which for her meant that Turkey was saying, ‘I am here and this land is 
ours’. It is interesting to note that she also commented that it is primarily Turkish 
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immigrants, not the Turkish Cypriots, who attend the 20 July parade. However, during 
the 20 July 2014 parade the majority of people I encountered were Turkish Cypriot 
viewers who were taking their children out for the day. Her understanding and 
misconception about the number of Turkish immigrants on the island and their “negative” 
influence in the changing culture of Cyprus harkens to a study by Hatay (2005). He 
examined the Turkish Cypriots’ misconceptions of the influence of Turkish voters on 
politics in North Cyprus and discovered that they were not changing the voting patterns 
in the ways that Turkish Cypriots claimed they did. In the context of the 20 July Parade, 
although the Turkish Cypriot female that I spoke to assumed that the 20 July Parade was 
put on primarily for Turkish immigrants, the numbers of Turkish immigrants and Turkish 
Cypriots present belied her viewpoint.  
 
The Communist Labor Movement (Komünist Emek Hareketi) in North Cyprus actively 
protested against the 20 July holiday by chanting, “Long Live Independent Cyprus” 
outside of the Turkish Embassy. The next day, I read in the newspaper that they protested 
against what they saw as Turkey’s 40-year imperial occupation of the island. Although it 
was a very small group of people protesting, it is notable that while all other newspapers 
posted images on the front page of the 21 July edition, the Communist Labor 
Movement’s protest was the lead story in the Afrika newspaper edition (Alptürk 2014, 
1d). Afrika is known across the island for their anti-Turkey stance but it is significant to 
note that this view towards the parade is not confined to that newspaper. The newspaper’s 
infamous editor, Sener Levent, wrote a long article in which he remarked that 20 July is 
the most tragic and bloody day of the country’s history and commented that it was a 
123 
 
shame that no one was calling for the removal of the holiday, which he believes needs to 
be done to see peace on the island (Levent 2014, 2b).  
 
While there were few people actively protesting on the streets, the sentiment of the 
protestors was echoed by many privately on the island. There are many who silently 
agree with the protestors as they spend the 20 July holiday barbequing with their friends. 
This is not to imply that all those barbequing are actively performing a silent protest, but 
rather, that many of those agree with the sentiments of the protestors even though they 
are not directly involved in the activity of demonstration. Many Turkish Cypriots want to 
be free to have their own democratic society, which for them means to be separate from 
Turkey. One such person is known around North Cyprus for his opinionated stances on 
issues in Cyprus. He has a large following on Facebook and his own online political 
satire newspaper, The Mandira Times. When discussing the 20 July holiday with him, he 
commented, “We are celebrating our national day and we are celebrating all of Turkey’s 
National Days…. Why? You tell me why? …. I don’t want any military celebration. I 
don’t want to see in this street soldier, tank, bomb, nothing. Do you know why they 
[Turkey] are doing this? It means to the Cypriot people, ‘I’ve got the power. Sit down.’” 
His stated reason for not wanting Turkish soldiers in the street is because it is 
representative of the political and cultural power Turkey has over the island. Thus, 
instead of protesting on the street he demonstrated his displeasure through the theme for 
his usual live music nights held at his bar, Anayasa Rock Bar.  
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On 19 July, Anayasa Rock Bar had one of their live music nights where a local musician 
plays an array of Turkish rock songs, many songs of which are politically charged from 
the 70s and 80s (See Chapter 5). These nights last until 2am, thus this live music night 
played into the morning of 20 July—the anniversary of the day Turkey ‘invaded’ the 
island. On this night many Turkish Cypriots are gathered at the Dawn Vigil (Turkish: 
Şafak Nöbeti) held on Troop Landing Beach where the Turkish Army first landed. The 
programme of the Dawn Vigil is comprised of speeches, Turkish Cypriot folk dancing, 
and musical performances by famous Turkish singers. People in attendance at the Dawn 
Vigil sing along to these songs and patriotically wave Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags. 
Around 12:30am participants carry lighted torches to the main landing area of the 
Turkish troops to watch a symbolic reenactment of the Turkish Army’s 20 July 1974 
beach landing. It should be noted that the Dawn Vigil emerged as a civil society 
initiative, independently funded by local organizations. Many citizens had grown weary 
of the military parades, thus the idea behind the Dawn Vigil was to reinvigorate and 
attract citizens to a celebration of 20 July. Despite this attempt to reclaim the holiday as a 
‘Cypriot’ celebration, it has received considerable criticism from Leftists as it is still a 
celebration of the ‘invasion’ of Cyprus.35 On July 19 2014, Anayasa Rock Bar held a 
different Şafak Nöbeti celebration titled, ‘Sa-fak nobeti’ [separating ‘fak’ to imply 
‘fuck’]. On his public Facebook account the owner of the bar announced his fake ‘Sa-fak 
nobeti’ evening making the word play to emphasize Turkey’s ‘rape’ of Cyprus. On this 
night, extending to 20 July, the songs usually played took on a more specific political 
                                                        
35 For example, in 2010 Leftists in the TRNC even criticized Bülent Ortaçgil, a well-
known folk singer with Leftist associations, for performing at the 2010 Dawn Vigil.  
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meaning showing their disgust for Turkey, AKP, and their ‘occupation’ of Cyprus. Here 
it is quite clear to see that Turkish Cypriots attending this alternate Dawn Vigil 
celebration contested and rejected the notion of a sovereign and independent TRNC.  
 
3.5 Turkish Air Show 
While there were few spectators at the military parade on Dr. Fazil Küçük Boulevard, the 
national celebration that took place that night in Kyrenia was actually very popular. 
While it was also a military show, it was attended by a greater number and more diverse 
group of people. Many people arrived in the square to find no place to park. Kyrenia 
locals sat on their balconies and rooftops to observe the spectacle. What was different? 
The festival-like atmosphere that evening provided a sharp break with the structured 
uniformity of the morning ceremonies. While during the morning celebrations one had to 
sit on a bleacher or stand in the sun, here people could watch from the rooftops of their 
own homes (as we did) drinking homemade Nescafé frappes, or stand near the sea in one 
of the main squares in Kyrenia. Whereas the morning was filled with long speeches, 
structured performances of Ottoman Janissaries, and the Flag giving ceremony, this event 
was all action with a high-flying acrobatic air show put on by the Flying Solo Türk and 
the Turkish Stars.  
 
The first of two back-to-back air shows started at 6pm in Kyrenia. The first act was the 
Solo Türk, heralded as the best jet pilot of the Turkish Air Force. His stunts with the F-16 
were impressive; he performed flips and turns, survived huge drops, and even flew upside 
down and backwards. As part of his finale he made a large heart in the sky with his jet’s 
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contrail. My friends remarked with glee that a Turk was the best pilot in the world, 
pointing at certain stunts commenting proudly that only the Solo Türk could perform 
them. After the Solo Türk show, there was a short break and I went downstairs with 
Merve to help make iced Nescafe frappes for everyone. As we were finishing up, the 
house began to shake and the glasses wobbled on the counter top. The Turkish Stars had 
flown directly over the house. Merve told me to hurry up and go to the roof. The Turkish 
Stars flew in intricate formations and performed daredevil stunts, teasing the audience 
into thinking they were going to crash when at the very last moment possible they would 
pass each other. At one point, Erkan and Nefise told me to watch what was going to 
happen next. The Turkish Stars flew far into the distance, along what my Turkish Cypriot 
friends interpreted to be the border between the north and the south. My friends were 
spellbound by this nationalistic spectacle, by the reenactment of aerial events of 20 July 
1974. Many of my friends even giggled with restraint and mimicked mockingly the 
shocked reactions the Greek Cypriots must be having of the planes flying close to their 
border. A few seemed to do so with a twinge of resignation, but they continued to make 
fun nevertheless. My friends explained to me that the Greek Cypriots hate it when that 
happens. Indeed the following day, the South side filed a complaint (as they do every 
year) with the UN over this violation of the Republic of Cyprus’s airspace by the Turkish 
military. After the performance of the air show, there was a military band procession, but 
my friends had already moved on towards the pool after the drama of the airshow had 
passed.   
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The display performed by the Solo Türk and the Turkish Stars demonstrated the level of 
skill and capabilities of the Turkish air force pilots. It was a representation of the strength 
and power of the Turkish military and a demonstration of the official Turkish discourse 
about the power of the military. The planes were re-enacting the invasion by flying close 
to the border and my friends giggled and mocked the faces the angry and sad Greek 
Cypriots might have been making when they saw the planes swoop close to the Greek 
Cypriot territory. Ironically, the air show by which my Turkish Cypriot companions were 
spellbound was representative of the “official” Turkish narrative about which many of 
them usually complain. Many of the people in my company had complained about the 
Turkish military presence on the island. Regardless of the level of passion of their 
complaints, the overall commonly held position was that they did not want to have a 
foreign military presence on their soil. In certain contexts, they aligned themselves 
actively with their ‘Cypriot’ heritage and their Greek Cypriot counterparts, especially 
when they complained of the Turkish military presence and called for an independent 
Cyprus. However in this context of the spectacle of the Turkish air show, they have 
accepted the ‘official’ narrative that they are an extension of Turkey. They are celebrating 
the Turkish military presence on the island. Though they may have spoken disparagingly 
about the Turkish presence on the island, there was also a certain seductiveness and sense 
of security in the latter narrative, whereby the Turkish military protected them from the 
Greek Cypriots and is continuing to protect them (as exhibited by their response to the air 
show). Or perhaps more accurately, returning to the notion of Kismet, they are resigned 
to that narrative. It was out of their hands, it was their fate, and there was nothing that 
could be done.    
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Chapter 4  
The Asmaaltı Project: An Unattainable Modern 
Future 
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Section 4.1 Introduction 
I first arrived in North Cyprus with my friend Erol and his mother, both Turkish citizens 
who had previously lived in North Cyprus during the late 1980s. Even though it was very 
late at night when we arrived at the Ercan airport, friends of Erol’s family, Hüseyin and 
his wife Müge, were waiting for us at the entrance. Hüseyin and Müge are middle-aged 
Turkish Cypriots who reside in a small farming village in North Cyprus. In this village, 
they work on a family owned farm cultivating various fruits and vegetables to be sold to 
wholesalers. With all of our suitcases packed into their car we could barely fit ourselves 
inside. We asked if we should get a taxi instead, but they refused our suggestion. They 
explained to us that we were guests and that they could not allow for us to arrive in a taxi 
because it would not be considered hospitable.  
 
Hüseyin drove us directly to Nur’s apartment. Nur is Erol’s sister and a dental student in 
North Cyprus living in Lefkoşa with a classmate.36 She served us tea and Turkish coffee 
as we conversed. Soon afterwards we turned our attentions to various activities. Erol’s 
mother and Müge went into the kitchen to gossip, Nur played on her iPhone, I got out my 
notebook to write down first impressions, and Hüseyin took Erol aside to have a more 
private conversation. From my spot on the couch I could overhear a few phrases here and 
there, and I could feel the seriousness of the conversation by the tone of Hüseyin’s voice. 
However, it was not until later when Hüseyin left and Erol relayed their conversation to 
                                                        
36 It is very common for Turkish citizens to study at universities in North Cyprus if their 
test results are too low to enter into Turkish universities. After their first year of study, 
many Turkish students re-apply for enrolment in Turkish universities in hopes that their 
grades will be high enough to gain acceptance into the university.  
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me that I learned what they had discussed. Hüseyin had warned Erol about the dangers of 
a young woman such as myself walking around the Walled City alone. Hüseyin stressed 
to Erol that the Turkish migrants in the Walled City were dangerous and not to be trusted. 
He gave Erol examples of the danger, including stories about how Turkish migrants put 
pills in girls’ drinks and then the girls “wake up in trouble”. He suggested to Erol that I 
purchase a fake wedding ring to wear on my left hand in an attempt to ward off these 
migrants who might make unwanted advances towards someone thought to be unmarried. 
Hüseyin ended his conversation with Erol saying that overall North Cyprus is safe, but 
that it used to be a much safer place prior to the arrival of the Turkish migrants. He 
emphasized this point by stating that in the past everyone left their houses and doors 
unlocked, but now people needed to lock their doors.  
 
Hüseyin’s depiction of the Turkish migrants living in the Walled City was not an 
anomaly. When conversing about the Walled City, Turkish Cypriots often spoke 
disparagingly about the Turkish migrants living there and the effects they had on both the 
physical transformation of the Walled City and the character of the Walled City. In these 
discussions Turkish Cypriots utilized nostalgic rhetoric to fantasize that the Walled City 
had been safer prior to the arrival of the migrants, even if they themselves were too 
young to have known a Cyprus prior to the increased migration of people from Turkey to 
the island. According to Hatay and Bryant (2008a) many of the negative attitudes 
expressed about Turkish migrants by Turkish Cypriots are projected fears regarding the 
political relationship between the TRNC and Turkey, whereby Turkish Cypriots feel the 
TRNC is being colonized by Turkey. Hatay (2008) illustrates that the media informs and 
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manipulates these fears by exaggerating and sensationalizing negative coverage of the 
Turkish migrants. Although the Turkish migrants are not a homogenous group as they 
hail from various parts of Turkey with different cultural backgrounds, they are often 
categorized by Turkish Cypriots and the media as a single entity, particularly as migrants 
coming from the ‘East’ of Turkey (Hatay 2008). 
 
This fear and distaste of the Turkish migrants living in the Walled City by Turkish 
Cypriots has transpired into feelings that Turkish migrants pose a threat to the very 
existence of Turkish Cypriot culture (Hatay 2007; Hatay 2008). Bryant (2015) argues that 
Turkish immigration to the island coupled with the lack of legal recognition of the TRNC 
has resulted in Turkish Cypriots feeling uncertain about their ‘identity37’ (Bryant 2015, 
167). She demonstrates that Turkish Cypriots, who had once used Turkish culture as the 
foundation for understanding and navigating their own cultural identity, now find 
themselves uncertain and anxious about their place in the world (Bryant 2015, 168). She 
defines this uncertainty and anxiety as ‘longing for essentialism’ (Bryant 2015, 166). She 
argues that within this context of abrupt change in their social environment a new kind of 
nostalgia materializes (Bryant 2015, 167). Bryant (2015) demonstrates that this nostalgia 
is a force used by Turkish Cypriots to construct social boundaries and essentialize 
identity. This argument demonstrates that nostalgia is both an active and transformative 
force.  
 
                                                        
37 Bryant defines ‘identity’ as “…something that groups perceive as their ‘essence,’ that 
thing that ties them together, and it describes it both to themselves and to others.” (Bryant 
2015, 165).  
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Bryant (2015) convincingly demonstrates that Turkish Cypriots desire to be able to 
clearly define themselves and that this desire manifests itself nostalgically. Researching 
the Walled City certainly illuminates and establishes this argument, as Turkish Cypriots 
utilize nostalgia to confirm what has been lost and in doing so construct boundaries 
between themselves and the Turkish migrants living there. Adding to this argument, this 
chapter will demonstrate that Turkish Cypriots in this politically liminal state do not only 
mourn an unattainable past, but mourn an unattainable future as well. Turkish Cypriots 
long for a future that is defined by negotiated notions of perceived European modernity 
(vis-à-vis the Greek side) and Turkish Cypriot modernity (vis-à-vis Dereboyu Street). 
Ultimately, they conceive this future to be unattainable because of what they see as the 
failure of their government to produce the modern. Similarly, as Turkish Cypriots accept 
the fact that they will not be able to return to the past they mourn (Bryant 2015), they 
have also resigned themselves to the notion that the modern future they desire is also 
unattainable. This longing is made all the more palpable as this desired modern future is 
situated in an alternative present in the Walled City in the RoC. It is also revealed that in 
interpreting themselves in the transformation of the Walled City they construct 
boundaries against the Turkish immigrants to define themselves as ‘modern’. 
 
For many Turkish Cypriots living in North Cyprus, the Walled City is characterized as 
something separate, something that is fixed and contained (Bakshi 2012b). In describing 
the Walled City from the outside Turkish Cypriots refer to the Walled City as a symbolic 
space representative of the divided nature of the island and because of this, the Walled 
City becomes a place on which Turkish Cypriots’ project their political understandings of 
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the island (Bakshi 2012b). This chapter will examine how Turkish Cypriots negotiate 
their social and cultural boundaries through their longing for a modern future through an 
examination of one heritage and urban planning project in the Walled City, the Asmaaltı 
Project. Rather than examining the Walled City as a contained entity, examining the 
Asmaaltı Project allows one to see the Walled City from the inside in that it provides 
insight into the ways in which the Walled City is a space that is continuously 
transforming. Examining the contested responses to the Asmaaltı Project will highlight 
these different relationships with the Walled City, through the top-down approach by the 
Municipality Officials who projected their ideas onto a “fixed space” and the shopkeepers 
who believed that it was not compatible with the Walled City as a lived space.  
 
Contained within fortified walls built by the Venetians in the 16th century are a high 
concentration of historic architectural structures spanning centuries. Through conflict, 
wear, and neglect many of the structures contained therein have suffered a significant 
amount of deterioration. To encourage economic development and promote tourism to 
the area, the TRNC Nicosia municipality now attempts to rehabilitate the area through 
heritage and urban planning projects. As will be argued in this chapter, these heritage and 
urban planning projects not only redesign the physical environment, but also through the 
Turkish Cypriots’ engagement with these new urban designs they negotiate new social 
imaginings of the Walled City. These social imaginings reveal how Turkish Cypriots 
construct social boundaries and negotiate understandings of their identity.  
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In his research on the Luang Prabang heritage site, Berliner (2012) examines the 
transformative force of nostalgia by demonstrating how nostalgia is a driving force in the 
making of heritage; that by attempting to preserve spaces the actors involved effectively 
transform the space, thereby constructing ‘new social configurations’. By new social 
configurations, Berliner refers to the ways in which the preservation of heritage sites can 
transform the way in which people relate to one another and their surroundings. Berliner 
(2012) holds that these many attachments to nostalgia can both bond diverse actors in a 
community as well as give rise to misunderstandings and tensions because these diverse 
actors may have different relationships to heritage. He argues that in these relationships 
that are both past and future oriented, people express their hopes and fears regarding the 
future (Berliner 2012, 770). 
 
Similarly in the preservation of heritage in the Walled City, the state is not the only actor 
involved in transforming the space. Firstly, there are also heritage preservation and urban 
regeneration projects that are organized and funded by EU and UN organizations. As will 
be demonstrated in this chapter, while the state primarily focuses on promoting a specific 
TRNC national narrative, many of these EU and UN funded projects seek to highlight a 
common ‘Cypriot’ past through the preservation of shared ‘Cypriot’ heritage in an 
attempt to build relationships between the RoC and the TRNC in order to foster a 
political reunification of the island. In this regard, the Walled City is often used for social 
experiments in bi-communal projects as it is the perceived seam between two cultural 
fabrics. Some examples of such projects include the Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) (1979 – 
present day) implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
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local Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Bi-communal Development Programme 
(1997-2005) implemented by United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the 
EU-funded Partnership for the Future (UNDP-PFF) (2001, on-going), and the UNDP 
Action for Co-operation and Trust (2005- March 2016). Evident in these projects, the 
Walled City represents the bi-communal possibilities of the island for international 
organizations and the Nicosia municipalities. Simultaneously, however, both the TRNC 
and RoC Nicosia municipalities are also expending efforts to preferentially preserve 
heritage sites deemed culturally significant to their own national narrative. As such, the 
Walled City represents the failure of these bi-communal projects in its continued and 
visible division. Examining heritage and urban planning projects conducted inside the 
Walled City in the TRNC will highlight contesting and overlapping urban designs. These 
tensions and layers reflect different orientations towards the political future by the 
different governing entities.  
 
Secondly, although the Walled City is shaped from “above” to be experienced by those 
visiting and living in the Walled City, the preservation and rehabilitation of this space is 
also actively constructed by all those who engage with the urban design through every 
day practices. In this way, there are additional overlapping and contesting social 
constructions of the space. As such, there is an active and continued negotiation over the 
meaning of the space of the Walled City. As will be demonstrated, through these 
negotiations over the construction of the identity of the space Turkish Cypriots articulate 
their longing for an unattainable modern future and simultaneously construct social 
boundaries.  
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Thus, examining the debates surrounding the Asmaaltı Project will demonstrate a longing 
by Turkish Cypriots for a ‘modern’ future.  This modernity is located in an unattainable 
future. This future is unattainable because of the failure of the state to live up to its 
promise to build a modern nation. Its loss is felt even greater as it is reflected in the 
alternative present of the Walled City in the RoC Greek side. This is not to state that 
Turkish Cypriots desire a political union with the RoC (although some may), but rather to 
illustrate how they see by this comparison that their government failed to achieve the 
modernity the RoC was able to reproduce. In debating the project Turkish Cypriots 
construct boundaries against Turkey, whom through characterization of immigrants from 
the eastern part of that country they see as in part responsible for the failed modernity. In 
doing so, they align themselves with modern values reflected in European countries.  
 
To make these arguments this chapter will be divided into three sections. Section 4.2 will 
describe the ways in which Turkish Cypriots imagine the Walled City as a place of decay 
and through nostalgic rhetoric long not only for a pure past, but a modern future as well. 
Through this rhetoric Turkish Cypriots also negotiate cultural boundaries with the 
Turkish immigrants. This section will additionally introduce how the TRNC Lefkoşa 
municipality attempts to address this urban decay through revitalization projects that are 
intended to promote tourism and create economic stimulus.  Section 4.3 will continue to 
focus on these initiatives by the government to regenerate the inner-city, specifically 
discussing the contentious Asmaaltı Project, an EU-funded pedestrianization and 
revitalization project carried out by the TRNC Lefkoşa municipality. This section will 
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demonstrate that although there are rival responses to the project, these responses 
illustrate that Turkish Cypriots long for a modern future and through this longing 
negotiate and construct social and cultural boundaries vis-à-vis the RoC. Section 4.4 will 
demonstrate that the Asmaaltı Project only partly addresses the Turkish Cypriots’ 
nostalgic concerns regarding the decaying Walled City. It will further demonstrate that 
Turkish Cypriots are ultimately disappointed with the regeneration attempt and interpret 
this failure as a failure of the state, believing this failure of the state is the reason for the 
unattainability of the modern future they desire.  
 
 
Section 4.2 The Walled City 
This section will provide a brief history of the Walled City, focusing specifically on its 
division and the ways in which it has been transformed since this division. The first 
section (4.2.1) will focus on the transformation of the Walled City by the influx of 
immigrants and migrant workers into the city and the urban decay of private property. 
The second section (4.2.2) will also focus on the transformation of the Walled City, but 
through an examination of the revitalization and heritage projects by the TRNC Lefkoșa 
municipality. Firstly, through an examination of the nostalgic rhetoric used by Turkish 
Cypriots regarding the transformation of the Walled City and the xenophobic rhetoric 
applied to the Turkish immigrants who live there, this section will introduce the argument 
that Turkish Cypriots long for a modern future. Secondly, in describing and examining 
the ‘official’ heritage of the Walled City, this section will illustrate the simultaneous, but 
conflicting ‘official’ narratives being constructed about the Walled City through heritage 
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preservation. Highlighting these contradictions will demonstrate the different ways in 
which heritage is preserved and promoted by the TRNC Lefkoșa Municipality to foster 
particular political futures for the TRNC.  
 
4.2.1 The Walled City and Decay 
Over time the Walled City has experienced a series of transformations, with one of the 
most significant recent changes being the division of the city. In 1956, during the inter-
communal fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots while Cyprus was still under 
British Colonial rule, British military personnel erected a wire fence named the ‘Mason-
Dixon Line’ in an attempt to prevent further skirmishes. This buffer not only divided the 
city in half, but also contributed to the stagnation of a once lively community. This 
division prevented the fluid movements between the various neighborhoods and by 1963 
the former vibrant life lived in the Walled City ground to a rather dramatic halt (Bakshi 
2012a; Attalides 1981). By 1964 the UN had intervened to stop the inter-communal 
fighting and a buffer zone was established, along with a UN peacekeeping force of 6,000 
men to keep the communities separated in an attempt to avoid further clashes (Kliot and 
Mansfield 1997, 497). After the Turkish invasion in 1974, the buffer zone in place was 
extended and reinforced, ensuring the continued division between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots within the Walled City, who had resigned themselves to 
living in what is referred to as a ‘ghetto’ or ‘enclave’, exercised their new freedom of 
movement and began to vacate their former homes and move to the suburbs. As a result, 
the once active life of the Walled City was regenerated in preexisting neighborhoods, 
such as Köşklüçiftlik and Kumsal, around Dereboyu. Over a short period of time, the 
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majority of the residences in the Walled City were filled with low-income migrant 
workers coming primarily from southeast Turkey to seek better working opportunities. 
After 1974 there were plenty of opportunities available for work that attracted many 
immigrants to the island and North Cyprus needed this influx of workers to help boost the 
economy (Hatay 2008; Hatay and Bryant 2008a; Navaro-Yashin 2012). Turkish migrants 
who came during this period were granted immediate citizenship in the newly established 
TRNC upon their arrival (Hatay 2008, 151). 38   
 
Many Turkish Cypriot construction companies gladly accepted the incoming migrant 
workers from Turkey because they worked for less than the wages demanded by the 
Turkish Cypriots (Hatay 2008, 157). The migrant construction workers were supplied 
with on-site accommodations wherever they worked in North Cyprus; however, many 
Turkish Cypriots later realized that they could utilize the unused properties within the 
Walled City to house these workers (Hatay 2008, 157). Placing twenty to thirty people in 
the same house without repairs to the inadequate plumbing and cooking facilities yielded 
a high profit margin (Hatay 2008, 157). These newly arrived migrants significantly 
changed both the demographics of the Walled City and the physical landscape (Hatay 
2008; Hatay and Bryant 2008a; Hatay and Bryant 2008b; Navaro-Yashin 2012). New 
businesses and organizations opened, tailored to the wants and needs of the new Turkish 
                                                        
38  This citizenship law was in effect until 1993, when during that year Turkish 
immigrants were no longer guaranteed automatic citizenship (Hatay 2008. 151). The 
citizenship law has undergone intense public scrutiny. The most recent amendment to the 
law was in November 2015. This law amendment replaced the granting of citizenship to 
foreign workers with permanent resident permits, with the exception for births and 
marriages (TRNC Directorate of Immigration [KKTC Muchahert Dairesi Müdülüğü] 
2016).  
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community living there (Hatay 2008, 158). As mentioned above (Section 4.1), due to the 
presence of these Turkish migrant workers and Turkish businesses many Turkish 
Cypriots felt that their culture was being erased through a ‘Turkification’ or 
‘Anatolization’ of the city (Hatay 2008). The influx of Turkish immigrants to the Walled 
City has led to great changes in the culture of the area in a short period of time, and it is 
this particular change around which Turkish Cypriots frame their nostalgic rhetoric 
(Hatay and Bryant 2008a).  
 
Hatay and Bryant (2008a) illustrate that this nostalgic rhetoric by Turkish Cypriots 
reveals a longing for a specific period of time; Turkish Cypriots were nostalgic for the 
enclave period (1963-1974) because it was during this period of communal strife that 
Turkish Cypriots developed a stronger attachment to Cyprus as a homeland. They argue 
that after 1974, when Turkish Cypriots confronted the realities of the Turkish state in the 
form of Turkish immigration to the island and political subjugation, the Turkish Cypriot 
imaginings of a Turkish modernity collapsed and a growing pride in being Cypriot 
flourished (Hatay and Bryant 2008a, 442). Hatay and Bryant (2008a) argue that this is 
significant because prior to this Turkish Cypriots had only considered Turkey as the 
“motherland”. They argue that this nostalgic rhetoric only implied a Turkish Cypriot 
desire for self-determination and that this nostalgic rhetoric was not aimed at 
reunification with the RoC (Hatay and Bryant 2008a, 431). Nostalgia in this context, they 
argue, highlights the purity of the past and emphasizes the corrupted nature of the 
present.  
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In addition to the “Turkification” of the Walled City, Turkish Cypriots commonly 
remarked to me that they were saddened by the derelict state of the Walled City—
referring to either the poor condition of the property, the uncleanliness of the city, or 
both. Many neglected buildings in the Walled City have succumbed to decay and 
deterioration. This decay has occurred incrementally over time due to neglect since the 
division of the city. It was not uncommon to see collapsed buildings, broken windows, 
missing shutters, missing doors, and condemned buildings. These two distinct but 
overlapping changes to the Walled City—the change in demographic and the neglect of 
the infrastructure—were often combined and related in the Turkish Cypriots’ imaginings 
of the Walled City. As will be described more in-depth below this rhetoric is often 
imbued with a sense of longing for the clean, pure, and known Cypriot past in contrast to 
the present depictions of decay, uncleanliness, and dirt. Thus as will be shown, the 
Turkish Cypriots not only longed for a defined identity as argued by Bryant (2015), but 
also a ‘pure’ identity.  
 
Turkish Cypriots who live outside of the Walled City often declare how much better the 
Walled City was before 1974. This rhetoric is focused specifically on the “character” of 
the Walled City. For example, a common phrase one hears from Turkish Cypriots is that 
the feeling of ‘trust’ has been lost in that area. Usually accompanying this expression of 
loss is sadness in the belief that there are no more familiar faces. According to a Turkish 
Cypriot male in his early twenties, “I think it [the Walled City] was better before. Now 
we don’t know each other. It’s definitely not as it used to be, people were more warm (iç 
içe). We now see faces and we understand that they moved in afterwards”. This particular 
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Turkish Cypriot, though too young to have known a Walled City before the arrival of 
Turkish immigrants and migrants, still idealizes the days before 1974. By utilizing 
nostalgic rhetoric and invoking the Walled City, he constructs social boundaries between 
himself as a Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish immigrants that inhabit the Walled City.  
 
This loss of trust is accompanied with a perception of danger. For example, a female 
Turkish Cypriot interviewee described the area around her grandparent’s house located in 
the Walled City as unsafe. “I like my grandparent’s house, but it’s not safe there, 
really…I have never stayed there because I get scared when I stay there…but I like to go 
there because the house is really different”. When pressed as to why it was unsafe she 
reasoned that it was unsafe to stay in the Walled City at night due to the high population 
of Turkish immigrants living there. “The immigrants they are from the bad side of 
Turkey and as I said, it’s not safe to walk around.” Thus, she praises the unique 
materiality of the Walled City, considering her grandmother’s house as ‘different’, but 
laments that the area is unsafe. It is worth noting that one first generation Turkish 
immigrant who arrived in the 1970s possessed similar emotional responses about the 
character of the Walled City. He sympathized with the Turkish Cypriots’ distrust and 
dislike of the Turkish immigrants, explaining that there was an increase in crime after 
1974 and that the city used to be much safer. He recalled an experience in which he 
protected a Turkish Cypriot girl from Turkish soldiers who were being unnecessarily 
aggressive towards her. Although an immigrant himself, he employed nostalgic rhetoric 
that constructed social boundaries between himself and the newer Turkish immigrants.  
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These expressions of longing are further contextualized by the political reality of the 
island whereby Turkey, governed by the AKP, wields great political, economic, and 
cultural influence over the island’s affairs. A common complaint and fear voiced by 
Turkish Cypriots was that their country was changing from being secular and modern 
towards one that was becoming increasingly more religious (See Chapter 5). This 
complaint was based on the conservative AKP policies that had seeped their way into the 
culture of North Cyprus. By invoking the transformation of the Walled City they were 
projecting their discontent of the political milieu of the island onto the immigrants. This 
reflects the argument by Bryant and Hatay (2008a) that Turkish Cypriots are nostalgic for 
a time before the arrival of the immigrants. Through this nostalgia they not only express 
their discontent with the current political situation, but also construct social boundaries 
against the Turkish immigrants. When examined further, it can be argued that they are 
not only mourning the loss of a past, but longing for a modern future.  
 
Turkish Cypriots expressed their fear that tourists to the Walled City had no way of 
knowing that the Turkish immigrants living there were not Turkish Cypriots. They 
expressed their frustration that these Turkish immigrants living and working in the 
Walled City were presenting a ‘bad’ image of the Turkish Cypriot people to those who 
came to visit. For example, one Turkish Cypriot shopkeeper in the Walled City 
articulated her concern that tourists, particularly those coming from the RoC for the day, 
would mistake the Turkish immigrants for the Turkish Cypriots and thus diminish the 
stature of the latter. She stated, “The quality of the country goes down because when they 
[tourists] see people like this, tourists do not know that they are not Cypriot…and when 
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they come to Cyprus and visit the Walled City and when they walk around they may 
think ‘What kind of people are these? I don’t want to come to Cyprus again.’” To address 
this fear, she suggested that the municipality should construct new restaurants and 
remove the immigrants from the Walled City in order to avoid promoting derogatory 
images of Turkish Cypriots.  
 
“We [Cypriots] only have one restaurant in the Walled City, you know about it, 
Sabor. It’s really the best place. It’s near the mosque. The area is very beautiful 
and Cypriots like going to Sabor; eating something, wasting time there. If they 
[the TRNC Nicosia municipality] do more restaurants in that area and remove that 
people, that [sic] immigrants from that place, I think it will be better.” 
 
Through the xenophobic rhetoric she demonstrates her vision of a Walled City that is a 
better place without the presence of Turkish immigrants. Her vision, however, is 
magnified as she simultaneously addresses their removal with the need to build new 
restaurants. The Walled City has many places to dine, however, in this comment she 
states her opinion that there is only one restaurant in the Walled City worth going to, 
Sabor. She refers to Sabor as the kind of restaurant she envisions being built in the 
Walled City. Officially named El Latino Sabor, it has an international menu, but she 
references it and interprets it as a Turkish Cypriot restaurant. The other restaurants in the 
Walled City are predominately restaurants owned by Turkish restaurateurs, selling 
Turkish food and staffed with workers from Southeast Turkey and Asia. Thus, her 
reference to Sabor as a place Turkish Cypriots go to is in contrast to these other 
restaurants. Through her comment she is not envisioning a return to the past, but 
emphasizing a desire to modernize the Walled City with varied, modern European 
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cuisine. Her fear, then, that tourists would mistake the Turkish migrants for Turkish 
Cypriots was really a projection of her fear that the tourists would characterize Turkish 
Cypriots as being non-cosmopolitan and unmodern. Her fear was further magnified by 
the knowledge that those tourists would have experienced the ‘modern’ Greek side and 
be comparing it to the less developed Turkish side. In this way she is not only longing for 
a modern, pure future, but also constructing boundaries of a Turkish Cypriot identity as 
one that is modern against the perceived backward Turkish immigrants.   
 
Other Turkish Cypriots expressed similar fears about the Turkish immigrants. One male 
Turkish Cypriot explained to me in an interview, “They are always trying to save money, 
they are not looking to their selves. If we go out we are taking good clothes, but they 
don’t care…If you look at their houses, they put all their clothes in front of their main 
door…If you have pants [underwear], you should put it in the back to not see…But if you 
look to their houses, you can take a tour [around the Walled City] and you will see that 
all the pants and everything is [sic] in front of the door. Can you believe that? It’s a 
shame for us, but for them it’s not…” Examining this comment will provide fruitful 
insight about his imagining of the Walled City and his construction of social boundaries 
against the Turkish immigrants living in the Walled City.  
 
In consideration of this comment as an insight as to how he imagines the Walled City, it 
is clear that he sees the immigrant’s presence as negatively transforming the area. He first 
declares that the immigrants themselves do not dress well and projects that opinion onto 
their houses, which he sees as dressed with dirty laundry. He uses the hanging of 
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undergarments as an example, which provides a more dirtying and shameful image than 
other articles of clothing; for him the presence of the immigrants has littered the space of 
the Walled City. His comment also reveals his construction of social boundaries. He 
separates Turkish immigrants from Turkish Cypriots by first negatively remarking that 
Turkish immigrants do not take pride in their appearance by spending money on their 
clothes to look their best.  Through this comment he is not only depicting the Turkish 
immigrants as dirty, but also stingy. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, shopping for 
clothing at brand name stores on Dereboyu is conceived of as a modern activity by 
Turkish Cypriots. Thus, by depicting the Turkish immigrants as unkempt and stingy, he is 
not only speaking disparagingly of the Turkish immigrants but also constructing social 
boundaries against them by imagining them as unmodern and Turkish Cypriots as 
modern.  
 
4.2.2 ‘Follow the Blue Line’  
In order to address the physical deterioration of the city the TRNC Lefkoşa Municipality 
has focused its attention on revitalizing the area through restoration projects and 
promotion of heritage sites. The revitalization efforts are targeted towards attracting 
tourism in order to foster economic stimulus. Over the years different heritage projects by 
the TRNC Lefkoşa Municipality in conjunction with the UNDP have been carried out in 
order to preserve and promote the city’s “Cypriot” heritage, such as the renovation of the 
Bedestan, Selimiye Mosque, and the Bandabulya Municipal Market.  
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This begs the question, what is “Cypriot” heritage? The answer appears to diverge 
depending on whether one is in the RoC or the TRNC. The concern of both governments 
has been on the identification and protection of the tangible manifestations of cultural 
heritage that are associated with the historical presence of their ethnic communities on 
the island (e.g., Bounia and Stylianou-Lambert 2011; Calame and Charlesworth 2002; 
Constantinou and Hatay 2010; Jansen 2005; Knapp and Antoniado 1998; Ladbury and 
King 1982). Examples include, but are not limited to the protection of churches, 
mosques, castles, mosaics, traditional buildings, and archaeological ruins. Research on 
heritage in Cyprus is usually framed by the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and explores how the 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot cultural and political differences take force within the 
physical environment of the city. Papadakis (2006) demonstrates that specific heritage 
sites have been strategically preserved in order to promote a specific historical narrative 
and, in addition, justify present political beliefs. Additionally, he demonstrates that on 
either side of the divide certain heritage is purposefully destroyed, downplayed, or 
neglected in order to purify the past. Scott (2002) and Akay (1996, 88) highlight that in 
the TRNC, Ottoman and Muslim heritage sites are promoted to align the history of the 
TRNC with “Turkishness” while simultaneously downplaying the Greek heritage sites by 
labelling and referring to them as  ‘Roman’ or ‘Byzantine’. Similarly, in the RoC, the 
Ottoman and Muslim influences are masked, while the Greek influences are underscored.  
 
Constantinou and Hatay (2010) demonstrate that in the academic debate about the 
destruction of heritage sites in both the RoC and the TRNC, the destruction is generally 
analysed as “…explicit or implicit attempts of ethno-cultural denial and cleansing” 
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(Constantinou and Hatay 2010, 1600). However, Constantinou’s and Hatay’s (2010) 
analysis of the dominant heritage discourse in Cyprus suggests that heritage practice is 
much more complex than commonly presented. They submit the view that heritage 
“…can be revaluated positively as well as negatively because of or despite conflict, 
surprisingly protected by those supposed to destroy it, or destroyed by those that were 
meant to preserve it” (Constantinou and Hatay 2010, 1601-1602). Focusing on case 
studies in North Cyprus, Saifi and Yuceer (2012), illustrate how some communities in 
North Cyprus protect Greek Cypriot religious heritage sites by reusing them based on the 
local community needs. For example, in Yeniboğaziçi, the Greek Orthodox Church, 
Agios Sergios, was converted into a kindergarten school (Saifi and Yuceer 2012). 
Through an examination of three different heritage sites, Constantinou, Hatay and 
Demetriou (2012) further illuminate the complexities of the relationships between 
heritage and politics in Cyprus by raising questions about what cultural heritage means in 
relation to conflict on the island. They demonstrate that the varying nuances of heritage 
protection, destruction, and neglect are not just inter-ethnic between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots, but intra-ethnic and trans-ethnic (Constantinou et al 2012, 194).  
 
Within the Walled City there is a clear political agenda in the historical narrative 
promoted by the TRNC Nicosia Municipality in the Walled City seen through the 
dominant focus on preservation and promotion of Turkish Cypriot and Ottoman histories. 
A guided route to various heritage sites and museums deemed significant by the TRNC 
Ministry of Economy, Tourism, Culture and Sports aptly named the ‘Blue Line’ has been 
physically painted onto the sidewalks and roads of the northern sector of the Walled City. 
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This 4.5km long blue line weaves in and out of the 11 neighborhoods situated within the 
northern sector of the Walled City. Tourists are advised that they can follow the blue line 
with a tour guide during designated hours or with a map. Without a map or a guide, the 
physical blue line is not a very reliable route guide in leading its follower as many parts 
of the blue line are barely visible or missing entirely from years of wear and lack of 
upkeep. Nevertheless, this tangible aid is there to guide the visitor through the Walled 
City to specifically chosen heritage sites and museums. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Lefkoşa City Map designed by Tourism Promotion and Marketing 
Department of North Cyprus Tourism Centre 
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Created by the Tourism Promotion and Marketing Department, the Lefkoşa City Map 
Guide (See Figure 4.1) highlights the heritage sites seen along the blue line. Similar to 
Scott’s (2002) and Akay’s (1996) observations mentioned above, the descriptions of the 
highlighted sites within this guide contain only two uses of the word “Byzantine” (which 
is a reference to heritage of Greek origin, without using the word “Greek”) compared to 
the twenty-eight uses of “Ottoman” and “Turkish”.  In fact, there is only one reference to 
the “Greek Cypriots,” and that is located in the description of the Museum of Barbarism39 
to highlight the Greek Cypriots’ persecution and murder of Turkish Cypriots. In doing 
this, the tour purposefully highlights the Ottoman and Turkish Cypriot history of the 
island over other cultural histories. 
 
On the other hand, in addition to the promotion of Turkish and Ottoman histories, there is 
a simultaneous running narrative promoting a common “Cypriot” heritage. This 
promoted narrative is in an effort to foster both political and social bi-communal relations 
between the TRNC and the RoC. For example, although the Blue Line Tour highlights 
the Turkish and Ottoman histories, the tour also leads visitors to other heritage sites that 
emphasize the multicultural past of Cyprus. The Lapidary Museum, the Armenian 
Church, and the Bedestan (English: Covered Market) are all examples of a multicultural 
history. Prior to becoming an Ottoman Market, the building previously functioned as a 
12th century Byzantine Church. Throughout the various foreign occupations the building 
underwent multiple restorations that are reflected in the diverse architectural details of the 
building.  
                                                        
39 See Chapter 2 for a description of the Museum of Barbarism.  
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To preserve the multi-cultural details, between June 2004 and 2009 the Bedestan 
underwent restoration funded by the EU and carried out by UNDP PFF and the Cyprus 
Evkaf Foundation40 .  For these bi-communal efforts, the Bedestan was awarded the 
Europa Nostra Award (European Union Prize for Cultural Heritage) in the Research 
Category for the ‘Study, Assessment and Design for the Structural and Architectural 
restoration of the Bedestan’. Since the restoration the Bedestan has been reopened as a 
cultural centre and because of its preserved multi-cultural past the Bedestan is used to 
promote bi-communal events. The pamphlet explains that its new role as a multi-cultural 
centre is for the all the citizens of Cyprus, stating, “…the re-use of it [the Bedestan] 
brought a new life and a new function as a multicultural centre, at the very heart of the 
Walled City of Nicosia, servicing all its citizens” (Hacışevik and Bozaltı 2013). 
However, not once during my year of field research in North Cyprus did any of my 
Turkish Cypriot friends go to visit the Bedestan. The centre was visited mainly by 
tourists visiting the Selimiye Quarter who wanted to see a performance of the Whirling 
Dervishes. Although the architectural details of the building displayed a multi-cultural 
past, the Bedestan was the venue for six performances a week of the Turkish Whirling 
Dervishes, which emphasized a present-day Ottoman association with this location. In 
ways such as this, the competing governments of the North and South continue to 
promote division between communities while appearing to cooperate in bi-communal 
efforts encouraged by outside agencies. The celebration and recognition of the Bedestan 
                                                        
40 The Cyprus Evkaf Foundation (Kıbrıs Vakıflar İdairesi) is a religious organization in 
North Cyprus under control of the TRNC government. Amongst other responsibilities, 
the Cyprus Evkaf Foundation allocates economic resources to the historic and cultural 
preservation of mosques, tekkes, cemeteries and other religious sites.  
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for being multi-cultural on an international scale perhaps is thus more prized than 
actually fostering of bi-communal relations as the prize acknowledges international 
acclaim for the island and as such attracts tourists to the vicinity. These contesting 
narratives promoted through the preservation of the Walled City reflect not only the 
complexities of heritage, but also demonstrate how these sites are preserved to orient 
different political futures.   
 
The preservation of heritage sites in the Walled City controlled by the TRNC 
municipality is done in part to increase tourism and promote the official historical 
narrative to external visitors, but also to construct a Turkish Cypriot narrative for nation-
building internally. As is a common practice of education in many countries, Turkish 
Cypriot schoolchildren are taken on field trips to visit these heritage sites in the Walled 
City to provide greater attachment to their country and indoctrination to the promoted 
history of the island. As adults, however, Turkish Cypriots seldom go into the Walled 
City to visit these museums and sites. Although the displays in museums are informative, 
these permanent museum exhibitions consist only of text, photos, and dioramas of 
historical events and are not successful in engaging the Turkish Cypriots I met, as they 
find them boring. This is not to state that they do not value the sites; on the contrary, 
many Turkish Cypriots hold the tangible heritage sites and old buildings in the Walled 
City in high regard due to their associations with their historic past. As stated by one 
young adult male Turkish Cypriot, “…yesterday they [TRNC Lefkoşa Municipality] 
demolished an old building [in the walled city] and I am very upset to hear this 
because…they [TRNC Lefkoşa Municipality] didn’t give any notice…We have to keep 
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the original…Many people are thinking ‘this is old we have to demolish it,’ but this is 
actually wrong we have to keep them because some of them are even about 100 years 
old…” Despite this high regard, none of the Turkish Cypriots I knew visited any of the 
heritage sites in the Walled City during my stay, with the exception of Büyük Han 
(English: The Great Han) and Selimiye Mosque. 
 
 
   Figure 3: Büyük Han. 
 
Büyük Han (See Figure 3) is an old Ottoman inn along the Blue Line and is one of the 
most well-known tourist sites in north Nicosia promoted heavily by both tourism 
companies and Turkish Cypriots. There are many artisan’s shops located in former rooms 
of the old inn and the artists and craftsmen there welcome conversation with visitors. 
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Tourist information centres and online tourist sites advise tourists to view its well-
preserved architecture, enjoy its relaxing ambience, and peruse and purchase traditional 
Cypriot arts and crafts, such as the UNESCO-listed Lefkara laces. More than other 
heritage sites located in the Walled City, I was repeatedly encouraged by Turkish 
Cypriots to visit Büyük Han. Repeatedly, they stressed the beauty of Büyük Han. This 
emphasis on the beauty of Büyük Han is heightened when juxtaposed to their views of 
the Walled City as decayed and underdeveloped. The experience of Büyük Han was the 
ability to sit and enjoy the ambience, and was touted by Turkish Cypriots as one of the 
best things to do in the Walled City. Although there are plenty of places within the 
Walled City where one can sit and pass the time, Turkish Cypriots often lament that they 
cannot partake in this activity in the Walled City in the way that they can on a street such 
as Dereboyu. However, within Büyük Han, they have the perception they can achieve this 
modern lifestyle. Part of this has to do with the ‘atmosphere,’ which they define as 
beautiful and clean. As Turkish Cypriots view the Walled City as polluted by the 
immigrants and decayed due to neglect, Turkish Cypriots are not only nostalgic for a 
purified past Cyprus, but also long for a modern future. This is reflected in their desire to 
reclaim the Walled City in a modern way.   
 
While the presence of the Turkish immigrants in the Walled City is invoked to show 
Turkish Cypriots’ dissatisfaction with Turkey’s control over North Cyprus, the focus on 
the presence of the conservative qualities of the Turkish immigrants reflects the fear that 
the TRNC has not lived up to its promise to create a modern country for Turkish 
Cypriots. In their comments, the Walled City reflects the island’s unaccomplished 
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modernity. Their longing is not just past-oriented, but future oriented as well. This 
nostalgia for an earlier time is not only rooted in the past, but it is also very much 
embedded in the hope for a modern future they believed they were promised.  
 
The following section (Section 4.3) will expand upon these arguments by engaging in-
depth with the Asmaaltı Project, a pedestrianization and revitalization project in the 
Walled City that was carried out during the time of my field research. Section 4.3 will 
demonstrate that Turkish Cypriots who oppose the Asmaaltı Project describe it as 
hindering the lifestyle of the Turkish Cypriots. Through their opposition to the project 
they depict the Walled City not as abandoned by Turkish Cypriots, but as a space that is 
actively being used by Turkish Cypriots. Through an examination of the debates 
surrounding the Asmaaltı Project, it will be argued that whether Turkish Cypriots support 
or oppose the Asmaaltı Project, they long for a future Walled City that allows them to 
practice their ‘modern’ lifestyle.   
 
Section 4.3. A Modern Shopping District in a Historic City 
Originally conceived in 1979, the Nicosia Master Plan (NMP) was a bi-communal project 
created to foster cooperation between the RoC Nicosia Municipality and TRNC Nicosia 
Municipality. The NMP team became a partner with the UNDP. Since October 2001, 
UNDP, in collaboration with its executive agency UNOPS, has been responsible for the 
implementation of Partnership for the Future (UNDP-PFF). The UNDP-PFF is an EU 
funded program and aims to support peace-building initiatives in Cyprus, particularly 
through the economic and social development of the island. Working within the 
156 
 
framework and principles of the NMP, UNDP-PFF has financially supported the 
“Rehabilitation of Old Nicosia” project, which is designed to revitalize the Walled City 
by the rehabilitation and preservation of the structures within. While many of the NMP 
planned projects have been realized over the last three decades, the implementation of 
many objectives has yet to be completed. During my field research the two mayors of the 
Nicosia municipalities pressed ahead with their attempts to develop a revitalization 
project for the buffer zone area and implement the pedestrianization project for the 
Walled City.  
 
The Walled City underwent significant development during the year of my field research, 
with the Asmaaltı Project generating the most controversy. The project included 
refurbishing the facades of some of the buildings in the Asmaaltı area and transforming 
the shopping and leisure district into a car-free zone. Originally intended to be completed 
in 2010, the project was cancelled for a time due to a lack of commitment on the part of 
the municipality itself (Evalutility Ltd., 2010). A 2010 UNDP project report stated that, 
“…the municipality had failed to prepare satisfactory design and technical specifications, 
despite the support of consultants provided by UNDP” (Evalutility Ltd. 2010, 26). With 
the international embargoes placed on the island, tourism and education are two of the 
most lucrative areas of economic benefit for North Cyprus as they cannot be controlled 
by the embargoes. Thus in 2013, recognizing the economic value of the Asmaaltı area as 
a tourist destination as well as its historic importance, the TRNC Nicosia Municipality 
was motivated to renew the project. In order to enhance economic gain for the 
municipality, government officials designed and influenced the Walled City through 
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revitalization projects such as the Asmaaltı Project to transform the space into a tourist 
destination. TRNC Nicosia municipal officials expressed their desire to transform the 
Asmaaltı area into a thriving shopping and leisure district for both tourists and locals 
alike (Kerem 2013b). 
 
Municipal officials believed that by creating a car-free environment, people would be 
able to safely enjoy their time within the Asmaaltı area. Municipality Project Manager 
Ali Güralp expressed his hope that, “People can flock to visit shops and enjoy the 
authentic atmosphere of Asmaaltı with no traffic, meaning they do so in a safe and clean 
environment.” (Kerem 2013b). It was estimated by officials that about 1200 people cross 
daily into the TRNC from the Ledra Palace and Ledra Street / Lokmaci crossings (Kerem 
2013b). Due to the high number of people crossing the border the mayor of Lefkoşa, 
Kadri Fellahoğlu, endorsed the project stating that it would be beneficial to the people 
living and working in the Asmaaltı area because the end result of the project would allow 
for the visitors to have a nicer experience, implying that they might shop and buy more 
goods (Bayrak Television, November 30, 2013). In order to transform this area into a 
clean and safe shopping district, the municipality looked towards creating an ‘authentic’ 
atmosphere, which was located in an unspecified historic past.  
 
Problems arose when Municipality Project Manager Ali Güralp defined the ‘authentic’ 
atmosphere as an area with no cars because in the TRNC Turkish Cypriots drive 
practically everywhere. Many shopkeepers claimed that the prohibition of vehicles would 
severely hurt their businesses because their customers who prefer driving would not walk 
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to the shops. As stated by another shopkeeper, “Our people will only go to places where 
there is convenience. They are not used to parking miles away and walking” (Kerem 
2013b). When traveling with my Turkish Cypriot companions, instead of walking a short 
distance, they preferred to drive for long periods of time, circling the destination point in 
order to find a closer, free parking spot. This characteristic was well known on the island 
and often the subject of jokes. One Turkish business owner quipped, “They [Turkish 
Cypriots] would want to go to everywhere with their cars. To the toilet too…We [people 
living in Cyprus] are a people who do not like walking. We only like kebab, eating and 
sleeping”. Another Turkish Cypriot business owner stated, “The Turkish Cypriots don’t 
like walking, we go everywhere with our cars. We are lazy people [laughs]” This self-
proclaimed and jokingly self-deprecating stereotype is often mocked by Turkish Cypriots 
and in this way is representative of Herzfeld’s notion of ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 
1997). These concerns and jokes by these shopkeepers reflect their belief that 
pedestrianization of this area did not fit the Turkish Cypriot culture and thus would 
actively discourage Turkish Cypriots from visiting the Walled City.  As stated by one 
shop owner, “This [the pedestrianization of the Asmaaltı area] is encouraging people to 
go and shop at supermarkets that have car parks” (Kerem 2013a). Motivated to encourage 
economic development, the TRNC Nicosia Municipality envisioned the Asmaaltı area as 
a space primarily for tourists and brushed aside concerns by many local shopkeepers who 
believed that this car-free zoning did not allow themselves or their local Turkish Cypriot 
customer’s easy access to the space. 
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Through the implementation of the Asmaaltı Project, the Walled City has been 
commodified in order to appeal to the tastes of the tourists and for some shopkeepers this 
has resulted in a Walled City that does not fit Turkish Cypriot’s way of living. As one 
male Turkish storeowner effected by the project stated to me, “…This kind of project 
doesn’t fit our people well. It doesn’t fit here well…They [Turkish Cypriots] would 
prefer to go to everywhere with their cars...” Shopkeepers who opposed the plan imposed 
by the TRNC Nicosia Municipality to create an ‘authentic’ atmosphere spoke to its flaws 
believing that this project only catered to tourists and did not aid in bringing more locals 
into the city. Although those who opposed the Asmaaltı Project wanted to attract tourists 
in order to get money, they were equally concerned about the city’s usefulness as a space 
for Turkish Cypriots. 
 
Turkish Cypriots frequently comment and joke about the undeveloped state of the TRNC 
by citing the many faults of the government and their unrecognized status by the 
international community as the primary reasons for this predicament. Through these jokes 
and stories they evoke a desire for a more modern and contemporary country. Though 
they make jokes when the electricity fails, as it often does, they are frustrated with this 
situation as they wish for a more modern country where infrastructure is reliable. These 
same longings were evident in the comments by the Walled City business owners in 
response to the Asmaaltı Project. In their expressions of their desired future, they 
compared the Walled City in the TRNC to the Walled City in the RoC. As stated by one 
female Turkish Cypriot shopkeeper, “The municipality should try to change the Project. 
They should clean the roads…For example, when I go to the Greek side, I really like 
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walking in the Makarios Street or the Ledra Street because it’s very clean…if they do the 
same thing to our side, to the Walled City, I think it can be better…” Here, this 
shopkeeper compared the present condition of the Walled City in the TRNC to the 
Walled City in the RoC and in her opinion the RoC Nicosia Municipality appeared to 
have achieved her imagined Walled City especially as exemplified by the clean 
pedestrianization of Ledra Street. 
  
Here she expressed her desire that the government should make the Asmaaltı area and the 
Walled City more attractive to Turkish Cypriots. Specifically, she thought that the 
government should construct more cafes and entertainment establishments so that the 
area would resemble Dereboyu. “They should open more coffee shops, there are only two 
or three. For example, we have more coffee shops on Dereboyu Street. We have Lavazza, 
Gloria Jeans, which you can find in other cities, but in the Walled City there are only a 
few coffee shops, but they [Turkish Cypriots] don’t know what kind of coffee they are 
selling and then they [Turkish Cypriots] don’t want to taste”. She continued, “They can 
make a pub street, like in other countries, so maybe our people [Turkish Cypriots] will 
choose to go there. We don’t have any other entertainment place, except Dereboyu. We 
only have Dereboyu”. Turkish Cypriots prefer to shop at clothing stores on the streets of 
Dereboyu and Metropol as they are filled with brand name stores (see Chapter 5). She 
went on to point out that the Walled City in the RoC has cobbled streets and that it would 
be very nice to have that instead of the asphalt streets of the Asmaaltı area.  
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Unlike the government’s attempt to historicize the Walled City, in this context she desires 
for the Walled City to be more modern in attempts to attract Turkish Cypriots. She is 
comparing the Walled City to Dereboyu and city centres of other countries, rather than 
comparing it to a past Cyprus. Her desire to transform the area exemplifies her position 
that the Walled City should also be a space for Turkish Cypriots. As a shopkeeper within 
the Walled City and relating herself to the Asmaaltı area, she constructed a vision of the 
Walled City that differed from the vision of the Walled City promoted by the 
government. She demonstrated a desire for a thriving, modern shopping centre, which 
was made more intense by the tangible realization of such a Walled City on the Greek 
side.  
 
To commemorate the start of the project and to encourage visitors to experience the car-
free Asmaaltı area, the TRNC Nicosia Municipality held a three-day program of events 
from 29 November to 1 December 2013. Events included Turkish Cypriot folk dancing, 
music, and children’s games. According to local newspapers, shopkeepers opposing the 
Asmaaltı Project showed their displeasure by protesting at the start of the three-day event 
by chanting songs, passing out leaflets, and carrying signs that attacked the municipality 
officials. They also laid black wreaths as an expression of their displeasure. The 
shopkeepers who were upset by the pedestrianization project created ‘The Protection of 
Lefkoşa Walled City Association’. Through this association the disgruntled shopkeepers 
took an opposing stance against the Asmaaltı Project, with the brunt of their anger 
directed towards the municipality’s lack of forethought in construction of compatible 
infrastructure for the newly pedestrianized area. The Association expressed deep concern 
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that there was no planned infrastructure to support the project. Imren Özerlat, owner of 
the Özerlat coffee shop, said, “…There is no appropriate infrastructure—road, pavement, 
car parks, dustbins, emergency services—and no elderly person will walk for a mile to 
come here…They are killing business” (Kerem 2013a). However, there were some 
Turkish Cypriot business owners who supported the car-free zone so this decision to 
pedestrianize the Asmaaltı area sparked debate and controversy over the project.  
 
The chairman of the Asmaaltı and Arasta Shop-Owners Association, Tanju Müezzinoğlu, 
spoke on behalf of the organization stating that, “We have been campaigning for many 
years for this project to be realized and we are delighted that it is finally being 
implemented. We are certain that the number of visitors, both locals and tourists, will be 
significantly boosted and it will make this part of our capital the most attractive place to 
visit” (Kerem 2013a). Mr. Müezzinoğlu continued, “It is absolutely amazing to see the 
crowds who come to have a real taste of untouched, historic Cyprus…” (Kerem 2013b). 
Mr. Müezzinoğlu’s claim echoed the TRNC Lefkoşa Municipality officials in that they 
both believed that the elimination of traffic congestion would result in drawing in more 
tourists. Business owners who welcomed the project did so because they believed that 
with less traffic congestion the area would look cleaner and that the more authentic look 
would draw in more tourists and customers. Although his opinions about the 
implementation of the project were in stark contrast to those who opposed the project, his 
view was similar in that he imagined the Walled City as a thriving shopping centre.  
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Additionally, like the TRNC Lefkoșa Municipality officials, Mr. Müezzinoğlu believed 
that in order to achieve a thriving shopping district the city should capitalize on nostalgia 
by transforming the Asmaaltı area in a way reminiscent of its historic past. Mr. 
Müezzinoğlu’s rhetoric of a ‘real’ and ‘untouched’ Cyprus did not seem to counter the 
fact that it took a revitalization project to construct an ‘untouched’ Cyprus. Applying 
Bissell’s (2005) argument, it can be said that the distinctions being made between the 
‘untouched’ Cyprus and the present-day Cyprus dismiss the fact that the vibrant trading 
area within the Walled City was once itself the product of urban transformation. In 
attempting to construct an ‘untouched’ urban past, the Asmaaltı Project is in fact a 
modern present-day transformation. Although supporters of the Asmaaltı Project 
favoured the removal of cars from the area, their imagining of the Asmaaltı area as a 
modern shopping area is similar to those who are against the project. Mr. Müezzinoğlu 
stated for a newspaper interview that the implementation of the project would be 
successful in this transformation to a thriving shopping district,  “The road will come 
alive with thousands of locals and tourists, and will be a symbol of the capital, like 
Chelsea’s King’s Road in London” (Kerem 2013b). Although supporters of the project 
approved of the ‘historic’ appearance, they compared the desired results of the 
transformation to busy cosmopolitan European streets.  
 
A journalist who supported the project stated,  “It [the Asmaaltı Project] will make this 
very historic part of our capital more attractive for people to be able to sit, relax, and 
enjoy themselves and at the same time increase economic and social activity” (Kerem 
2013b). By making the area attractive through sanitation and removal of cars, he believed 
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that this would allow one to be able to enjoy the area.  His comments echoed that of those 
Turkish Cypriots who enjoyed the atmosphere of Büyük Han and the shopkeeper who 
enjoyed the atmosphere at El Latino Sabor restaurant. So although those who supported 
the project agreed that the Walled City should be ‘historic’ and those who were against 
the project wanted to keep cars in the area, both desired the Walled City to be a ‘modern’ 
shopping district.   
 
When describing the transformation of the Walled City through the Asmaaltı Project, 
these Turkish Cypriots did not employ a sense of loss. Whether supporting or rejecting 
the project, shopkeepers juxtaposed the Asmaaltı area to other modern areas, longing for 
it to be like streets such as Chelsea Road in London, and Makarios Street and Ledra 
Street in the RoC. They longed for a future Walled City that allowed for the Turkish 
Cypriots to experience their modern lifestyle. This rhetoric was not nostalgic, but situated 
in a present where they negotiated their Turkish Cypriot values with their constructed 
imaginings of modern, European values and against the inability of the TRNC to achieve 
this goal.  
 
While the previous section (Section 4.2) highlighted the ways in which Turkish Cypriots 
imagine the Walled City as a place of decay, this section demonstrated the ways in which 
Turkish Cypriots imagine the Walled City as a modern, thriving shopping district.  
Through the present debates about what they see as the successes or failures of the 
project, shopkeepers articulate their longing for a modern future. The shopkeepers 
compare the Asmaaltı area of the Walled City to other thriving European shopping streets 
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in order to articulate their desire to create a space that is compatible with a modern 
Turkish Cypriot lifestyle. Extending this argument, Section 4.4 will argue that what is 
really at stake in these debates is not merely a debate about the Asmaalti Project, nor a 
complaint over lack of infrastructure, but the inability of the TRNC government to 
revitalize and transport the country into a modern future as imagined by Turkish 
Cypriots.  
 
4.4. Buyer’s Remorse 
Located within the Asmaaltı area is Asmaaltı Purses41, a store that sells imitation purses 
designed to mimic expensive luxury brands such as Gucci, Chanel, and Louis Vuitton. It 
was August 2014 and the Asmaaltı Project had already been implemented for almost a 
year when I went to spend a working day with the shop owner’s daughter, Zeynep. As 
Zeynep made tea, I asked her if the Asmaaltı Project had affected her business. She 
complained that the infrastructure still had not been fixed, a comment consistent with 
those of other shopkeepers against the Asmaaltı Project. She explained specifically that 
she was upset that the parking issue had not been resolved. As shopkeepers they needed 
parking access for many more hours than area visitors, yet they had to pay the same fee 
of 5TL per hour for parking. To avoid this extra economic burden, most shopkeepers and 
area workers sought the free places to park around the Walled City, which meant they 
had to walk much farther than they would like to get to their places of work. She went on 
to complain that it was much worse when it was raining, for the elderly, for those who 
had to carry numerous shopping bags, and for mothers who had to carry their small 
                                                        
41 Name has been changed for privacy. 
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children. As with other shopkeepers, it was clear that the project was not compatible with 
her lived experience within the Walled City.  
 
As we sat in her shop, the customers who entered were primarily tourists visiting for the 
afternoon from the RoC. However, according to Zeynep, most of her store’s customers 
were primarily Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots frequently went to the TRNC to purchase 
imitation purses, as they were not readily available in the RoC because the sale and 
distribution of counterfeit purses was illegal in the RoC.  In the TRNC, counterfeit goods 
in general were still sold in many shops across the island. On 28 April 2014, a few 
months after implementing the Asmaaltı Project, the TRNC government published the 
Product Safety Law, which allowed shop owners to continue selling their contraband 
goods until 1 June 2015. For counterfeit goods produced in the TRNC, the law would not 
be implemented until 1 June 2015 (TRNC Chamber of Commerce, 2016). Although 
counterfeit purses were considered contraband in the TRNC during the time of my field 
research, the law was not strictly enforced and was further weakened by barriers to police 
search of any store. Police were not allowed to enter a store and search for contraband 
unless a formal complaint had been filed.  
 
As stated previously, on this particular day most of the customers in the store were 
tourists visiting only for the afternoon, but staying in the RoC. The majority of these 
tourists looked at the wallets and purses on display but did not purchase anything. Some 
explained to Zeynep that although they wanted to purchase an item, they would not do so 
because they did not want their purchases to be seized at the border on their return to the 
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RoC. Their tour guides from the RoC had warned them that it was illegal to carry 
counterfeit purses into the RoC from the TRNC. Zeynep tried to reassure the tourists that 
it was legal to carry the purchases made in the TRNC to the RoC, but her attempts at 
persuasion were more often than not unsuccessful. I asked her if it was illegal to bring the 
counterfeit items across the border. She stated that it was legal for Cypriots to bring 150 
euros worth of purchases across the line, but she did not know specifically if it was illegal 
to bring contraband items across the border.42 Instead she turned our conversation to 
focus on her belief that the RoC government does not like it when their citizens or 
tourists spend money in the TRNC, so the RoC government is trying very hard to prevent 
people from spending money in the TRNC. She recounted a story in which a woman was 
so frightened to take counterfeit purses over the border that Zeynep offered to bring them 
to her and meet her at the Starbucks on Ledra Street in the RoC. The woman paid for the 
goods and agreed to meet her there, but still seemed hesitant after the fact, not wanting to 
break the law. As promised, Zeynep went to the Starbucks but the customer never 
showed up for the delivery.  
 
Transporting counterfeit goods across the border was a practice I commonly observed 
during the time of my field research. Many Greek Cypriots and tourists wore their 
purchases from the TRNC (so as to appear as though they were not purchased items) 
while crossing border to the RoC to avoid seizure of their purchased goods. Shopkeepers 
opposed to the Asmaaltı Project, already fearing a decline in local visitors because of the 
                                                        
42Although she did not comment on whether or not it was illegal, it should be noted that 
according to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) 1480/2004 it is in fact illegal to carry 
counterfeit and pirated goods across the border to the RoC (RoC Ministry of Finance 
2014).  
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ban on vehicles, now had also to deal with the potential loss of Greek Cypriot customers 
with the passing of the Product Safety Law. The Product Safety Law was unpopular not 
only amongst shopkeepers in the Walled City, but also across the rest of the TRNC 
because of the volume of Greek Cypriot customers who shopped across the border for 
counterfeit products. Zihni Kalmaz, a Turkish Cypriot shop owner of counterfeit goods 
stated in a newspaper interview, “I do not think this kind of rule would work in the 
KKTC [TRNC]. It happened in South Cyprus and the production and distribution of 
counterfeit goods was banned. But that is a European Union country. As for the KKTC 
[TRNC] it is an unrecognized country. There is neither a need for a law like this, nor is it 
possible to implement” (Kibris724, 2014). Through this comment he is not only 
expressing his frustrations over the government’s implementation of The Product Safety 
Law, but he is also citing the unrecognized status of the TRNC as the reason such a rule 
would not work. As one shopkeeper stated, “Do we produce anything? No. We have to 
sell these things [counterfeit items] because we cannot even produce yarn” (Kibris724, 
2014).  
 
Returning to Zeynep, although she expressed her desire that the Asmaaltı project should 
be compatible with the lived experience of shopkeepers and Turkish Cypriots, she also 
acknowledged that attracting more tourists was also important and claimed that ‘new’ 
things, such as the cafes Turkish Cypriots would desire, are not what tourists wanted to 
see, stating instead, “Tourists prefer to visit older places”. Yet, even in the Asmaaltı 
project’s attempt to attract tourists, her opinion was that the government’s attempt to 
revitalize the city has thus far been unsuccessful. Likewise, the Protection of Lefkoşa 
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Walled City Association and others shopkeepers who did not support the Asmaaltı 
project did not oppose the goal of the project organizers to attract more tourists to the 
area. These shopkeepers wanted more tourists to come to the Asmaaltı area and agreed 
that the Walled City needed to be cleaned. Specifically, they spoke of the desire to fix the 
roads and buildings, and upgrade sanitation services to include sewage and litter 
management. For example, one shopkeeper stated, “The road itself is not in a very good 
state and you have unpleasant sewage smells and pot holes. Many buildings are in a bad 
state. The municipality should have fixed these instead of shutting the whole road to 
traffic” (Kerem 2013b). Thus, although the municipality viewed the Walled City as a 
broader economic asset and wanted to attract more tourists through the implementation of 
the Asmaaltı project, Zeynep and other shopkeepers felt that the municipality’s efforts 
were unsuccessful. For many other shopkeepers this transformation was not only seen as 
unsuccessful, but also as mismanagement of money by a government they believed to be 
corrupt.  
 
One male Turkish storeowner was happy that the government was trying to attract more 
tourists, but regarded the attempts by the government to restore the Walled City as 
useless, saying, “The budget was allocated by the European Union, but now our 
government is trying to eat this money…They’ve just erected 5 poles [in reference to the 
poles blocking cars from driving into the area] with that money and the money has 
already disappeared. No one is happy with this project.” From his perspective and that of 
other shopkeepers, the Lefkoşa municipality officials were transforming the Asmaaltı 
area in order to turn the Walled City into a thriving tourist destination at the expense of 
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those who work, eat, and make their living in the Walled City. From this, it is clear that 
the real source of anger of the Turkish Cypriots was not just that their voices were 
excluded in the planning process or the poor execution of the pedestrianization project, 
but their frustration over what they believe to be blatant displays of corruption by the 
TRNC government. To this effect, their modern future has literally been stolen from them 
and they are given ‘authenticity’ instead.  
 
Other shopkeepers who were against the Asmaaltı Project also juxtaposed it to the Greek 
side to emphasize the differences. One shopkeeper stated, “You cannot compare Asmaaltı 
Road to Ledra Street. That is wide and long. Asmaaltı is completely the opposite” 
(Kerem 2013b). Although he argued that the streets are not the same, his focus was on the 
failure of the municipality by excluding the shopkeepers in the decision-making process. 
He did not dispute the success of Ledra Street. What is worthy to note is that both 
supporters and opponents of the Asmaaltı Project juxtapose the TRNC Walled City to the 
RoC Walled City to justify their claims. Through this comparison of the Asmaaltı Project 
to the pedestrianization of Ledra Street, Turkish Cypriots are highlighting what they see 
to be the failures of their government to deliver on the promises of a modern, sovereign 
nation as the Greek Cypriots are doing on their side.   
 
The Asmaaltı Project was designed by the government to accommodate tourists and 
increase the TRNC economy. However, the way in which the project was implemented 
left many shopkeepers feeling frustrated in that they found that the project was 
incompatible with the life style of both the visitors and the shopkeepers. Many of the 
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shopkeepers in the area felt excluded from the process of implementing the Asmaaltı 
Project; “…They [the municipality] never listened to us, they imposed their own project” 
(Kerem 2013b). Specific flaws cited were the lack of car parks and the banning of all 
vehicles, which did not allow for the use of delivery trucks, private vehicles by local 
shoppers who wanted to use their cars, or ambulances to access the area. For shopkeepers 
who were against the project, their vision of a shopping centre did not negate the need for 
modern conveniences which were actually incorporated strongly within those imaginings. 
Thus, the result of the Asmaaltı Project was not only a debate about a pedestrianized area, 
but also an intricate web of conflicts amongst and between the different actors about the 
future of the TRNC. What was really at stake was the ability of the state to revitalize the 
country and the ability of the TRNC to transport the country into a modern future.  
 
To summarize, shopkeepers who oppose the plan have different visions of the Walled 
City than the government and the international community. The government is 
redesigning the city to promote what tourists might regard as an ‘authentic’ atmosphere. 
The international community is trying to promote the city for the reunification of the 
island and peace reconciliation. The shopkeepers partially agree with the government in 
that they too want to promote the city for tourism, but not at the expense of the Turkish 
Cypriots’ use of the space. In these disagreements regarding the design of the city 
Turkish Cypriots feel that the TRNC has ultimately failed them, not merely because of 
the inability to provide the proper infrastructure, but more importantly because of the 
inability to provide them with the modern future they desire. Turkish Cypriots were 
promised modernity when they bought into the idea of a TRNC nation-state, but they 
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have discovered that their purchased state was a fake, much as the counterfeit goods that 
are commonly sold in the Walled City. Perhaps the Turkish Cypriots are experiencing 
something akin to ‘buyer’s remorse’. They find themselves in a situation not of their 
liking, but they cannot take their situation back for a refund. Instead, they find themselves 
looking across the border to other European countries and seeing the modernity they long 
for but cannot seem to grasp.  
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Chapter 5 
 “Return home, Ayşe!” 
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5.1 Negotiating Islam and Secularism 
There is a sparrow living in the churchyard. It drinks water from the basin by the bell 
tower and then goes back to the bell and poops on it. The pastor of the church is sad 
about this. Curious, the pastor empties the water in the basin and fills it with wine. The 
bird drinks the wine and still poops on the bell. Furious, the pastor asks the bird: “Dear 
sparrow, there was water in the basin and you pooped on the bell. I filled it with wine 
and you still poop on the bell. You cannot be a Christian as you dirty the bell and you 
drink wine so you can’t be Muslim. What are you then?” The sparrow replies, “I am a 
Turkish Cypriot.” 
 
This well-known Turkish Cypriot joke was told to me by a Turkish imam who led the 
Islamic congregation at the mosque off of Dereboyu Street in Lefkoşa. Like many imams 
in North Cyprus, he was sent from Turkey to serve for a few years in North Cyprus. At 
the time of my field research 110 religious officials working in North Cyprus, were sent 
by Turkey through the Religious Affairs Office (Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı). Educated 
Turkish imams are sent to mosques in different countries across the world as part of their 
civil service. The stated reason for this is to promote and control the religious message 
being presented so as to combat what Turkey regards as the incorrect interpretation of 
Islam. Furthermore, they carry out this work “To contribute to Turks living abroad not to 
lose their self-identity and be in harmony with the society they are living in without being 
assimilated…To introduce Turkey’s experience and heritage in the field of religion 
abroad…” (Presidency of Religious Affairs 2013). The Turkish Religious Affairs Office, 
working together with the TRNC Religious Affairs Office, is charged with preserving 
Turkish religious heritage, which as will be discussed later is considered an important 
part of the Turkish national identity by the AKP government.  
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He told this joke to me during a discussion about religious practice in North Cyprus in 
order to illustrate the different ways that Muslims in North Cyprus practice Islam as 
compared to Muslims in Turkey. The majority of Muslims in both Turkey and North 
Cyprus are of the Hanefi-Sunni School of Islam. However, it is well known by Turkish 
Cypriots and other inhabitants of the TRNC that Islamic practices and rituals are loosely 
adhered to by Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus, especially in comparison to religious 
practice in Turkey (Yeşilada 2009). For example, while Turkish Cypriots have a strong 
belief in God, most drink alcohol, do not regularly attend mosque (if at all), and do not 
pray five times a day. When Turkish Cypriots are questioned as to why they do not 
adhere to the traditional practices of the religion, they express that they “feel Muslim on 
the inside” and that this, coupled with their strong belief in God, is enough for them to be 
considered a Muslim. In this way, Turkish Cypriots practice Islam with the idea that faith 
is more important than ritual, unlike the more orthodox view that a Muslim should adhere 
strictly to the daily rituals associated with Islam. As will be discussed later in the chapter, 
their relaxed approach to religion stems in part from their strong secular heritage. Turkish 
Cypriots advocate a strong separation of religion and politics and as such see any mixing 
of religion and politics as a threat to their secular way of living.  
 
Journalists and academics have used the term “political Islam” to encapsulate a political 
theory that fuses Islam and politics. Debates about the use of this term question its 
productivity (Ayoob 2007). Ayoob (2007) identifies three major misconceptions about 
the notion of “political Islam”:  first, that “political Islam” like “Islam” is a monolithic 
construction; second, that the intermingling of religion and politics is unique to Islam; 
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and third, that political Islam is inherently violent. He disputes these misconceptions by 
showing how different national contexts give rise to different manifestations of “political 
Islam”. Nonetheless, I will use the term ‘political Islam’ in order to distinguish between 
approaches by political parties in Turkey that actively try to dissociate themselves from 
religion (even if in practice they do not), from parties that actively embrace the mingling 
of religion and politics (no matter if their interpretation is moderate or aggressive). It 
needs to be made clear, however, that “political Islam” is far from a fixed political theory 
not only across the Muslim world, but also internally to Turkey; it is continuously 
changing over time and even within political parties.  
 
Navaro-Yashin (2002) eloquently articulates why the multifaceted terms “secularism” 
and “Islam” are continuously evolving in Turkish nationalistic discourse.  She argues that 
nation-states are founded on the idea of cultural unity and a common past. After the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, the government under Atatürk attempted to 
eradicate historical and cultural connections with the Ottoman Empire. The newly formed 
Turkish government did not look to a common past to unify a nation, but to a common 
future based on a “modern” Turkey. For Atatürk, the idea of the modern meant distancing 
the newly formed nation from its Ottoman past and making Turkey a “western 
civilization”. In attempts to achieve this future, he promoted a separation of religion and 
politics and pushed through a series of radical reforms in attempts to modernize Turkey 
(See Chapter 2). As the past is continuously re-interpreted, so too is this idea of the 
“modern”. Today, the governing AKP party has abandoned Atatürk’s definition of a 
“modern” Turkey in favor of one that sees Islam as playing a greater role in governance. 
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The AKP seeks to tamp down those practices put in place during Ataturk’s period of 
influence and reestablish pride in Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and practices. Just as 
Atatürk’s vision of Turkey was resisted by some, so too is the AKP’s redefining of 
Turkishness. The strongest opposition comes from the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), whose policies and visions are steadfastly dedicated to 
those laid out by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and views any deviation with great disdain and 
suspicion.  
 
The AKP government, although denying that they are an Islamic party (preferring instead 
to term the party’s agenda as “conservative democracy”), still actively promotes the 
“Islamic way of life” in Turkish society and adheres to the view that the modernization of 
the country should not come at the expense of Islam (Michael 2014, 22; Criss 2010, 45).  
In direct opposition to Kemalist constructions of ‘Turkishness,’ AKP upholds the position 
that Islam is a necessary component of Turkishness. Like previous political parties in 
Turkey that embraced Islam, AKP does not see Islam as ‘backwards’ or as a hindrance to 
“modernity”. In fact, AKP views it as a key component of modernity. Yet, AKP’s 
conception of political Islam is framed differently from its predecessors in that it portrays 
‘Islam’ as compatible with a republican form of government.  
 
AKP envisions their efforts at synthesizing Islam and politics and posits Turkey as 
potentially leading the Muslim nation, thereby claiming an international role for Turkey. 
As stated by then Prime Minister Erdoğan after AKP’s 2011 victory, “Sarajevo won 
today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as 
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Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, [and] Jerusalem won as much as 
Diyarbakir” (Erdoğan 2011, as quoted in Taşpınar 2012). Through this speech, Erdogan 
is not only speaking to his party’s present day wishes to be seen as a model for other 
Muslim societies, but in his speech he also harkens back to Turkey’s Ottoman past when 
Turkey was the center of the Muslim world. AKP is the latest and most powerful in a line 
of conservative religious political parties that have viewed Atatürk’s effort to redesign the 
nation based on the European model as weakening Turkey. Therefore, the AKP 
government embraces the past grandeur of its Ottoman and Islamic heritage and actively 
seeks to transform the ideological framework of Turkey from one based solely on secular 
Kemalist values to one that acknowledges its Muslim heritage and its relevance for today. 
In doing so, AKP seeks to eliminate Atatürk’s vision of a westernized Turkish society 
and attempts to recapture Turkey’s former Ottoman glory.  
 
Although highly contested amongst the population in Turkey, political parties that 
embrace political Islam receive a tremendous amount of support. In North Cyprus, 
however, Turkish Cypriots are much less inclined to support a political party that 
promotes political Islam. Even the more conservative parties in the TRNC, such as the 
National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, UBP) and the Democratic Party (Demokrat 
Parti, DP) are less sympathetic than political parties in Turkey to AKP’s active efforts to 
implement Islamic values in their society. The reason for this can be found in the roots of 
Turkish Cypriot political secularism. The vehement embracing of political secularism by 
Turkish Cypriots has been traced historically by Michael (2014). Michael illustrates that 
the British modernity framework and the introduction of Kemalist secularism greatly 
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influenced the defining of political practices in the TRNC. During the British colonial 
period many religious institutions lost their power and consequently the already small 
religious fervor of the Turkish Cypriots was diminished. After the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kemalist reforms were enthusiastically adopted by the 
Turkish Cypriot community, which furthered the separation of church and state and 
increased their embrace of secularism. Bryant (2004) demonstrates that the immediacy 
and ease with which Turkish Cypriots embraced Atatürk’s ‘modernizing’ reforms were 
due in part to the concept of ‘enlightenment’ constructed by Cypriot Muslim elites during 
the late Ottoman period of the early 1900s.  
 
According to Bryant (2004), the Cypriot Muslims were divided over the future direction 
of their community. There were those who wanted to use the Islamic identity as the basis 
for a modern state which would be achieved through ‘revelation’ and available to all 
(Bryant 2004, 103). There were also those who believed strongly in the need for 
leadership and argued that it was only through “enlightenment” the state would be saved 
(Bryant 2004, 103). In her exposition, Bryant (2004) examines how the concept of 
“enlightenment” in Cyprus was understood to be a product of education, something 
available essentially only to the elite of society. Therefore, while Muslims could be 
created through accepting revealed prophecy, Ottomans could be created only through 
education. As Bryant demonstrates, Atatürk, referred to by Turkish Cypriots as “ikinci 
peygamber” (English: “second prophet”), used the notion of “enlightenment” in the 
construction of the new Turkish Republic; it was “…the ‘enlightened’ individual that was 
the cultural type to be molded in Turkish schools” (Bryant 2004, 152). Thus the Cypriot 
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Muslim population, whose concept of ‘enlightenment’ was already fostered through 
British education, easily embraced Atatürk’s ideals about secularism and the new Turk.   
 
Under the influence of Atatürk’s guiding principles, Turkish Cypriots’ governing bodies 
have tried to protect its separation of religion and politics and as a result there is strong 
resistance to the AKP in North Cyprus by Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots feared 
that AKP’s abandonment of Kemalist secularism and their embrace of political Islam 
would result in an “Islamification” of the island. As evidence of this attempted 
“Islamification” Turkish Cypriots cite the increased efforts to bring Islamic tourism to the 
island and the non-secular changes made to education, such as the inclusion of mandatory 
religious classes in public schools and the opening of Hala Sultan Divinity College, the 
first religious school in North Cyprus for the study of the Koran. As will be discussed 
more in-depth later (Section 5.3.2), although Turkish Cypriots often cite these examples 
as evidence of AKP’s ‘Islamification’ of the island, in some cases their ‘evidence’ is not 
always based in fact.  
 
Although Turkish Cypriots fear an ‘Islamification’ of the island by AKP, the AKP 
government views their policies to be an effort to assimilate them into Turkish culture—
to ‘Turkify’ them (Michael 2014). Michael (2014) makes evident that just as Atatürk 
tried to integrate the Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish nation employing secularity, today 
the AKP is attempting to re-integrate the Turkish Cypriots using Islam as the unifying 
force by re-conceptualizing Turkish Cypriots not as ‘Turks of Cyprus’ but as ‘Muslim 
Turks of Cyprus’. Just as the policies of the post-colonial Turkish government were 
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enacted to unify Turkish Cypriots under the definition of ‘Turk’ as conceived by Atatürk, 
the current Turkish government is also enforcing polices to culturally integrate Turkish 
Cypriots into Turkish society as defined by AKP. Hence, the definition of ‘Turk’ is 
changing again. For AKP, Turkish Cypriots are first and foremost ‘Muslim Turks’ that 
are part of a larger Turkey. Michael (2014, 25) has noted that Turkish government 
officials prefer to promote the term ‘Muslim Turks of Cyprus’, while Turkish Cypriots 
prefer to use the term ‘Turkish Cypriot’ (Turkish: ‘Kıbrıslı Turk’). During my field 
research, many Turkish Cypriots also referred to themselves as just ‘Cypriot’ (Turkish: 
‘Kıbrıslı’). Despite the AKP government’s efforts to change their description, even 
Turkish citizens refer to Turkish Cypriots using the term ‘Cypriot’ or ‘Turkish Cypriot’ 
not ‘Muslim Turks of Cyprus’.  
 
These differing views about the role of secularism and Islamism in politics and culture 
lay the framework for the ways in which the ‘secular’ and the ‘Islamic’ identity are being 
continuously constructed and negotiated within the varying concepts of ‘Turkishness’. 
This chapter will argue that Turkish Cypriots invoke the Kemalist definition of 
“Turkishness” to combat what they perceive to be the AKP-driven Turkish political and 
cultural domination of the island, and seek to retain more autonomy for themselves 
through more secular policies. The discourse on Turkishness provides a legitimate way to 
contest the island’s Turkish domination. At the surface this contestation appears to be 
AKP’s ‘Islam’ vs Atatürk’s ‘secularism’, but it is actually a series of complex 
negotiations on notions of progress and modernity.  
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Through both collective organized protests and individual practices on Dereboyu in 
North Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots challenge notions of Turkish modernity as promoted by 
AKP and in doing so Turkish Cypriots actively shape the street of Dereboyu. This 
chapter will argue that Dereboyu is a socially constructed place where Turkish Cypriots 
can perform their secular heritage. As argued by Low, “The social construction of space 
is the actual transformation of space—through people’s social exchanges, memories, 
images, and daily use of the material setting—into scenes and actions that convey 
symbolic meaning” (Low 1996, 862). In this way, places become imbued with meaning 
by individuals and collective groups of people; owing to this, spaces are contested 
constructions. Using Low’s (1996) understanding of space, this chapter will examine how 
people engage with Dereboyu and in doing so negotiate and reproduce their 
understandings of “Turkishness”.  
 
To make these arguments, the remainder of this chapter will be divided into three 
sections. Section 5.2 will provide an in-depth description of Dereboyu and through an 
analysis of the description will argue that Dereboyu is a place where Turkish Cypriots 
perform their secular heritage. Section 5.3 will examine two official protests against the 
Turkish government that took place on Dereboyu Street. This section will demonstrate 
that although Turkish Cypriot demonstrators stand in solidarity with the Turkish 
protesters, they negotiate their own understanding of ‘Turkishness’. Section 5.4 will 
analyze informal protests against the AKP government by exploring both the activities 
that take place at Anayasa Rock Bar on Dereboyu and the use of rock music as a tool of 
protest. This section will illustrate the ways in which Dereboyu is a place where Turkish 
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Cypriots can live out their secular values by examining the way in which the patrons and 
musicians of Anayasa Rock Bar perform informal protests through everyday practices. 
Through an analysis of these case studies, this chapter will demonstrate the complex 
layering of how Turkish Cypriots engage with this street, and through different 
negotiations of “Turkishness” articulate a distinct demotic nationalism from below.     
 
 
5.2 Encountering Dereboyu 
Spanning 98km, the Pedieos (Turkish: Kanlı Dere) River traverses across the divided 
capital of Nicosia and runs parallel to one of the most frequented avenues in North 
Nicosia, Mehmet Akif Street; also commonly referred to by locals as ‘Dereboyu’ Street. 
According to a newspaper article, the name ‘Dereboyu’ originates from an expression 
used by locals in years past to refer to the avenue: “dere boyundaki cadde”, which 
translated into English means: “The avenue along the river” (Day 2010). Today, 
Dereboyu is also used colloquially to refer to the intersecting street, Osman Paşa Caddesi. 
Dereboyu is one of the most popular destinations for both locals of Lefkoşa and Turkish 
Cypriots travelling to Lefkoşa. Despite being a major center of activity for Turkish 
Cypriots living in Lefkoşa there has been little written about it. Over the decades 
Dereboyu has undergone quite a transformation. During the period of intercommunal 
violence leading up to and following the 1974 Turkish Operation, Dereboyu was witness 
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to violence and bloodshed.43 Within recent decades, Dereboyu has become the center for 
entertainment and nightlife for those living in and visiting Lefkoşa.  
 
During my field research Dereboyu was also the place I called home. After two weeks of 
living with a Turkish dental student, I moved into my own apartment on Dereboyu. The 
apartment was recommended to me by my Turkish Cypriot friend Ali, who provided 
insurance for a man who had available flats to lease. Due to the location of the apartment 
on Dereboyu and Ali’s trusted recommendation of the landlord, my Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot acquaintances advised me to rent it. The apartment was conveniently located 
within walking distance to the Walled City (my original targeted site for research), bus 
and taxi stations, cafes, restaurants, and grocery stores. However, some of my Turkish 
Cypriot friends expressed concern when they learned that the apartment I was planning to 
rent was located next to an apartment rented as a gathering space and meeting hall by the 
all-male political youth group, “Idealist Club” (Turkish: Ülkü Ocakları). They organized 
events to increase political support for the Turkish political party, the Nationalist 
Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), recruit new members for MHP, and 
promote MHP’s political ideals. Members of this youth group are known as the “Grey 
Wolves” and are seen as acting as an unofficial para-military youth wing for the MHP. 
Grey Wolves are known for their far-right conservative views and are often remembered 
                                                        
43 Dr. Nihat Ilhan was a major in the Turkish Army aiding the Turkish Cypriots during 
the period of inter-communal violence on the island. In December 1963, Dr. Ilhan’s wife 
and three children were murdered in their home by Greek Cypriots. The house has been 
preserved as the “Museum of Barbarism”. The bullet holes and bloodstains are still 
visible in the bathroom where Dr. Ilhan’s wife and three children tried to hide.  
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for their complicity in the assassinations of numerous left-wing intellectual leaders and 
academics during the 1970s in Turkey. While several of my Turkish Cypriot 
acquaintances were concerned that I was a female living alone next to an apartment full 
of men, others were concerned because of the violent and nationalistic reputation of the 
political party. A concerned middle aged Turkish Cypriot, Serdar, asked my less 
concerned friends, “Would you put Katie inside a beehive?”  
 
Grey Wolves have counterparts all around the world to promote Turkish nationalism. 
They have been active in Cyprus since 1974 and their role has been to actively promote 
the political idea that Cyprus is Turkish. In the 2004 Annan Referendum, while Turkish 
Cypriots overwhelmingly voted ‘yes’ for the unification of the island, the Grey Wolves 
actively lobbied for a ‘no’ vote. In October 2013, the same month I moved into my new 
apartment, the Grey Wolves opened up their new headquarters (next to what was to have 
been my new apartment) on Osman Paşa Street. This newness of the event contributed to 
the heightened fears of my Turkish Cypriot friends. During the opening of their new 
headquarters members of Ülkü Ocakları chanted phrases such as “Cyprus is Turkish and 
will remain Turkish” and “The Grey Wolves movement cannot be stopped” (Afrika 
2013). My Turkish Cypriot friends’ disapproval of the Grey Wolves organization was not 
only a rejection of the nationalistic ideologies of MHP in Turkey, but an objection to the 
presence of the Grey Wolves ideologies in Cyprus. After much deliberation with my 
friends and the landlord, I decided at their suggestion to move to an apartment on the 
floor above so that I was not living right next door to them.  
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Encompassing a two-mile stretch, Dereboyu houses a multitude of shops, cafes, bars, 
apartments, and restaurants. Although Dereboyu is only a small two-way street with few 
parking options, the car is still the preferred method of travel. All too frequently, the time 
Turkish Cypriots spend looking for a parking space takes far longer than the time it takes 
for them to reach their destination. During weekdays at around 2pm and again at 6pm, the 
traffic is particularly congested due to lunch breaks and end of day work hours. While 
pedestrian sidewalks are present, most of the time they are completely unusable for their 
intended purpose. Instead, they function as makeshift parking spaces for vehicles (see 
Figure 4). Additionally, while there are signs located directly in front of each building 
signifying the names of the shops, there are few independent advertisements located on 
the street. The most prominent advertisement is for Jack Daniels Whiskey; it heralds over 
the street on top of one of the high-rise apartment buildings and is highly visible from 
both directions on the street.  
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      Figure 4: Mehmet Akif Street, Dereboyu 
 
The people who frequented Dereboyu were Turkish Cypriots, immigrants, and students, 
usually between the ages of 18-40. Dereboyu was a very social street and those visiting 
the cafes usually went in groups or with their significant other. Rarely would an 
individual visit a cafe alone for purposes of work or to read, and even more rarely would 
that individual be a lone female. With few exceptions, all of the cafes, restaurants, and 
bars have outdoor seating options. Those that did not provide outdoor seating had the 
option of opening up wall-length windows, thereby transforming the space into an 
outdoor seating area. Most people preferred to sit outside, so even during the coldest 
months of the year outdoor heating was provided. Additionally, most outdoor seating 
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areas were equipped with retractable roofs so as to provide for protection from the 
various elements. 
 
During both weekdays and weekends, daytime and nighttime activities on Dereboyu 
remained similarly constant, except for Sunday when most clothing stores and a few 
shops were closed for business. During the morning hours (8am-noon) there were very 
few pedestrians on the street with the exception of those going to work on weekdays.  
Activity increased around 1pm and the area was crowded by 2pm, filled with people 
drinking coffee or eating lunch with friends. Most of the clothing stores were fairly quiet. 
After working hours, many people would go out to eat at one of the restaurants or have a 
beer or coffee with friends. Most of the cafes and bars televised Turkish football games 
that were playing on any particular day. My Turkish Cypriot friends would go to a café 
almost every evening to watch a Turkish football match, talk about the events of the day, 
and drink Turkish tea.44 Occasionally, they would attend a themed musical night hosted 
by restaurants where one could either listen to live music or listen to a local DJ play their 
favorite Turkish hits from a specific decade. These musical nights usually occurred after 
the football games ended or when there were no football games being televised. By 2am 
all the bars and restaurants were closed.   
 
                                                        
44 It should be noted that the preference to drink Turkish tea was an unusual choice. 
Generally, Turkish Cypriots prefer to drink Turkish coffee or English tea when at home. 
Although the café that my Turkish Cypriot friends often frequented was usually filled 
with Turkish Cypriot patrons, the café was the Turkish chain MADO. As it was a Turkish 
chain, traditional Turkish tea was on the menu.  
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There were many large street parties and events organized on Dereboyu by both 
businesses and the Municipality. Two such well-attended events were the Halloween 
Party hosted by one of the most popular bars on Dereboyu, Cadı’nın Evi (English: 
Witch’s House), and the Dereboyu Street Festival organized by the Municipality. 
Although Halloween is not a holiday traditionally celebrated by Muslims, one would not 
know that when standing on Dereboyu 31 October 2013. The Halloween party on 
Dereboyu attracted over 500 people; most of them 18 to 30 year-olds (see Figure 5). 
Anticipating the large crowd, the bar had a few outdoor minibars stationed on Dereboyu 
so that there were plenty of places to buy beer and other beverages throughout the night. 
Turkish Cypriots came dressed in all manners of Halloween costumes, although the most 
common costume was something “scary looking” decorated with fake blood. People 
drank beer, chatted with friends, listened and danced to the live sounds of DJ Barrios, and 
were entertained by the fire performer Tulga Altunbilek.  
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       Figure 5: Halloween Party at Cadı’nın Evi on Dereboyu (Osmanpaşa Street) 
 
Halloween has its roots in pagan festivals and was later adapted by Christians as All 
Hallows Eve. However, in North Cyprus, as in most American and European countries 
today, Halloween is not celebrated as a religious event, but rather as an excuse to dress in 
costumes and attend parties. Although in America and some parts of Europe it is common 
for children to go door to door in costume collecting candy, this tradition is not practiced 
in North Cyprus. A few people may carve pumpkins, although this too is not a common 
practice. Halloween was not a traditionally celebrated event in North Cyprus until more 
recently gaining popularity. Halloween has become popular due to an amalgam of 
reasons including globalization of ideas spread through advertising and social media, the 
growth of popularity of Halloween in Turkey, and the introduction of new British 
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primary schools on the island.  Young Turkish Cypriot schoolchildren in these British 
primary schools, such as the Necat British School, celebrate national Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot holidays, but are also introduced to and celebrate some British holidays such as 
Halloween. Most of the scattered Halloween celebrations on the island are attended only 
by British immigrants. On the night of the Dereboyu Halloween party mentioned above, a 
Turkish Cypriot acquaintance was playing in a band at a bar in Kyrenia attended almost 
exclusively by British people with the exception of myself and his Turkish Cypriot 
friends who had come to see him perform. My friends were eager to attend the Halloween 
party on Dereboyu as well so we did not stay for his entire performance. Partaking in this 
celebration on Dereboyu is yet another example of one of the ways in which Turkish 
Cypriots practice their chosen secular heritage on this street.  
 
The Dereboyu Street Festival held on 3 May 2014 attracted even more people than the 
Halloween Party, as it was an event targeting people of all ages and it lasted late into the 
night. All of the bars and shops along Dereboyu were open with most of them holding 
special discounts and or promotions. Many of the bars had special live musical 
performances. There were also street venders along Dereboyu giving away Turkish 
Cypriot foods, free promotional beer, toys, and balloons, amongst other items.  
 
There are many parallels to be drawn between the Dereboyu Street Festival and the local 
heritage festivals held in rural villages across North Cyprus (e.g., Guzelyurt Orange 
Festival, Yesilirmak Strawberry Festival, Lefke Walnut Festival, Mehmetcik Grape 
Festival, Tepebasi Tulip Festival). At these rural village festivals, Turkish Cypriots 
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celebrate the local food produce or environmental heritage that is associated with that 
specific village. Festivals like these also promote the town itself as they sell local crafts, 
clothing, and various odds and ends on temporary table and booths. These local festivals 
usually feature traditional Turkish Cypriot dancers, music, and speeches made by both 
local and TRNC national politicians. The Dereboyu Street festival can also be interpreted 
as a local heritage festival, although instead of a local village Dereboyu is a zone within a 
large city and the celebration revolves around the unique commerce available and the 
Turkish Cypriot secular heritage. Similar to the local village festivals where one walks 
down a street lined with temporary booths selling different goods, the Dereboyu Street 
festival has opportunities to shop as well. The difference being that instead of booths and 
tables, there are fixed storefronts with brand named stores such as Tommy Hilfiger, Nike, 
Adidas, and MANGO. Instead of traditional Turkish Cypriot dancers and music, there are 
live rock concerts and Turkish Cypriot women dancing on elevated platforms to lure 
patrons to the promotional booths. 
 
At the Dereboyu Street Festival, there are not only local Turkish Cypriot sweets, such as 
Lokma, being sold from carts, but also there are cafes, bars, and restaurants offering 
promotional deals to entice visitors to dine and drink. There are stands by different 
alcoholic beverage companies giving away free drinks. There are a few cafes and 
restaurants known outside of the TRNC, such as Leman-Kültür (a famous Turkish 
restaurant chain), Gloria Jeans (an American coffee company, now Australian-owned), 
and Domino’s Pizza. Because of the embargoes placed on the TRNC, it has been a long 
and arduous process to allow these stores, restaurants, and cafes to operate on TRNC soil. 
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Resultantly, many Turkish Cypriots take great pride in the fact that they have these stores 
and see it as a small step towards the process of their recognition as a legal country. As 
such, Turkish Cypriots interpret these brand name stores as a sign of the modern. In the 
village festivals, the heritage celebrated and the products sold is the food or the 
environment. But in the capital city, on Dereboyu, the ‘secular’ is being celebrated. 
Through engaging in activities such as drinking, commerce, and singing along with 
Turkish Cypriot musicians, Turkish Cypriots are reproducing a local identity where the 
‘modern’ is celebrated. These special events exemplify the popularity of Dereboyu as a 
place where Turkish Cypriots enjoy and practice their secular heritage as Cypriots. While 
Turkish Cypriots project their nostalgic views of the past onto the Walled City from the 
outside (see Chapter 4), Turkish Cypriots project their views of modernity onto 
Dereboyu.  
 
Diverse groups of people frequent the shops and cafes located on Dereboyu, but Turkish 
immigrants, Turkish Cypriots, and university students tend to segregate themselves in 
their favorite cafes and bars. This self-segregation was an occasional topic of discussion. 
One night my Turkish Cypriot companions wanted to play Okey, a domino game 
whereby the objective is for a person to be the first one on their team to form a hand 
consisting entirely of sets of equal numbered tiles or runs of consecutive tiles of the same 
color. There is a café on Dereboyu with tables built to play such games, a café usually 
associated with Turkish students because it is part of a chain also found in Turkey. My 
Turkish Cypriot companions never went there to watch football games but only when 
they wanted to play Okey. As they enjoyed playing this game, they would make small 
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bets, such as the loser would have to pay for everyone’s tea. They especially enjoyed 
teasing one another, such as when one team felt their side was getting close to winning, 
they would order another round of tea. On this particular night, a group of Kurdish 20-
year olds were watching the football game on TV in the café. When the soccer team they 
were rooting for scored, their voices made a long-drawn out ululation which my Turkish 
Cypriot companions found funny. The sound made by the young men watching the 
football game became the subject of ridicule by my Turkish Cypriot acquaintances for the 
rest of the night. The ridicule of these young Kurds illustrates their rejection of 
immigrants and acts as an example of how they negotiate boundaries between themselves 
and Kurdish ‘others’.   
 
As Turkish Cypriots negotiate the boundaries between themselves and Turkish and 
Kurdish ‘others’, they also project these boundaries onto the materiality of Dereboyu. For 
example, Tuncay, a Turkish Cypriot, commented about a mosque located at the end of 
Dereboyu, stating, “…the mosques are increasing [in North Cyprus] as well. Okay, a 
Muslim should follow his religious duties. He should go and pray, but I don’t understand 
why a person would go to a mosque on this street after coming to this street and drinking 
alcohol. Would it be normal?”  He went on to say, “You cannot think of this country 
becoming conservative. It’s almost impossible to imagine, but we are being put onto this 
road, you know? Slowly, slowly, they [AKP government] are trying to make us become 
more Muslim. This has been happening the last 13 years in Turkey, but is only recently 
starting in our country.” Through these statements it became quite evident that he feared 
that Erdoğan and the AKP government in Turkey were attempting to make his country 
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more religious. Ironically, the mosque he refers to was not built at the expense of the 
Turkish government, but was actually built by a Turkish Cypriot father who lost his child 
in a traffic accident. Though Tuncay’s reference to this specific mosque as an example of 
AKP’s ‘Islamification’ of the island was misinformed, it reveals the degree of his fear 
about the ‘Islamification’ of the island by generalizing all new mosque construction as 
being financed and driven by the AKP. His comments against the increase of mosques on 
the island were directed against the AKP’s political influence on the island, and the ways 
in which he believed their influence to be changing the island’s cultural landscape. His 
objection to the mosque on Dereboyu was therefore not one against religion per se, but 
rather it was against a religious presence in a space he sees as ‘secular’.  He is afraid that 
the increasing number (perceived and real) of mosques will slowly eliminate the secular 
heritage of the Turkish Cypriots. Here he is projecting the Turkish Cypriot ideology 
about the ‘modern’ onto Dereboyu.  
 
In this same discussion, Tuncay criticized the length of the ezan (call to prayer) in 
Lefkosa, stating, “I thought that the prayer length was too long, so I looked up how long 
the prayers should be on the Religion Ministry Website and I’ve seen that the prayer 
length is longer here (Lefkoşa)!...It’s more than five minutes here yaaa! It causes me 
discomfort”. In the recent decade, the length and volume of the ezan has been magnified, 
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causing considerable discontent amongst people, to include Tuncay. 45   Like many 
Turkish Cypriots, although Tuncay himself did not attend mosque, he still considered 
himself Muslim and as such these complaints should not be interpreted as a 
condemnation of the Islamic faith. In fact, he comments further about the ezan stating, 
“It’s actually a beautiful sound, it needs to be spread”. This comment supports the notion 
that his distress regarding the increase in mosques is not a fear directed against Islam. 
Instead, Tuncay’s fear is directed against the AKP. By specifically referencing the 
Dereboyu mosque and its location next to the drinking establishments and bars, Tuncay 
articulates his fear of the AKP altering and or eliminating the Turkish Cypriot ‘secular’ 
and ‘modern’ lifestyle. 
 
When comparing Dereboyu vis-à-vis AKP’s vision of Turkey, Turkish Cypriots construct 
Dereboyu as a “modern” and “secular” space. In a different context, when Turkish 
Cypriots compare Dereboyu to the shopping streets in the RoC, Dereboyu is revealed to 
be “less modern”. Hatay (2008) illustrates that while North Cyprus has acquired a 
number of legitimate name-brand stores, Turkish Cypriots remain acutely aware of the 
limitations levied by the embargoes and the number of knock-off chains such as the fast 
food chain “Burger City” (instead of the better known Burger King). The impact of the 
embargoes is particularly revealed when compared with the stores, cafes, restaurants, and 
bars located on the Greek side of the island. Many Turkish Cypriots asked if I had visited 
                                                        
45  For example, in November 2015 a trial was brought to session concerning the 
complaint filed by the lawyer, Feza Güzeloğlu, regarding the volume of the ezan from the 
minaret speakers of three mosques, Şeyh Nazım, Aşağı and Pir Paşa (Güzeloğlu, No. 
386/2014). Feza Güzeloğlu’s complaint was not against the ezan itself, but rather the 
volume of the ezan.  Until a further decision can be made, the court has temporarily 
banned the dawn recitation of the ezan from these mosques (Güzeloğlu, No. 386/2014). 
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the Walled City on the Greek side and then immediately said, “Isn’t it nice? It’s much 
more European”. Most will go on to say that it is not as congested and dirty as the TRNC. 
Several Turkish Cypriots were particularly curious as to whether or not I had eaten at the 
McDonalds on the Greek side or had gone to their Starbucks. While many Turkish 
Cypriots are proud to have a Gloria Jeans, some mourn the fact that it is not a Starbucks 
Coffee. Many of the Turkish Cypriot youths also longed for the variety of international 
brand name clothing stores located on the Greek side. While one can sample international 
brands on Dereboyu, there is a painful awareness of the comparatively meager offer of 
choices in the TRNC compared to the ROC. Although Dereboyu, a space filled with bars 
and international brands distinguishes the Turkish Cypriots as ‘secular’ and ‘modern’ 
against the AKP vision, when Dereboyu is compared to the Greek side, it highlights their 
as yet unattained ‘modernity’.  
 
Regardless of whether Dereboyu is being socially constructed as a modern space or seen 
as backwards in comparison to the Greek side (thus emphasizing the unrecognized status 
of the TRNC), Dereboyu is socially constructed as a secular Turkish Cypriot space. 
While the Walled City symbolizes a nostalgia for the past (Chapter 4), Dereboyu reflects 
their desired future—a place that is continuously under construction and progressing 
forward, a step toward their vision of a modern TRNC, and a vision that is threatened by 
the AKP’s non-secular efforts. The proximity of the Walled City to Dereboyu provides a 
sharp contrast and only enhances these views. Dereboyu is a place where Turkish 
Cypriots can embrace modern secularism and as such becomes a place where they can 
defend their secular heritage through protest.  
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The next section will examine two organized protests that took place on Dereboyu 
against the AKP government in Turkey. Although these protests were expressions of 
solidarity with protests happening in Turkey, it will be demonstrated that these events on 
Dereboyu were happening in a very specific Turkish Cypriot context. Through an 
examination of these protests, and the contexts in which they were held, this section will 
argue that the underlying motivation for Turkish Cypriots to protest was the defense of 
their secular values. This section will illustrate that Turkish Cypriots felt that these values 
were under threat by what they perceived to be the AKP government’s ‘Islamification’ of 
the TRNC and Turkey’s political and cultural dominance over the island. Much like the 
protestors in Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots resorted to Kemalism to resist the AKP, 
however, this section will emphasize that they protest within a very specific Turkish 
Cypriot context and as such negotiate a different construction of ‘Turkishness’.  
 
 
5.3 Gezi Park and Berkin Elvan Protests 
5.3.1 Alcohol restrictions and the Taksim Protests in Gezi Park 
On May 28th 2013, the Gezi Park protest in Istanbul began. It started peacefully as a 
demonstration against the decision made by the AKP government and then Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to remove trees in Gezi Park in order to provide space to 
build a shopping mall. In attempts to silence the demonstrators, the government used 
police force to remove them from the park. The extreme measures taken by the police 
included water cannons, pepper spray, and forced removal, videos of which were soon 
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posted on social media sites. After seeing these images, a protest erupted in Taksim 
Square attracting tens of thousands of people, with simultaneous protests being held in 
Ankara and Izmir. The protest was no longer about just the trees in Gezi Park, but had 
grown into a larger protest against the AKP government and Prime Minister Erdoğan 
over their interventions to restrict individual lifestyles and freedoms. The protest united 
disparate groups of people. Whether they were from different ethnic backgrounds, 
different age groups, social groups, political parties, or football team fans, they were all 
united in protest against Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP government.  
 
The anger against AKP did not happen overnight, but had been slowly building over the 
years amongst a large percentage of the population. Prior to the Taksim protests, the 
government passed a series of legislative mandates with little or no public consultation or 
forewarning, resulting in increased anger amongst the public against the AKP 
government and Prime Minister Erdoğan. One such legislated bill that passed was a bill 
restricting the sale, advertisement, and consumption of alcohol beverages (Resmi Gazete 
2013).46 The Turkish government claimed that the bill was passed to help protect the 
health of the Turkish youth, while opponents claimed that these regulations were an aim 
to make Turkish society more “Islamist”. CHP Deputy Musa Cam spoke out against the 
                                                        
46 Under this bill, alcohol cannot be sold after 10pm and is prohibited from being sold 
within a hundred meters of mosques and schools. Alcohol cannot be sold at educational 
or health institutions. Alcohol advertising campaigns such as promotions, sponsored 
activities, festivals and free giveaways are prohibited. Any images of alcohol on TV will 
be blurred (which is already in place for cigarettes). All liquor bottles being sold will 
have to display warning signs that indicated the harms of alcohol, as is the same for 
cigarettes (Resmi Gazete 2013).  
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law saying, “This is not a struggle against the ills of alcohol but an attempt to redesign 
the society according to their beliefs and lifestyles” (Hurriyet Daily News 2013).  
 
To justify their frustrations, opponents of the new law further cited AKP’s 2013 decision 
to change the national drink of Turkey from the much beloved alcohol drink, rakı47, to the 
non-alcohol yogurt-based drink, ayran. This change caused national outrage, with many 
commenting on how the drink of Atatürk was being replaced by the ‘Islamic-friendly’ 
yogurt drink. Supporters of the bill denied the claim they were attempting to “redesign 
society”, emphasizing that alcohol was not being banned completely as it would have to 
be to conform to Islamic religious teachings. Instead, they argued that their only concern 
when passing the law was for the health of Turkish citizens, particularly the youth. They 
also emphasized that in fact, far from being “backwards,” they were actually 
implementing a law that was already in place in several western, non-Islamic countries. 
For example, in a newspaper interview the head of the Planning and Budget Committee, 
Lütfü Elvan of AKP made comparisons to Sweden stating, “In Sweden, [the retail sale of 
alcohol] is forbidden after 7pm on weekdays, 3pm on Saturdays and 24 hours on 
Sundays. There are similar restrictions in all Scandinavian countries” (Hurriyet Daily 
News 2013). Here it is clear that the AKP government and its supporters do not want to 
be seen as “backwards”, thus political parties, whether promoting a separation or 
synthesis of religion and politics, both share Atatürk’s view on modernity as an 
                                                        
47 Rakı is an aniseed flavoured alcoholic drink that is usually served with ice water, 
although can also be consumed straight. When combined with water, it produces a 
distinct milky-white colour and as such is referred to as ‘Aslan sütü’ (English: ‘Lion’s 
milk’). Drinking Rakı is a cultural activity in North Cyprus and Turkey, most commonly 
consumed with company and mezze dishes. The drink is also associated with Atatürk 
who is known to have enjoyed drinking large quantities of Rakı. 
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instrument of ‘progress’. These debates were not just about whether or not the sale of 
alcohol should be restricted, but also through these debates the concept of ‘Turkishness’ 
was being negotiated and redefined.  
 
This law is best understood in the social background in which it was enacted. AKP had 
gained strict control over the media, shutting down YouTube and Twitter to control news 
stories as needed. The police had adopted brutal tactics in dealing with resistance and 
used that against protesters including those involved in the Taksim event. On the 
occasion of the Taksim protest the Turkish media, under control of the government, did 
not air information about the Taksim protest but instead aired documentaries and cooking 
shows. CNNTurk aired a documentary about penguins. This inspired the protesters to use 
the penguin as a symbol of their opposition, which became very popular because of the 
irony that penguins are nowhere to be found in such a hot country. The penguin rapidly 
became an image that was posted throughout social media and painted as graffiti onto 
walls. Social media became the platform to get their messages across throughout Turkey 
and the world because their own news stations were not fulfilling their proper role.  
 
In addition to the images of penguins, social media became inundated with music, comic 
strips, photographs, videos, and chants that were happening at protests across the country. 
Two popular protest songs included “Sounds of Pots and Pans” and “Everyday I’m 
Çapuling”. The former song used kitchen pots and pans as musical instruments to mimic 
the residents in the protest areas who banged pots and pans from the windows of their 
homes to express their support for the protesters in the street. The latter song used the 
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melody of the international pop musical hit, “Everyday I’m shuffling” by LMFAO, but 
replaced the word ‘shuffling’ with ‘çapuling’. Prime Minister Erdoğan used the term 
“çapulcu” (English: ‘looter’) disparagingly to describe the protesters, which was 
immediately reclaimed by the protesters and used to further unify themselves as part of 
the movement against AKP. As noted by Singer (2013) the term “çapulcu” used by 
Erdogan is significant as it was previously used by Necip Fazil (See Chapter 2). Fazil 
described the Action Army lead by Kemal Atatürk and Ismet Inonu as “çapulcu”  in their 
resistance against the 1909 mutiny, whereby religious students and lower-ranking Islamic 
scholars were revolting against the so-called “anti-Islamic” government of the late-
Ottoman era, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Singer 2013, 86). The Action 
Army eventually prospered, but what makes this even more significant is that this 
resistance took place at the present day Gezi Parks (Singer 2013, 86).  
 
It is important to note that social media was widely used not only by those who protested 
against the government, but it was also used by those who supported the government in 
their attempt to stop the protest. Those who supported the government used social media 
to present protesters as “hooligans” instead of peaceful protesters. One popular image 
circulated by the pro-government supporters was a beer can left inside a mosque by 
protestors. Comments were made by social media users that it was disrespectful for 
protesters to enter mosques with their shoes on and bring in and consume alcohol. 
Another popular way to use social media to support the government was to display 
images of police officers being abused to counteract the images posted of protesters being 
abused by the police.  
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Although these social media protesters present these static images of alcohol and 
mosques as mutually exclusive, the orientation of both the protesters and supporters of 
the government were not. Many protesters who were against Erdoğan and against the 
alcohol ban were Muslim. Similarly, there were hybrid groups such as the “Islamic non-
capitalist”, who although devoutly religious, were protesting against Erdoğan for his 
neoliberal policies. Therefore, underlying their protests were concerns about where the 
future of Turkey was headed. The protesters were worried that Atatürk’s secular vision 
for the nation would be replaced by AKP’s political Islam, while the supporters defended 
AKP’s alternate Turkish future embedded in a synthesis of politics and religion. 
Consequently, these diverging understandings of the future have repercussions on how 
the citizens define themselves in relation to their nation.  What ‘Turks’ are to comprise 
this future? These negotiations of ‘Turkishness’ in Turkey lay the framework for how the 
protests on Dereboyu can best be understood.  
 
5.3.2 “Dereboyundayiz Taksim!” (“We are in Dereboyu, Taksim”)  
In addition to Gezi protests held around Turkey, solidarity protests were held in foreign 
countries with large Turkish populations such as Germany, England, and North Cyprus. 
Upon seeing the protests in Turkey, the TRNC citizens, Turkish immigrants and Turkish 
students in the TRNC wanted to stand in solidarity with the Turkish protesters. On June 
1st 2013, they organized themselves using social media and gathered outside Kuğulu 
Park. Similar to the protests in Taksim Square, the demonstrators in North Cyprus were 
composed of a cross-section of society. The protesters in North Cyprus were primarily 
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students at the TRNC universities, but non-governmental organizations and unions were 
also present. From Kuğulu Park they marched to the Turkish Embassy and down 
Dereboyu Street. At the protest in North Cyprus, demonstrators insulted Prime Minister 
Erdoğan by toasting to him with the Turkish crafted Efes beer, singing “Şerefe Tayyip” 
(English: “Cheers Tayyip”) (See Figure 6). The song was appropriated from the protests 
in Istanbul. Originally created in Turkey by the Beşkitas football fan club, Carşı, the song 
was soon adopted by protest groups all across the globe thanks to social media sites such 
as YouTube. To further show their disdain for the alcohol ban, they painted their slogans 
on Efes Beer posters that they carried down the street. 
 
 
    Figure 6: Front Cover Afrika Newspaper (2 June 2013).  
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Why were citizens in North Cyprus passionately protesting and standing in solidarity 
with Turkish protesters?  Why were many angered by the restrictions on alcohol if they 
did not directly affect North Cyprus?  Although the alcohol ban did not directly affect 
North Cyprus, many Turkish Cypriots were outraged over Erdoğan’s increasingly 
authoritarian rule, his deconstruction of Atatürk’s work, and what they viewed as the rise 
of pro-Islamic policies promoted by the AKP government. By toasting to Erdogan, they 
were fiercely opposing the AKP’s alcohol ban to illustrate their conviction that the 
government should not be allowed to control alcohol consumption. However, more so 
they were demonstrating their support of the separation of religion and state put in place 
by Atatürk. Although the ban does not prevent anyone from drinking alcohol, these 
protestors interpreted the alcohol ban as a not too subtle move by AKP to Islamify 
Turkey. As such, their protest is also demonstrating how they define the Turkish nation, 
one that progresses towards a modern future by keeping religion and state affairs 
separate. Through this protest they were standing in solidarity with the protestors and 
constructing boundaries against the AKP to define themselves as Turks as defined by 
Atatürk. In this definition of the state, the Turkish citizen is not religiously defined. They 
do not want to replace their Efes with Ayran nor live in a future Turkey that embraces 
political Islam. Simultaneously, as will be demonstrated, the Turkish Cypriots are 
invoking a Turkish Cypriot identity to combat the political and cultural dominance of the 
island. As will be made clearer throughout this chapter, Erdoğan’s vision of Turkey’s 
future vis-à-vis its relationship with North Cyprus both differs from the majority of 
Turkish Cypriots and has tangible effects on the island. Over the years, many Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkish immigrants living in North Cyprus have been increasingly angered 
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with Erdoğan’s pro-Islamic policies, many of which have had direct consequences for the 
political landscape of North Cyprus. 
 
Perhaps the most noticeable changes have been the increase in the number of mosques 
and the enforcement of religious education. According to data provided by Yusuf 
Suiçmez and gathered by Dayıoğlu and Hatay (2014) North Cyprus had a total of 182 
mosques in 2009. 84 of these mosques existed before the island’s division, but the rest 
were either converted from Greek Orthodox churches or newly constructed. There were 
39 newly constructed mosques, of which 31 were directly financed by the Directorate of 
Aid Committee of the Turkish Embassy. This is not surprising as most of the cost of 
infrastructure in North Cyprus is provided for by Turkey. According to research 
conducted by Dayıoğlu and Hatay (2014), although Turkey granted 10,400,000TL 
(approximately 3,466,000E) to the TRNC to be spent on mosque construction, upkeep 
and organization of religious courses, the total amount spent by the TRNC was 
2,185,207TL (approximately 728,400E). Although only 20% of the funds allocated were 
used, Turkey continued to send money to the TRNC for religious purposes. While Turkey 
provided copious amounts of money to the TRNC for religious purposes no money was 
allocated for the construction of a cemevi, the house of worship for the Alevis, a cultural 
and religious minority in Cyprus and Turkey (Dayıoğlu and Hatay 2014). For many, this 
expenditure of money gave evidence to a biased agenda on the part of Turkey.  
 
On 20 July 2012 the ground breaking ceremony for the first religious school in the 
TRNC, Hala Sultan Divinity College, was held. The allocation of 12,000,000TL 
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(approximately 4,000,000E) by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of 
Turkey for the construction of the Divinity College was heavily criticized by the Turkish 
Cypriot population (Bailie 2013, 12; Dayıoğlu and Hatay 2014, 164). One of the main 
arguments of objection stemmed from the fact that while 12,000,000TL was allocated for 
the building of one religious school, only 11,000,000TL had been allocated for the 
maintenance of all state schools in North Cyprus (Bailie 2013, 12). In a joint statement 
with the Turkish Cypriot Secondary Education Teacher’s Union (KTOEOS), the Turkish 
Cypriot Teachers’ Union (KTOS) stated, “It is a reflection of that mentality when only 11 
million TL has been set aside for the repair and maintenance of all state schools, and 22 
million TL has been allocated for the construction of one mosque. What will destroy the 
Turkish Cypriots is not the TOMA [riot control vehicle] but the seeds of Sharia [Islamic 
Law] that will be injected into young brains.” (Bailie 2013, 12). The TOMA, an armored 
riot control vehicle designed by a Turkish company, was under consideration for 
purchase by the TRNC. However, in this statement it acts as a symbol representing the 
authoritarian control of Turkey because the TOMA had gained notoriety after its use by 
Turkish police forces during the Gezi Protests. Sharia Law was mentioned in this 
statement as a symbol of the building of the divinity school and to represent the practice 
of political Islam by Turkey (even though Sharia Law is not practiced in Turkey). Either 
way, it is clear from this statement that KTOS consider Turkey as the ‘outsider’ creating 
the destruction of the Turkish Cypriots’ way of life.   
 
Although the financial support for the Hala Sultan Divinity College was technically non-
governmental funding, many Turkish Cypriots opposed the opening of the Divinity 
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College because they perceived it as another attempt by the Turkish state, under the 
control of the AKP government, to “Islamify” North Cyprus. These Turkish Cypriots 
demanded the college’s closure, arguing that the AKP government was attempting to 
create a more religious community at the expense of the secular community. To evidence 
their fears they cited Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay who said, “As we all 
know, North Cyprus is a place which needs religious education. With this protocol, this 
need is being fulfilled” (Dayıoğlu and Hatay 2014, 173). While Turkish Cypriots were 
greatly opposed to the building of the Divinity College, many organizations in North 
Cyprus, particularly those established by Turkish immigrants, supported the college’s 
opening (Dayıoğlu and Hatay 2014, 173). However, because it was mainly Turkish 
immigrants who supported the opening of the college, many Turkish Cypriots saw this as 
proof that the Turkish Cypriots’ culture was being diminished.  
 
A little over a year after the ground breaking ceremony, on 27 September 2013, the Hala 
Sultan Divinity College in Haspolat was opened. With the opening of the first religious 
college in North Cyprus and the construction of two more mosques48, the question about 
the “Islamification” of the TRNC had become a renewed topic of discussion. This 
discussion was further exacerbated by the optional (although often cited by Turkish 
Cypriots as compulsory) Koran courses that had been implemented in primary schools 
across the country and other religious courses that were implemented for the first time in 
                                                        
48  Two groundbreaking ceremonies occurred during the opening of the Hala Sultan 
Divinity College. One groundbreaking ceremony was for the mosque at the educational 
complex housing Hala Sultan Divinity College and the other groundbreaking ceremony 
was for the mosque being constructed on the campus of Near East University (NEU). The 
NEU mosque, inspired by Ottoman architecture, will be the largest mosque in Cyprus 
allowing 10,000 to worship at the same time (Bailie, B., 2013).  
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higher education institutions in 2013. The debate about the “Islamification” of the island 
was positioned as a debate to define Turkish Cypriot identity. In many cases, Turkish 
Cypriots define themselves as distinct from the “people of eastern Turkey” who they see 
as being more religious and having a “different culture”. Many Turkish Cypriots blamed 
the Turkish immigrants, specifically immigrants from eastern Turkey, for the changes in 
the landscape, particularly the increase in the number of mosques because they are the 
ones who attend mosque more regularly and are supporters of the implementation of 
religious courses in public education. In this way, Turkish immigrants from ‘the east’ 
have come to represent Turkey’s ‘Islamification’ of the island. As a result, Turkish 
Cypriots ‘other’ Turkish immigrants from ‘the east’, and in doing so align themselves 
with ‘western’ Turks. Simultaneously, Turkish Cypriots sympathize with Turkish 
immigrants from ‘the west’ as many of them also opposed the increased construction of 
mosques on the island and see themselves differently from Turkish immigrants from ‘the 
east’. As such, both Turkish immigrants from the ‘west’ and Turkish Cypriots embrace 
Kemalist values. This self-identification with ‘western’ Turks suggests that this political 
contestation is one that is both about Turkish Cypriot identity (and political sovereignty) 
as well as about definitions of Turkishness (inspired by a Kemalist legacy). In other 
words, the debate presents a paradoxical identification with transnational Kemalism and 
aspiration for TRNC sovereignty.  
 
5.3.3 Defenders of Kemalism  
In addition to the protests against the alcohol ban on Dereboyu, TRNC protesters 
ventilated their frustration with AKP through anti-Erdoğan demonstrations and burned 
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images of Erdoğan. One of the burned posters had an image of Erdoğan yelling with a 
caption that read, “I am not even this much the son of a human” which is a Turkish 
expression used to imply that the person is like an animal because the things they do no 
human would do to another human being. Protesters chanted “Eat my dick, Tayyip,” 
which was appropriated from the Beşiktas football chant usually used against the rival 
football team Fenerbahçe but re-composed to target Prime Minister Erdoğan. To further 
show their anger against Erdoğan, they had many pro-Atatürk posters and sang pro-
Atatürk chants. They held banners that said “We are Soldiers of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” 
and “How happy I am to be a Turk,” a well-known saying by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
engraved on the Beşparmak mountainside. Turkish immigrants sang nationalist songs 
such as the “10 Year March” (10. Yıl Marşı). In 1933, this song was composed for 
Turkey’s 10 year anniversary as a Republic. The song is still sung at national holidays 
and events such as graduation and wedding ceremonies. The song is more frequently 
sung by those who are pro-Republic or pro-Kemalist and as such has become heavily 
associated with Republicans and Kemalists. In their demonstrations, Turkish Cypriot 
protesters are invoking Atatürk, the champion of a secular Turkey, in order to confront 
the pro-Islamic policies of AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan and the more conservative 
practices of the Turkish immigrants. 
 
Atatürk and Erdoğan are frequently pitted against one another, as both are representative 
of two distinct ideas of Turkey. As stated previously, Kemalists dissociate themselves 
from their Ottoman past, which they see to be uncivilized and ‘backwards,’ and instead 
look towards Europe for inspiration in the construction of the Turkish nation and the new 
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‘Turk’. On the contrary, Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKPs attempt to defy Atatürk’s 
efforts by embracing its Islamic and Ottoman roots. The AKP seeks to use the Ottoman 
past as a source of inspiration in the unification of a new Turkey and in the redefining of 
what it means to be a ‘Turk’. A few months after the Gezi Protest, on the anniversary of 
Atatürk’s death, many anti-Erdoğan sentiments were again revived. On the anniversary of 
Atatürk’s death the Turkish people around the world celebrate and commemorate 
Atatürk’s life. Businesses also run advertisements in newspapers showing their respect 
for their founding father. In 2012, Koc, which is one of the biggest companies in Turkey, 
ran an advertisement displaying a portrait of Atatürk with the phrase “Olmasaydın 
olmazdık,” which translates into “If you didn’t exist, we wouldn’t exist”. The portrait and 
this phrase were accompanied with Atatürk’s date of birth and death (1881-1938), with 
the “8” in “1938” shaped as an infinity sign, further emphasizing that he lives on in the 
Turkish imagination. On the anniversary of Atatürk’s death in 2013, a pro-AKP magazine 
named Sancaktar paid Yeni Akit, an Islamist Turkish daily newspaper with close ties to 
AKP, to run an advertisement on the back of their newspaper. This advertisement 
displayed the dates of Atatürk’s birth and death coupled with a quote derived from the 
Koç’s advertisement which read, “Olmasaydı da olurduk” which translated means, “It 
doesn’t matter if Atatürk existed, we would still exist and be the same”. Many saw this 
advertisement, coupled with Erdoğan and AKP’s mixing of religion and politics, as an 
attempt to downplay and perhaps even erase the legacy of Atatürk and his secular 
construction of Turkey. This advertisement infuriated many people, both Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot. In retaliation, many Turkish and Turkish Cypriots took to the internet 
and circulated the Sancaktar advertisement replacing the advertisement’s phrase with, 
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“Olmasaydin süper olurdu” meaning, “It would have been super if Erdoğan had never 
been born,” and coupled it with Erdoğan’s birth date and the phrase “bekliyoruz işte” 
(English: “well we are waiting”) for his death date. This had an added impact in that a 
few years before this advertisement Erdoğan was very ill and near his death. Images of 
the latter advertisement were posted on many Turkish Cypriot Facebook pages and 
became a major topic of discussion.  
 
In these acts of protests Turkish Cypriots are invoking Atatürk to legitimize their 
rejection of Erdoğan. However, these two men are not the subject of this debate, but 
rather the debate is about Turkish modernity. By embracing Atatürk, Turkish Cypriots are 
embracing his ideals about the need for the TRNC to be a modern state with a national 
identity based on secular ideals. In doing so, they are negotiating an identity different 
from AKP’s construction of a Muslim-Turk. Although they are protesting what they 
perceive to be Turkey’s instituted non-secular politics, their desire to preserve Kemalist 
values is an embracing of their Turkish roots and these two negotiations are not seen as 
contradictory. In this context, through this embrace, Turkish Cypriots negotiate 
‘Turkishness’ to project a future founded in Kemalist values whereby they relate to the 
Turkish immigrants and citizens from the ‘west’.  
 
5.3.4 Berkin Elvan Protests 
A 14-year old boy spent several months in a coma after being hit by a tear gas canister 
during the Gezi Protests. He died on 11 March 2014. His name was Berkin Elvan and he 
was 15 years old at the time of his death. Those opposing the AKP government and the 
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brutal tactics of the police portrayed Berkin Elvan as a young boy who got hit on his way 
to the market to buy bread. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and his supporters claimed 
that he was a member of a terrorist organization. In Prime Minister Erdogan’s speech on 
14 March in Gaziantep celebrating his 12th anniversary of being the longest serving Prime 
Minister he characterized Berkin Elvan as, “…a kid with steel marbles in his pockets, 
with a slingshot in his hand, his face covered with a scarf” (BBC 2014b). His death 
sparked anti-government protests in Turkey and the TRNC similar to the Gezi Protests by 
those who held the government responsible for Berkin Elvan’s untimely death.  
 
Protesters shouted “Berkin’s murderers are the AKP police” and the boy’s mother said, 
“It’s not God who took my son away but Prime Minister Erdoğan” (BBC News 2014a). 
On March 11th, in solidarity with the protesters in Turkey, the people in the TRNC took 
to the streets of Dereboyu to protest the AKP government. The protest was organized by 
Communal Democracy Party (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi,TDP) youth group, CTP 
Youth, New Cyprus Party (Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi, YKP) youth group, Baraka, Devrimci 
Komünist Birlik (Revolutionary Communist Union), Pir Sultan Abdal Association, and 
the Poseidon Culture Centre. University students from EMU and METU North Cyprus 
Campus also participated. A crowd gathered at Kuğulu Park and walked towards 
Dereboyu holding posters with Berkin's picture and chanted slogans in protest of his 
death. The chants were showing their support for the protesters in Turkey and protesting 
against Tayyip Erdoğan. Slogans like, “Shoulder to shoulder against fascism”, “Cyprus 
don’t sleep, defend Berkin”, “Berkin Elvan is immortal”, and “Murderer Tayyip 
Erdoğan” were chanted during the demonstration. The demonstration's last stop was the 
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Turkish Embassy. Echoing Berkin’s mother, the protesters shouted, “God didn’t take 
Berkin away, Tayyip took him away”. The protestors called for AKP and Tayyip 
Erdoğan to be held accountable and further stated, “…with the death of Berkin we are not 
only saying goodbye to a young boy but also to justice, democracy and independence one 
more time”. Turkish Cypriots stood by their fellow Turks with this announcement: 
“Whoever killed him should know that we are all Berkin Elvan. We brought these loaves 
of bread, but we are not eating them as Berkin could not eat them either. We invite these 
killers to give account in front of justice. We believe that the Turkish public will ask 
AKP to be held accountable….we salute resisting groups on the streets since the 
beginning of Gezi protests. We are giving shoulder to the Turkish people. Your pain is 
our pain” (Afrika 2014, 3a). 
 
For Turkish protesters in Turkey, the purpose of the demonstrations after Berkin Elvan’s 
death and at Gezi was to move Turkey in the direction of Kemalist ideals of 
modernization. They sought to rid themselves of what they regarded as an oppressive 
central government in which the voice of the people was being stilled. According to the 
Kemalist values they support, the idea that North Cyprus is a part of Turkey is not 
contested. Atatürk regarded the Turkish Cypriots living in Cyprus as the Turks of Cyprus. 
How Turkish Cypriots are affected by Turkey’s influence over North Cyprus is not an 
issue for Turkish citizens. The only issue to some Turkish citizens is the cost to the 
people of Turkey to maintain the TRNC. To them, the loss of the territory of North 
Cyprus is acceptable if solving the “Cyprus Problem” allows them entry into the 
European Union (EU). However, it should be noted that the desire to enter the EU by the 
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Turkish public is in decline (Erdenir 2014, 105). According to the 2014 Eurobarometer 
Report, Turkish public support for joining the EU is low, with only 38% of the Turkish 
public believing that EU membership is “a good thing” for Turkey (European 
Commission 2014, 83-84). For those in Turkey supportive of the AKP government, 
Cyprus is also seen as a part of Turkey, but in a different way.  The AKP sees Cyprus as 
part of the old Ottoman Empire and reimagines Turkish Cypriots as Turkish Muslim 
Brothers. In both the narrative of the Gezi protester and the AKP supporter, Cyprus is a 
part of Turkey.  
 
When the Turkish Cypriots protested on Dereboyu against the death of Berkin Elvan and 
in support of the Gezi protests, it was similarly a protest against AKP’s promotion of 
political Islam and the resultant non-secular conception of Turkish ‘modernity’ held by 
the AKP, as well as Turkey’s political and cultural dominance over the island. For the 
Turkish Cypriots, the current political leadership of Turkey does not represent their ideals 
of modernization or even include the possibility for a Cypriot narrative. Therefore, when 
the Turkish Cypriots were protesting in solidarity with the Gezi protesters and the 
protesters after the death of Berkin Elvan, they were doing so from their own vantage 
point, negotiating their own construction of ‘Turkishness’. Their concept of what it 
means to be Turkish in North Cyprus differs from the concept the Gezi protesters have 
for them. They stand together in support of the idea of removing AKP from power, and 
both invoke Atatürk, but in doing so they negotiate different understandings of 
‘Turkishness’.    
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5.3.5 Dereboyu and Protest  
Anthropologists and social scientists such as Low (1996), de Certeau (1984) and Mitchell 
(1988) examine the relationship between public space and social change. Through 
different examples they illustrate how although the construction of public spaces can 
increase the power of the state, the public users of the space also possess a power through 
their ability to contest the meaning and use of such spaces through collective and 
individual actions. The places where these protests were held, in both Turkey and the 
TRNC, were not inactive backdrops to the demonstrations but were active performers 
that played an important role throughout the protests.  
 
In the context of the political protests in Gezi, research has shown the important way in 
which protesters situated the debate in the physical space of Taksim Square in Istanbul 
(Gül, Dee and Cünük 2014). With the square first being constructed as part of Ataturk’s 
vision for a modern Turkey, to today’s use of Taksim Square as the center of business 
and location to some of the popular bars, Taksim Square has a long history of association 
with secularism. As such, Taksim Square is socially constructed as a place that is 
representative of these ideals. In addition to the socially constructed ideas about Taksim, 
the physical attributes of Taksim Square were also important in the Gezi protests. The 
protests in Turkey were originally sparked by a desire to protect one of the last green 
spaces in an expanding city and to prevent the secular space of Taksim Square from 
being transformed into an Ottoman style shopping mall. The forceful attempts to remove 
the peaceful protesters quickly became a metonym for the larger political issues at hand, 
that being the AKP government’s enforcement of its Ottoman values despite all protests. 
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It also highlighted the importance of the physical space because although the AKP 
government is well known for their urban building projects they have yet to claim any 
square of central importance to display their own vision and identity (Gül, Dee and 
Cünük 2014).  
 
Through their demonstrations, the diverse group of Gezi protesters contested how the 
state was to construct Taksim’s public space. As Gezi protesters wanted to protect their 
secular square and their secular country, so too did the Turkish Cypriot protesters. 
Turkish Cypriots, Turkish immigrants, and students stood in solidarity with the Gezi 
protesters by occupying Dereboyu in Lefkoşa to demonstrate just what kind of 
democratic rule they envisioned. Dereboyu was also used in the protests following the 
death of Berkin Elvan. It was chosen as the location for the protest in part because the 
TRNC National Assembly and the Turkish Embassy were located on this street, 
providing an audience for their protest. As stated in Section 5.2, Dereboyu is a place 
where Turkish Cypriots project their modern ideals for the future. Marching down this 
socially imagined space of Dereboyu is symbolic of their opposition to AKP’s alternate 
ideas of modernity. Because of the location of the Turkish Embassy and the TRNC 
National Assembly on Dereboyu, there are numerous authorized protests occurring 
weekly. However, while there are many official, organized protests, there are also more 
organic informal “protests” that occur through the practices of everyday living by the 
people on Dereboyu. These informal protests situate Dereboyu as a place where they can 
live out their secular values as well as protest against the Turkish government’s rule on 
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the island. Through an analysis of a rock and roll bar on Dereboyu and the music played 
within, the following section will provide further insight into these informal protests.  
 
 
5.4 Anayasa Rock Bar 
5.4.1 Kahve or Gahve?  
The owner of the bar below my apartment hands me his business card. At first glance, the 
card appears to be a normal business card, with a pronounced logo in the center of the 
card and the contact details in fine print located on the bottom. The logo for the bar is a 
large “A”, which is purposefully constructed to mimic the anarchist symbol, but also acts 
as a monogram for the bar’s name, Anayasa Rock Bar. My eyes scan to the bottom of the 
card and the first words are the street name—Osman Pasa Cadessi. The next words read, 
“Guglahane Garşışı”. I pause, confused because I had never seen these words before. 
After a minute, I realize what he has done and chuckle.  
 
The owner of the bar is known around the island for his far left views. He has amassed 
over 5,000 followers on both his Facebook and Twitter accounts, where he frequently 
comments on the politics and daily events in Turkey, TRNC, and Cyprus. He also 
publishes an online satirical newspaper (The Mandira Times) that parodies real news 
stories, again focusing primarily on issues regarding Turkey, TRNC, and Cyprus. During 
my conversations with him he frequently expressed that he is proud to be a Cypriot—
using the word “Kibrisli,” rather than the term “Kibrisli Turk” found in textbooks. He 
further expressed his pride by claiming, “There are Cypriots who speak Greek and there 
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are Cypriots who speak Turkish. I am a Cypriot who speaks Turkish. I am not a Turkish 
Cypriot.” The Turkish Cypriot accent is very distinct, with one distinction being that they 
frequently pronounce the letter “K” as the letter “G”. However, it is not only the accent 
but Turkish Cypriots also have their own dialect, using words influenced from Greek and 
phrasing their questions differently. Turkish people often make fun of Turkish Cypriots 
for their accent and what they see as an improper adaptation of the Turkish language, 
commenting that they are ruining the pure, proper Turkish language. Their comments 
highlight one way in which Turkish culture demeans Turkish Cypriot culture by 
emphasizing that Turkish, as spoken in Turkey, is the norm.  
 
Mahmut claims the Turkish Cypriot accent and dialect as a source of pride and 
emphasizes this “Cypriot” part of himself often. While the Turkish Cypriot dialect is 
different, the written language follows standard Turkish rules. However, at Anayasa Rock 
Bar, Mahmut will frequently write words that are supposed to be spelled with a “K,” with 
a “G”. Prominent amongst these words is the Turkish word for coffee, “kahve”. Mahmut 
will frequently write “gahve” out of pride in the Turkish Cypriot dialect, thereby adding a 
visible space for the Turkish Cypriot dialect in the written landscape. So on the business 
card, the words “Guglahane Garşışı” are his way of writing the Turkish words 
“Kuglahane Karşışı”, which means “Across from the Puppet House”. The “Puppet 
House” the card refers to is the Turkish Cypriot Parliament (KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi), 
which is indeed located directly across the road from Anayasa Rock Bar. By using the 
“G” instead of the “K”, Mahmut emphasizes his Cypriotness and through the description 
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of the Turkish Cypriot Parliament he stresses the political conundrum of the island and 
implies that the Turkish Cypriot Parliament is only a tool of Turkey. 
 
5.4.2 Mixed Media Protest  
The satirical business card is only a prelude to the bar itself, which is a political 
microcosm of the divided capital within which the bar is situated. A large pirate flag 
hovers over the bar, referencing the local inhabitants’ use of “korsan” (“pirate”) as a 
nickname for the TRNC and alludes to the political illegality of the TRNC. The bar is 
located on the corner of Osman Pasa Street and Servet Somuncuoglu Street. One side of 
the bar borders a side street and the other side borders a hamburger diner. At the divide 
between the hamburger diner and the bar, there is a large chain fence with barbed wire at 
the top. This fence is part of the bar’s decor, with intent to mimic the border between 
North and South Cyprus. Keeping with the theme, the fence is also lined with the same 
“no trespassing” signs one would encounter along the divide. Mahmut added some 
additional signs such as a board showcasing the photocopies of his multiple ID cards—a 
citizen of North Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, and the European Union, which like the 
pirate flag allude to the illegitimacy and “fakeness” of the state.  
 
This fence also serves a practical purpose, as it serves as a shelf to hold the bar’s liquor 
during the months this outdoor portion of the bar is open. A bartender, wearing a shirt 
with a rude comical inscription as his uniform will take a bottle off this fence and place it 
on the long green marble top bar to pour into glasses. The green marble was purposefully 
chosen in order to reference the Green Line that divides Cyprus in two. The customers sit 
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at tables and chairs sponsored by Efes Beer which also bear the same green cushion. In 
the middle of the outdoor bar is a tall tree that instead of being cut down has been 
incorporated into the bar’s construction. The tree trunk has a decorative rope around it 
and at the top is a clapper board that satirically depicts 20 July as a rape scene directed by 
“Uncle Sam” with the cameraman being “Kenan Evren” (See Figure 7). 49  The movie is 
titled “Mandira,” (English “barnyard”), a metaphor used to describe the political state of 
North Cyprus, as well as the name given to the online newspaper Mahmut runs—The 
Mandira Times. The bar is full of irony in every direction you turn. Although Mahmut is 
proudly Cypriot, through his comedy he sheds light on what he sees as a real tragedy for 
the people of his country not to have a nation. In his own words he speaks against the 
claim that there are national borders in Cyprus, “What borders? It’s a very small island 
and there is only one Cyprus.” He continues to express the conundrum that although 
Cyprus is one, in the current division of the island, he has no place to call home. “I have 
no place to go. But the population that comes from Turkey, they can go home. If they 
want to go home, they can. But where am I going to go? ” 
 
                                                        
49 Kenan Evren led the 1980 military coup in Turkey and was the President of Turkey at 
the time of the 20 July Turkish Operation in North Cyprus.  
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Figure 7: Clapperboard Décor at Anayasa Rock Bar 
 
Mahmut opened Anayasa Rock Bar because he enjoyed listening to rock music and he 
liked what the music stood for, “Rock is a revolution music”. The genre of rock music is 
commonly associated with protest and anti-government sentiments. Although Anayasa 
Rock Bar is unique in theme, the use of rock music to protest in North Cyprus is hardly 
so. The use of rock music to protest against Turkey and against the divided nature of the 
island is a very common trend on the island. As will be shown, the rebellious significance 
of rock music is its multiplicity in protest.  
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5.4.3 Protest and Rock n’ Roll in North Cyprus  
“Deep Purple is coming to town!” was the phrase most heard in North Cyprus after Near 
East University (NEU) announced that they had secured the band to come and help 
celebrate their 25th anniversary. At first Turkish Cypriots could hardly believe that Deep 
Purple was coming to play because previous singers and athletes who had tried to come 
to the island had backed out at the last minute due to pressures from Greek Cypriot 
lobbyists. The most notable instance of this was in 2010, when the international pop-
singer Jennifer Lopez had accepted an offer to perform for the opening of Cratos 
Premium Hotel in North Cyprus but backed out at the last minute due to the pressure of 
the Greek Cypriot Lobbyists, who stated that if she performed in North Cyprus she would 
be supporting a country that has committed numerous human rights abuses. Deep Purple, 
however, defended their performance on the island claiming that they were not “choosing 
a side” and that they were merely playing music for their fans.  
 
Regardless of their intentions, the decision to perform was interpreted as a political 
statement by Greek and Turkish Cypriots and caused much controversy. However, the 
TRNC government and the Turkish Cypriots interpreted the decision to perform in 
different ways. The TRNC government saw the concert as a way to further their peace 
negotiations, seeing it as a confidence building measure. After a two years hiatus in 
peace-negotiations, TRNC President Eroğlu and ROC President Anastasiades resumed 
peace talks. President Eroğlu extended an invitation to President Anastasiades to attend 
the concert and received no response. Turkish Cypriots, however, interpreted the rock 
musicians’ presence on the island as a rebellious act. Rock music is rebellious and for the 
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Turkish Cypriots it was a particularly proud moment of legitimization when Deep Purple 
‘rebelled’ and flew a direct route from London to the TRNC Ercan airport to land in their 
country instead of the Larnaca or Paphos airport in the ROC. The Greek Cypriot foreign 
ministry launched an investigation into whether the plane that landed in Ercan airport was 
operated by British Airways (BA) since a plane flying directly from London would be 
considered illegal. BA responded to these accusations, stating that it was a charter plane 
operated by SunAir not BA. NEU claimed that the ROC government had sent an 
Ottoman Turkish title deed to Deep Purple to convince them not to play in lands stolen 
from Greek Cypriots (LGC News 2014). The newspaper Haber Kibris said, NEU should 
“Answer to Greek Cypriots with an Ottoman style slap” (LGC News 2014). An Ottoman 
slap is an action known by Turkish and Turkish Cypriots as a large open-palmed hand 
slap to the face that when delivered to an enemy it could crack a skull. Despite the ROC 
Government’s attempts to cancel the concert, Deep Purple played an admission free 
concert in the TRNC to around 35,000 people.  
 
Assistant Professor and NEU director of the board of trustees, İrfan Günsel said in a 
newspaper interview, “Rock is not only a music style, but a lifestyle. Rock is such a 
music that rises up against the status quo, [it's] a rebellion against the established order. 
Rock music is the reflection of freedom and honor. … It is an awakening, a power that 
lays the word ‘impossible' aside with the power of notes and guitar,” (Today’s Zaman, 26 
March 2014). The portrayal of rock music as the music of rebellion is widely accepted 
across the world. In North Cyprus, the presence of a rock concert by Deep Purple 
represented a protest against the world which does not recognize the legitimacy of their 
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country. While many Turkish Cypriots want the peace negotiations to be successful, they 
feel that success is impossible. In this context, they not only took pleasure in a world 
famous music group playing rebellious music and boldly landing directly at Ercan airport 
to give the Turkish Cypriots a rock concert, but they celebrated it as a protest against 
those who do not recognize the legitimacy of the TNRC.  
 
Like Deep Purple, Şebnem Ferah’s concert was also attended by thousands of people. 
Şebnem Ferah is a famous female Turkish rock singer, songwriter, and guitarist. Her 
original performance in North Cyprus was delayed for a few days due to national 
mourning over those who lost their lives in the SOMA mining accident in Turkey. As 
Turkish musicians frequently play on the island, her concert, unlike Deep Purple’s, was 
not seen as a protest concert. However, she sympathized with the leftist movement in 
Turkey throughout her performance. The crowd showed their approval of her sympathies 
with screaming and loud applause.  During her song “Eski” [“Old”] in her performance’s 
repertoire she said, “Until today, we have discussed things that have made us separate. I 
would like to talk about the things that connect us.” The large projector screens on either 
side of the stage then filled with a portrait of Halide Edip, the Turkish novelist, 
nationalist, and social advocate during the Turkish War for independence who promoted 
Atatürk’s ideals for the nation. The people in the audience applauded and cheered. The 
image dissolved and another image appeared, that being the face of Ayhan Işık, a 
prominent Turkish director and actor during the 1950s and 60s. Again the people 
cheered, whistled, and clapped their hands feverishly. The images of famous Turkish 
singers, actors, musicians, authors, artists, and poets were shown over the course of the 
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next 10 minutes. Many of those who were portrayed were famous Turkish nationalists or 
leftist singers, songwriters, authors, poets, and artists, who used their art form to show 
flaws in the state and fought for creating a better present and future Turkey.  At the end 
of the slideshow was a quotation by Atatürk that read, “A nation which is without art has 
one of its veins (‘lifeblood’) broken.” [“Sanatsız kalan bir milletin hayat damarlarından 
biri kopmuştur”]. This quotation implies that a nation that cannot express itself freely 
through art is a broken nation. Contextualizing this quotation within recent events makes 
it resonate even more powerfully with the audience, because after the Gezi protests AKP 
threatened many artists if they spoke out against AKP. 
 
Şebnem Ferah has used this slideshow at her concerts for a few years in order to pay 
tribute to famous artists of Turkey. However, her concert is not the only one to show a 
slideshow in conjunction with a musical performance. The use of slideshows to showcase 
famous leftist Turkish artists, authors, and singers was also employed at the November 
2013 concert of Volkan Konak in Kyrenia at the Merit Hotel. Volkan Konak is a 
renowned Turkish folk singer who became popular in the 1990s and is well-known for 
his views against AKP. Most notably, after the death of Ali Korkmaz, a casualty of the 
Taksim protests, Volkan Konak paid him tribute by playing “Mağusa Limanı” 
[Famagusta Port]. Traditionally, the lyrics of this song were about a Turkish Cypriot who 
died at the hands of British soldiers in Cyprus. Since Volkan’s performance, the lyrics 
also have become associated with the death of Ali Korkmaz. In both Volkan’s and 
Ferah’s performances the slideshow accompanied by the musical performance was a way 
to celebrate and honor artists of Turkey. Occurring after the Gezi protests, the slideshows 
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in these performances were received in a new context as a way to celebrate those artists 
who spoke up against the Turkish state when it strayed from Atatürk values and to 
celebrate those who promoted the Kemalist vision of Turkey. The inclusion of Atatürk’s 
quote at the end of the Şebnem Ferah concert further enhanced the idea that these artists, 
herself included, are using their art as a voice to protest the Turkish state when the state 
does not represent the people’s voice. In Konak’s and Ferah’s concerts, rock music is 
used to celebrate a history of leftist politics and those who protest against the state, for 
what they determine to be the good of the state.  
 
In addition to musicians coming to the island to perform, there are also concerts and 
musical performances held on the island by Turkish Cypriots. On few occasions, Turkish 
Cypriots intentionally perform to protest against Turkey’s control of Cyprus. For 
example, an event was held on 14 August 2014 to promote an ‘Independent Cyprus’. The 
pamphlet advertising the event read, “As Turkish Cypriots, we were blamed for not being 
Turk enough before; and now we are being blamed for not being Muslim 
enough….When we start raising our voices, they call us ‘besleme’50…We are under 
occupation. Are we going to give up? No! We are going to raise the resistance….To 
make Ayşe and many go home, we are going out onto streets!” (Pamphlet 2014). Arda 
Gündüz, the same Turkish Cypriot musician that played frequently at Anayasa Rock Bar, 
performed songs at this event to air his discontent with Turkish domination. While Rock 
music at the Deep Purple concert created a divide between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots, rock music in this context is being used as a tool of protest against Turkey to 
                                                        
50 “Besleme” is used as an offensive term to call someone a freeloader or a parasite. In 
2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the Turkish Cypriot people “besleme”.  
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unite North and South Cyprus. Thus, Anayasa Rock Bar is not alone in its use of music to 
protest Turkey’s policies regarding the TRNC but rather rock music is engaged in 
multiple ways on the island to protest. Unique to Anayasa Rock Bar located on Dereboyu 
is the repetitive, frequent nature with which the “protest” occurs as they play recorded 
rock music every night, with live rock music twice a week.   
 
5.4.4 Turkish Music Revolution  
Almost every Tuesday and Saturday night at Anayasa Rock Bar, the Turkish Cypriot 
musician Arda Gündüz performed an acoustic concert. He would be seated in the far 
corner of the outdoor bar with a glass of rakı on another small stool next to him. The 
patrons of the bar, primarily middle-aged Turkish Cypriots, would reserve a seat in 
advance or walk-in if there was space available. The cover charge for such an event was 
10TL (2GBP). Most of the tables were crowded, with four or five people at each one and 
all of the tables were covered with different alcoholic beverages, with rakı and Efes beer 
appearing to be the two most popular choices. As Arda played, people sang along, moved 
their hands, and swayed their bodies to the melodies. When a song ended they clapped 
their hands enthusiastically and frequently shouted out suggestions of other songs they 
wanted to hear played. The set list remained more or less the same for every 
performance, with varying order to the sequence of the pieces. One of the songs that Arda 
Gündüz played at each of his performances was the Italian “Ciao Bella Ciao” translated 
into Turkish. In 1994, Grup Yorum, a political band in Turkey, released a Turkish version 
of the famous anti-fascist song. The song was a crowd pleaser, with the entire audience 
singing along with great enthusiasm. The song was attractive for audience members to 
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sing due to both the repetitive lyrics and the association of the song to the political 
situation of Cyprus. Given the song’s content (see below), it was sometimes jokingly 
referred to as the “real national anthem of Cyprus”.  
 
“See, one morning when I awakened / Ciao bella, ciao bella, ciao bella / Ciao, ciao, ciao / 
I found my homeland’s hands tied up / Everywhere was under invasion / I found my 
homeland’s hands tied up / Everywhere was under invasion”51 
 
Most of the songs played in these sessions were written by famous Turkish artists of the 
60s, 70s, and 80s. For example, the song list at every performance included songs such 
as, “Mağusa Limanı” (English: “Mağusa Harbor”), “Söyle” (English: “Tell”), and 
“Dağlara Gel” (English: “Come to the Mountains”). Turkish music was radically 
changing during this era. Turkish rock music was heavily influenced by the coinciding 
rock movement in North America and Western Europe. During this time, Turkish rock 
musicians such as Erkin Koray, Cem Karaca, Barış Manço, and Moğollar created a new 
music genre referred to as Anadolu Rock (Anatolian Rock). Anadolu Rock is a fusion of 
modern rock and Anatolian folk music made possible because of the Kemalist music 
reforms, which opened the doors for new inspirational sounds with the promotion of 
                                                        
51 Turkish: “İşte bir sabah uyandığımda / Çav bella, çav bella, çav bella / Çav, çav, çav / 
Elleri bağlanmış bulduğum yurdumun / Her yanı işgal altında / Elleri bağlanmış 
bulduğum yurdumun / Her yanı işgal altında” 
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European classical music (Karahasanoğlu and Skoog 2009, 53).52 Anatolian melodies and 
instruments such as the bağlama (also known as saz; a long necked 7-stringed instrument) 
and ney (reed-pipe) were synthesized with the sounds of the electric guitars, bass, and 
drums (Karahasanoğlu and Skoog 2009). Anadolu Rock artists were known for their left-
leaning lyrics, with songs such as “Bindik Bir Alamete Gidiyoruz Kıyamete” (“This is 
not a good sign”) and “Durduramayacaklar Halkın Coşkun Akan Selini” (“They will not 
stop the flood of people’s enthusiasm”). Around the same time there was another musical 
genre developing known as Özgün Müzik (Original Music). These artists, such as Ahmet 
Kaya, Zülfü Livaneli, and Grup Yorum also wrote political lyrics, but were less 
influenced by European music and were more inspired by Anatolian folk traditions 
(Karahasanoğlu and Skoog 2009).  
 
Wearing long beards and jeans, the musicians of both of these movements also inspired a 
new visual style that was seen as a threat to the moral values of Turkish society (Hecker 
2012). As internal violence in Turkey grew the government suspected many of the 
Turkish rock musicians including Cem Karaca and Zülfü Livaneli of treason, portraying 
them as people who were writing songs to start a revolution (Hecker 2012). The 1980 
military coup disapproved of anyone with leftist or socialist agendas and suppressed such 
                                                        
52 Kemalist reforms to achieve modernity included the modernization of Turkish music. 
Inspired by the writings of the political advocate Ziya Gökalp (who argued that the 
modernization of Turkish music could only be achieve by adopting European music 
standards), reforms were passed to shut down Ottoman music institutions open up new 
music institutions modeled on European conservatories in their stead. The new sounds 
and instruments from these institutions provided inspiration for the creation of new 
musical genres in Turkey (Has 2014; Hecker 2012; Karahasanoğlu and Skoog 2009).  
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groups. As a result, Turkish rock music was banned with many artists and musicians 
arrested, while others exiled themselves from the country.  
 
At Anayasa Rock Bar, these songs are still played and engender powerful feelings from 
those coming to listen. Many of the older patrons feel a strong sense of nostalgia for this 
music because it was the music of their youth and simultaneously they also relate the 
songs and emotion in the songs to the political and cultural context of the island. While 
the sounds and lyrics are certainly important, the effect of the music within the social 
setting depends less on the meaning of the lyrics and the musical ingenuity of the songs 
and more on the social and political context and relationship within which it is embedded 
(Has 2014, 369). In North Cyprus, the economic dependence on Turkey has led to high 
tensions on both sides, with Turkish Cypriots feeling as though their legitimate claims are 
being dismissed and Turkish people feeling that Turkish Cypriots are ungrateful for their 
help. The military bases on the island, the building of casinos, and other exploitations of 
the land have provided a strong metonym for many Turkish Cypriots who feel that they 
are only being used, rather than just protected. These tensions have played out along the 
lines of cultural differences between Turkey and North Cyprus, exacerbated by AKP’s 
promotion of Islamic Tourism and Islamic education on the island leading many in 
Cyprus to fear an Islamic transformation of the island.  
 
While these patrons desire to separate themselves from the narrative of a shared future 
with Turkey and become independent, they are using the same protest songs created by 
Turkish citizens to fight against what they believed to be an oppressive regime. As was 
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the same for the Gezi Protests and the Berkin Elvan protests, they want a more 
autonomous TRNC or for some even an independent Cyprus, yet they are fighting in the 
context of their desire for a more Kemalist Turkish government. Turkish Cypriots are 
invoking the secular spirit of Turkey that these musicians fought for in order to combat 
the Turkish political and cultural dominance of the island.  
 
While these songs that were played at the Anayasa Rock Bar on Tuesday and Saturday 
night clearly created a common leftist bond among the listeners, the intention behind 
playing them was entertainment. It was a way to spend one’s evening. These same songs, 
however, were also played at Anayasa Rock Bar for particular themed political nights. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Anayasa Rock Bar held a live music night on the 19th of July 
that would last through to the 20th of July, the anniversary of the Cyprus “Peace 
Operation”. This event, as previously described (p. 124), was advertised as a parallel 
event (Sa-fak nobeti) to the Dawn Vigil (Şafak Nöbeti) celebrations on Troop Landing 
Beach. In the context of this “Dawn Vigil” celebration, the songs take on a more 
powerful political meaning. The same bar is still open, Arda is still singing the same 
songs, people are still drinking the same drinks and singing along, but the occasion of the 
date transformed this space into a place where they are actually voicing their opinions 
against the Turkish domination of the island through music thereby creating a 
revolutionary soundscape. 
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5.4.5 “Evine dön Ayşe” [“Return Home, Ayşe”] 
Not all songs played at Anayasa Rock Bar are Turkish songs from the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. American and British rock music from the 1980s is played as well, including Eric 
Clapton, Lynyrd Sknyrd, and Queen. There are also songs that are composed by Turkish 
Cypriots that specifically harken to their leftist values. Towards the end of almost any 
given night, to include the event on 19-20 July, patrons will inevitably request the locally 
written song, “Evine dön Ayșe” (“Return home, Ayșe”) to be played. This politically-
charged Turkish Cypriot song uses the melody from the 1968 British song “Those were 
the days my friend”, with lyrics changed to highlight the unwanted presence of Turkey on 
the island.  
 
“Your black money is in casinos / You established meat bazaar (sex trade) in night clubs / 
You exploited me with your companies / Are you not ashamed at all, Ayşe?! / Holiday is 
over / Return Home Ayşe”.53 
 
The song is a play on the codename, “Ayşe may go on holiday” (Ayşe Tatile Çıksın), for 
the 1974 Turkish Army operation in Cyprus which gave the consent for the Turkish 
military to land on Cyprus. In the song, with the repetitive chorus, “Return Home Ayse” 
(Evine dön Ayșe), the people singing it are clearly expressing their longing to see an end 
to the Turkish military occupation and Turkish presence on the island; they shout for 
Turkey to leave North Cyprus. The song’s criticism of the exploitation of the land and 
people of North Cyprus (i.e., Turkey’s establishment of casinos and nightclubs) provides 
                                                        
53 Turkish: “Kara paran kumarhanelerde / Et pazarı kurdun kulüplerde / Beni sömürürken 
şirketinle / Hiç mi utanmadın Ayșe?! / Tatil bitti / Evine dön Ayșe” 
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an outlet for North Cypriot’s frustration regarding the relationship between Turkey and 
North Cyprus. There were also nights where they would change the last chorus of the 
song to sing, “Return home, Tayyip” instead of, “Return Home, Ayse!”, thereby directing 
the song specifically against Prime Minister Erdoğan and the specific present-day issues 
the AKP government has brought to the island. Here they do not agree with the AKP 
policies reshaping North Cyprus, but unlike the protestors on Dereboyu who invoked 
Atatürk, these bar patrons are not. Instead they are invoking a past Cypriot event—the 
invasion of the island by Turkey—to protest against AKP. Through the act of singing this 
protest song they are agreeing with the international perspective that Turkey invaded their 
island and are negotiating a distinct ‘Cypriot’ national identity.  
 
With the decoration of the bar, the live music being played bi-weekly, and the patrons in 
attendance, the bar and the everyday activities going on at the bar acts as a continuous 
protest situated directly across from the political powers (the National Assembly and the 
Turkish Embassy) whose policies they oppose. The presence of the bar directly across 
from the National Assembly and the Turkish Embassy heightens the message of these 
protests. The bar and its patrons informal protest against Turkish domination of the island 
both produces and is contextualized by the ‘secular‘ and ‘modern’ constructed social 
space of Dereboyu. In this way, the playing and singing along to this music by Turkish 
Cypriots is an everyday practice that protests against Turkey and rejects notions of 
‘Turkishness’ in place of ‘Cypriotness’. These negotiations of Turkishness through 
protest highlights the ways in which they negotiate Turkishness differently depending on 
the different contexts. Turkish Cypriots are not shifting between Turkish nationalism and 
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Cypriot nationalism, but rather these everyday negotiations of ‘Turkishness’ by Turkish 
Cypriots produce a distinct Turkish Cypriot demotic nationalism from ‘below’. 
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Chapter 6 
 Gambling in North Cyprus  
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 “Gambling can be allowed in particular places and only to foreign [yabanci]54 people” – 
Bet Houses, Casinos and Preventing Gambling Law 
 
“There is no obstacle you can put in front in which you can make people stop gambling. 
They can play ‘Okey’ [domino game], they can play backgammon and let’s say the 
police come while you are gambling, you could easily pretend that you are paying for the 
bill. Forbidden is always sweet.” – Turkish Cypriot Citizen 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Arriving at Ercan Airport on Friday night, the only airport in North Cyprus, visitors 
might think they had mistakenly landed in the American city of Las Vegas. Greeting 
arriving passengers at the arrivals gate is a bevy of beautifully dressed women holding up 
signs, enticing new arrivals to go to the casino that each one is representing. Tourists, 
primarily from Turkey, fly in from all over the world to test their skills and luck in these 
casinos. While peak gambling times fall on prominent Turkish holidays, there are many 
tourists who frequent North Cyprus every weekend—taking a Friday night flight in and a 
Sunday afternoon flight home. Many of these weekend gamblers are high rollers and as 
such have taxis provided by casinos waiting for them at the airport. Casino operators in 
many parts of the world have learned that it is profitable for the casino to pay wholly or 
in part for transportation, food, and lodging for these high rollers, or “big fish” (Turkish: 
“büyük balık”), as they are often referred to in North Cyprus. This practice is known as 
“comping” and is common in the upper tier of gambling establishments all over the 
world. Home to more than 30 casinos and 50 nightclubs, the small island of North Cyprus 
has garnered an image for many tourists as a Turkish Las Vegas.  
 
                                                        
54 In this law ‘yabanci’ means non - TRNC citizens. ‘Yabanci’ does not include TRNC 
citizens who reside in the TRNC with double citizenships or residents of TRNC-origin 
with foreign citizenships. 
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In 1975, shortly after the Turkish invasion of the island, legislation was passed legalizing 
casino gambling on the island. However, it was not until Turkey banned casinos within 
its national boundaries in 1998 that the number of casinos in the TRNC increased 
significantly. The ban was initially imposed by the Welfare government on 5 June 1997, 
just before they were forced out of power by the Turkish military for having an Islamic 
agenda (Scott 2001, 53). President Demirel vetoed the ban, but the succeeding ANAP-led 
government overrode the veto after allegations that the casinos were being used by 
organized crime (Scott 2001, 53). This law, officially published 10 August 1997, gave 
casinos six months to close and at midnight 11 February 1998, all Turkish casinos ceased 
to operate within the established boundaries of Turkey (Scott 2001, 53). Turkish Cypriot 
leadership embraced the prospects of legalizing casino gambling, justifying it as a way 
for their country to earn money (Scott and Asikoglu 2001, 53). Initially thought of as 
only one of many touristic endeavors, it has since become a mainstay of TRNC tourism, 
contributing $600 million to the local economy annually according to Ayhan Sarıçiçek, 
head of the National Casino Association (LGC News 2013). Others not involved in the 
gambling sector dispute that amount and their opinions will be discussed in the following 
pages. In the past few years alone the numbers of casinos have increased significantly 
with many new casinos being built yearly and multiple licenses waiting for approval. 
While tourists are encouraged and allowed to partake in casino gambling, Turkish 
Cypriots and all students are banned from gambling in casinos. In practice, however, this 
ban does little to prevent either group from gambling in these establishments and 
gambling is widely practiced among both Turkish Cypriots and students studying in the 
TRNC.  
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The multiplying number of casinos on the island and its effect on Turkish Cypriot society 
is a topic on which Turkish Cypriots hold strong opinions. Although some Turkish 
Cypriots speak of the positive impact the influx of cash has on the economy, the majority 
decry the low rate of taxation of casinos and the mishandling of what monies are received 
by the TRNC government. Many more Turkish Cypriots lament the presence of so many 
casinos due to their perceived impact on the culture of North Cyprus, referring to high 
divorce rates, an increase in prostitution, and government corruption. However, many of 
the Turkish Cypriots who complain about the imposition of casinos on their island still 
enjoy gambling within them. Despite these criticisms about casino gambling, these 
Turkish Cypriots do not construe gambling in other locations (such as homes, betting 
offices, and cafes) as having the same negative effects on their culture. For example, one 
Turkish Cypriot commented, “I don’t think the betting places affect the culture here, 
they’re found in almost every country in the world…Casinos are the worst…at the end, it 
[sports betting] is about sports, it’s not that bad.” From these opinions arise debates about 
whether or not casino tourism and gambling should be promoted on the island. As will be 
argued, on the one hand casino gambling is not at odds with a Turkish Cypriot secular 
lifestyle, but on the other hand it is seen as morally corrupting the Cypriot way of life and 
acts as another way in which Turkey is taking advantage of the island and thus should not 
be supported. This chapter will argue that the debates surrounding casinos are not just 
debates about casino gambling, but are also debates about the ways in which Turkish 
Cypriots view themselves as a society and where they see themselves headed as a 
country.  
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Cohen argues that, “The consciousness of community is…encapsulated in the perception 
of its boundaries, boundaries which are themselves largely constituted by people in 
interaction” (Cohen 1985, 14). In this case, gambling in North Cyprus, I argue, is one 
activity in which these boundaries are being constructed. The act of gambling in North 
Cyprus constructs a range of boundaries depending on the context and the audience. 
From outside casinos, Turkish Cypriots, through stories about casino gambling and 
opinions on casino tourism, reject Turkey as an outside oppressor and exclude people 
from Turkey as ‘Other’. From within the casinos, these boundaries fluctuate and shift as 
Turkish Cypriots engage with the activity of casino gambling and buy into the modern 
spectacle that casinos have to offer. To make this argument, this chapter will demonstrate 
how the debates about gambling are reflected in the practices of gambling by critically 
examining the different spaces of gambling and the practices conducted in those spaces. 
This chapter will conclude that the practice and experience of gambling within casinos 
reflects and reproduces another way in which boundaries of Turkishness are constructed, 
reconstructed, and negotiated.  
 
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section (Section 6.2) highlights 
the political contexts surrounding casinos that are emphasized by Turkish Cypriots in 
order to illustrate how casinos act as a symbol emblematic of Turkey’s exploitation of the 
island. This section will examine the activities taking place within casinos in order to 
illustrate how boundaries of Turkishness are re-negotiated. The second section (Section 
6.3) will highlight that the casino is also contextualized within the politics of island 
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unification. Within this context the casino is a representation of reunification between 
North Cyprus and South Cyprus. Within this context, construe the act of gambling as a 
boundary towards Turkishness. It is important to note that these shifting and 
contradictory boundaries are not consciously discerned by the Turkish Cypriots as such 
and therefore these contradictory boundaries serve to highlight the malleable ways in 
which national identity is negotiated depending on the context. Thus, through an 
examination of the negotiation of these boundaries, this chapter will illustrate the ways in 
which Turkish Cypriots articulate their demotic nationalism through the practices of 
gambling and through the discourses regarding casinos and casino tourism.  
 
6.2 Casino Tourism and Gambling Culture in North Cyprus 
This section will begin with an account of the growth of casinos in the TRNC and 
demonstrate the ways in which Turkish Cypriots perceive this growth as harmful to the 
fabric of Turkish Cypriot society. Section 6.2.1 will examine the debates surrounding 
casino tourism and argue that they are not merely debates about gambling, but also 
debates about notions of ‘modernity’ and how Turkish Cypriots imagine the future of 
their country. In the context of these debates, Turkish Cypriots oppose casino tourism as 
they interpret casinos to be incompatible with the Cypriot way of life and see them as 
symbols of Turkey’s exploitation of the island. As such they negotiate boundaries of 
Turkishness whereby they see themselves as distinct from Turkish citizens.  
 
Section 6.2.2 will argue that although Turkish Cypriots complain about casino tourism 
and casinos, gambling itself is an integral part of Turkish Cypriot culture. Through an 
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examination of an array of different types of non-casino gambling practices performed in 
everyday life, this section will argue that although these practices of gambling are 
‘traditional’ as argued by Scott (2013), it does not mean that they are ‘unmodern’. In fact, 
this section will highlight how Turkish Cypriots view small-stakes gambling as in part 
compatible with a Turkish Cypriot, secular lifestyle.  
 
This section (6.2) will conclude by turning the discussion towards an analysis of 
gambling practices within the casino. Section 6.2.3 will highlight that although Turkish 
Cypriots denounce casino tourism, many actively gamble within the casinos. Within the 
milieu of the casino, Turkish Cypriots (re)negotiate boundaries of Turkishness through 
the practice of gambling. Within this context, this section will argue that Turkish 
Cypriots perform their national ethos by gambling against Turkish bettors on equal 
footing.  
 
6.2.1 Casino Tourism and Turkey’s Footprint in North Cyprus  
Before examining the activities taking place within the casino, it is important to consider 
the varied external contexts that Turkish Cypriots construct around casinos and casino 
tourism. These contexts are shaped largely by the political status of the TRNC and the 
debates that arise from the various understandings of the relationship of the TRNC with 
Turkey. Casinos were first introduced to the island after Turkey’s military intervention in 
1974. In 1975, legislation permitting the licensing of casinos for betting and gambling 
was passed as a way to encourage tourist investment and attract foreign currency into the 
TRNC economy. However, it was not until 1998 when the Turkish government banned 
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casino gambling within Turkey that the industry in the TRNC started to flourish. Scott’s 
research into casino tourism in North Cyprus shows that after 1997 the number of casinos 
on the island more than quadrupled to over 20, with license applications pending for 
more (Scott 2003, 267). Today the casino industry is one of North Cyprus’ most 
successful endeavors with more than 30 legal casinos in operation and many more in the 
process of being built and opened.  
 
The growing casino industry has successfully attracted a new crop of tourists to the island 
(Scott 2001). However, critics of casino tourism voiced concern that the revenue brought 
in by casino tourists was not cycling back into the TRNC economy. While these Turkish 
Cypriot critics freely admitted that casinos did indeed attract more tourists to the island, 
they reacted negatively to the suggestion that these tourists explored the island and spent 
money in the local economy. Most tourists coming to play in the casinos do not in fact 
leave the casino resorts and instead only spend their money within those establishments. 
In these cases, the money brought and spent by the tourist is funneled back to the foreign 
investor and not into the local economy. As stated by one Turkish Cypriot, “What is a 
tourist? A tourist is a person who comes to your country and leaves money in your 
country. These people are coming to the casino, staying there, and leaving all of their 
money to the casino. This doesn’t leave any money to our country. Those owners are not 
from here and they take their [the tourist’s] money to their own country”. For this reason, 
unlike other gambling spaces (such as the home, sports betting offices, and cafes), 
casinos are associated with foreign investors economically taking advantage of the island. 
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Scott and Asikoglu’s (2001) research into the relationship between casino tourism and 
conventional tourism in North Cyprus reveals that at first glance casino tourists do spend 
little time outside of the casinos (Scott and Asikoglu 2001, 59). They suggest, however, 
that further analysis is needed to see if this is because this lack of spending outside the 
casino is characteristic of casino tourists in general or because most casino tourists were 
repeat visitors to the island and as such their overall expenditure on non-gambling related 
activities decreased with each visit (Scott and Asikoglu 2001, 59). If the latter proves to 
be true then spending habits of repeat casino tourist are not altogether different from 
other repeat conventional tourists. However, in the context of the research for this 
dissertation what is more pertinent is not the motivation behind casino tourist’s 
expenditure or lack thereof, but how the Turkish Cypriot population perceives these 
actions. The perception that their island is being exploited by Turkey (and to a lesser 
extent Israel and Russia) is construed by Turkish Cypriots as yet another way in which 
Turkey has secured its foothold in order to continue to take advantage of North Cyprus. 
As stated by one Turkish Cypriot, “… casinos are dependent to [sic] Turkey…that’s why 
all of the money goes to them and this is not good at all…. If the money didn’t go to 
Turkey, if it stayed here, our island would have been strong”. Turkish Cypriots critical of 
casino tourism view casinos not as a part of North Cyprus, but rather as separate entities 
capitalizing on North Cyprus and imported to the island by Turkey.   
 
Although casinos profit significantly, the TRNC government also receives certain tax 
benefits from the casinos. Turkish Cypriot opinion is divided between those who see this 
income as an example of how casino tourism is good for the island and those who argue 
245 
 
that the island is not enjoying the benefits of the monies received because the government 
is mishandling this tax income. One Turkish Cypriot expressed a sentiment shared by 
many, “The government is not managing the casino tax money well. In this country, 
whoever gets into power promises many things…but you will never see them keeping 
their promises. None of the presidents or prime ministers have kept their promises on this 
island”. Other Turkish Cypriots have taken these comments further by accusing the 
government of using the casinos to launder money. “People maybe think that casinos 
have positive effects on the economy… That it is good economically. They employ 
people. Or the amount that is earned from gambling is spent here. No, not at all actually. 
Money laundering is in process”. Whether or not the government is mishandling funds or 
laundering money is not part of this research. Instead, what is interesting to note is that 
many Turkish Cypriots believe their government to be corrupt and have little faith in the 
TRNC leadership. As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkish Cypriots continually scrutinize 
their government and believe it to be mishandling funds. In the context of casino tourism, 
Turkish Cypriots blame Turkey for offshoring their casino industry to the island, but in 
doing so Turkish Cypriots do not forget or excuse the active role the TRNC government 
plays in regulating the legal environment so that the casino industry can thrive. The 
TRNC government has the authority to license an entity to conduct gambling on its 
premises, conduct oversight of that entity, and collect and disburse tax income received. 
The TRNC’s involvement in the proliferation of casinos on the island is one of the many 
associations Turkish Cypriots engage with while constructing and negotiating the various 
meanings of the casino. 
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Given the small size of the country, the growing number of casinos on the island has left 
a large footprint, altering the physical environment to a degree such as to engender 
conflict with the Turkish Cypriots affected. The increasing development of new luxury 
hotels, resorts, and casinos changed the coastlines and beaches of the TRNC. These assets 
are primarily held by foreign investors, but Turkish Cypriots also invest in and own some 
of these properties. Regardless, Turkish Cypriots citizens primarily associate casino 
ownership with foreign financiers, particularly those from Turkey. In the construction of 
these casinos Turkish Cypriots witnessed foreign investors claiming spaces on the island, 
including popular beaches heretofore public. Building these establishments created 
conflict with the local communities with both citizens and their local government 
officials displaying anger at the increase in casinos. The anger stemmed not just from the 
fact that they were institutes of gambling, but also because the resorts denied access to 
what were believed to be beaches for public use, not just for tourists.  
 
For example, the development of Merit Crystal Cove and Kervansaray’s Merit Luxury 
Hotel and Casino along the Girne coastline enraged Yücel Atakara, the Mayor of 
Alsancak, who spoke out against the development of new luxury hotels and casinos for 
this very reason. He was adamant that the Mare Monte beach in Alsancak belonged to the 
municipality: “All beaches should be open to the public. This is not just about Mare 
Monte. The constitution is quite clear. Alsancak should have its own public beach…” 
(Cyprus Today, June 21 2014). The particular hotel and casino in discussion belonged to 
the Turkish owned Merit Hotel. With more than a billion dollars invested in its 
development across the island it is one of the TRNC’s largest hotel chains. While 
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discussions to this point have been focused on the Turkish government’s influence over 
the affairs of the island, this situation illustrates one of the ways in which Turkish 
business interests were also attempting to control what the Turkish Cypriots could and 
could not do. This is tantamount to business interests having the power of imminent 
domain over the citizen’s private and shared properties. This physical change in the 
landscape altered by the presence of the casinos on the island is seen as a tangible 
manifestation reflecting the ways in which some Turkish Cypriots believe that Turkey 
has exploited their island. As stated earlier in Chapter 5, the lyrics in the Turkish Cypriot 
song “Evine Don Ayse”, speak specifically to their disgust over the presence of foreign 
casinos on the island. As reflected in this ballad, Turkish Cypriots consider the 
deleterious effects of casinos to be evidence of Turkey’s invasion and occupation of the 
island.  
 
The growth of the casino industry on the island not only has had a transformative effect 
on the physical environment but also has affected the imaginary landscape of North 
Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots have contended that the proliferation of casinos is both 
damaging to the favorable image of local businesses, as well as harmful to the fabric of 
Turkish Cypriot society. The first contention is supported by the fact that many tourists 
view North Cyprus as a place where behavior thought to be “immoral” in neighboring 
countries is accepted conduct in the TRNC. The Koran denounces gambling as both 
immoral and sinful, describing it as a vice that turns one away from devotion to God 
(Surah al-Baqarah 2:219; Surah Ma’idah 5:90-5:91). Thus, North Cyprus, dotted with 
nightclubs [strip clubs], multiple luxury hotels, and casinos appears from the outsider’s 
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perspective to not only welcome but encourage tourists to indulge in gluttonous and 
promiscuous behavior. The ‘immoral’ landscape of North Cyprus is highlighted by the 
fact that these places are hidden and taboo in Turkey’s landscape. In North Cyprus, 
however, these ‘immoral’ establishments are both advertised and displayed in plain sight 
from one’s first step into the Ercan airport. The casinos and nightclubs are not hidden, but 
instead stand proud garnering the passerby’s attention. “Lipstick Nightclub” one building 
shouts from the side of the main highway with bright lights and two neon-lit lips framing 
the name. The Ottoman architecture of the establishment suggests a modern day harem lit 
with multicolored lights. Although prostitution is illegal in the TRNC, it is well known 
that many of these nightclubs act as purveyors of the sex trade.55 The sheer number of 
casinos and nightclubs found on such a tiny island, coupled with their blatant advertising 
and easy access, factor greatly in the island’s image abroad.  
 
To support the fears that casinos are impacting the moral fabric of Turkish Cypriot 
society, Turkish Cypriots tell stories and anecdotes about friends or family members who 
have divorced over debts accrued or have been financially ruined due to casino gambling. 
Together these stories and anecdotes fabricate a mythology that Turkish Cypriots use to 
navigate and understand casino gambling. Through her research on casino tourism in 
North Cyprus Scott (2003) has recounted and analyzed both local stories of casino 
                                                        
55 There have been several human rights organizations condemning the human trafficking 
through these nightclubs in the TRNC. According to the 2016 ‘Trafficking In Persons’ 
Report by the US Department of State, “Nightclubs provide a significant source of 
revenue for the Turkish Cypriot administration; media reports estimated nightclub owners 
pay between 20 and 30 million Turkish lira (7 – 10 million USD) in taxes annually. This 
presents a conflict of interest and a deterrent to increased political will to combat 
trafficking” (US Department of State 2016, 151).  
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gambling and traditional gambling. In her analysis, she compares and contrasts these 
stories to argue that their message can be interpreted to reflect that the modern casinos 
originating outside the island are replacing the traditional Cypriot village way of living 
with a “modern commercial nexus” (Scott 2003, 271). Scott makes the argument that 
non-casino gambling spaces are “traditional”; while I agree that these spaces are 
embodied with a sense of historical past, I would argue that “traditional” does not mean 
“un-modern”. In fact, as will be argued below, these “traditional” gambling spaces 
embody Turkish Cypriot notions of modernity, as they are spaces where they can indulge 
in a secular Cypriot activity. For this reason, Turkish Cypriots do not see casinos as 
replacing the Cypriot way of life because they are ‘modern’, but in fact they embrace the 
“modernity” exhibited and embodied in the casino. Instead, Turkish Cypriots see casinos 
as replacing the Cypriot way of life because they view the casinos as a symbolic 
manifestation of Turkey’s exploitation of the island.  
 
Scott (2003) further illustrates contradictions found within both casino gambling and 
traditional gambling stories. On the one hand these stories highlighted pride in risk-taking 
and rebellion, but on the other hand these stories produced a feeling of shame in anti-
family and anti-social behaviors (Scott 2003, 271). Scott (2003) argues that these 
contradictions illustrate the confirmation and transformation of gender norms in different 
gambling spaces. I agree with her findings regarding the relationship between gender 
ideology and casino stories, and I would like to further extend her argument to show how 
these contradictions illustrate a Turkish Cypriot understanding of gambling as a secular 
activity. In stories relating to casino gambling addicts, metaphors of illness were often 
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used; gambling was often referred to by Turkish Cypriots as a “sickness,” or “disease”. 
This metaphor extended to the realm of the physical casinos as well. An elderly Turkish 
Cypriot man explained to me, “Casinos, if they are poison for Turkey, for this small 
country the poison is much more dangerous. I want them [the casinos] to go back. To 
anywhere, but not here.” Gambling, both inside and outside the casino is a way to partake 
in a secular activity, but gambling in the casinos is seen as having the potential to 
overindulge in secular activities and therefore gives way to sickness. Casinos are then not 
only considered to be a way in which Turkey is exploiting North Cyprus economically, 
but they are also viewed as Turkey’s exportation of moral problems to North Cyprus. 
 
The physical landscape of numerous casinos as mediated by this imagined landscape 
produces debates within Turkish Cypriot society about notions of modernity, specifically 
debates about what moral codes of behavior are acceptable within a modern Turkish 
Cypriot society. As stated above, most Turkish Cypriots attribute fault to the casinos (that 
were exported to TRNC by Turkey) for negatively impacting Turkish Cypriot culture by 
enabling and encouraging immoral behavior. For these Turkish Cypriots, the cure to this 
immoral behavior is to not over-indulge in this secular practice. On the other hand, the 
Islamic religious leaders in North Cyprus, as well as some of the more religiously 
conservative members of their congregations (both Turkish Cypriots and Turkish 
immigrants), see casino attendance and the increase in immoral behavior as a result of 
Turkey having neglected the enforcement of religious education classes immediately after 
the 1974 “Peace Operation”. These leaders and like-minded congregation members hold 
that the immoral behaviors are a result of Turkish Cypriots forgetting their Muslim ways 
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and turning to fill that void with gambling and other unspiritual pursuits. As one Turkish 
hoca (religious leader) in Nicosia stated,  
  
“…Religious ties were broken off, religious education was not given to people, especially 
to Turkish Cypriots, after 1974. So they became distant and grew away from religion and 
at the end they didn’t want to live with the religion…. When the religion is weak, when 
the Islamic religion is not lived…they fill that gap with gambling, alcohol, prostitutes and 
drugs…”  
 
This observation further demonstrates that the Turkish hoca does not correlate the 
immoral behavior of gambling with an increase in casinos. To be clear, this does not 
mean that the hoca condones the building of more gambling establishments. His 
emphasis on the lack of religious education in North Cyprus as the root cause for 
immoral behavior provides a different understanding of morality than those Turkish 
Cypriots who state only that the immoral behavior is a product of over-indulging and 
gambling too much in casinos. Additionally, the Turkish hoca believes that only by 
increasing religious education will the corruption be healed, while other Turkish Cypriots 
believe removing the casinos will heal the corruption. For the Turkish hoca and the 
devout members of his congregation any gambling is seen as immoral and behavior 
typical of those who follow a more secular lifestyle. The less conservative Turkish 
Cypriots have a more ambivalent relationship with gambling. They believe it is not 
immoral to gamble per se, but overindulgence leads to chaotic and ruinous lives. 
 
Further, the hoca’s comment highlights a desire by some for Turkey to take a greater role 
in island affairs, while the latter group believes Turkey has already an excessive influence 
on island affairs. The hoca sees Turkey as having a positive moral impact on North 
252 
 
Cyprus, while others in this example see Turkey as negatively influencing the island. 
Religious leaders in North Cyprus and their more dedicated followers are hopeful that 
with the AKP government in power in Turkey there will be an increase in implementation 
of religious classes and a return to the pre-1974 days. As one Turkish immigrant 
congregation member stated, “We can say that Turkey didn’t give enough support with 
regards to religion. For example Islamic Divinity High Schools were not opened here, 
even though they were opening up in Turkey…But in the last two years [referring to the 
role of the AKP] in Cyprus, a Divinity College opened, a Divinity High School opened 
and even a Divinity Faculty opened within Near East University…” His focus is not on 
Turkey’s exploitation of North Cyprus, but rather Turkey’s neglect of North Cyprus in 
not taking greater control of Turkish Cypriot educational affairs. As such, he is praising 
the current Turkish AKP government for taking a more proactive interest and increasing 
religious education on the island. These viewpoints are not isolated to the island. One 
Turkish politician expressed a similar viewpoint. He enraged many Turkish Cypriots 
when he claimed that North Cyprus had too many loose moral values and had strayed 
because Turkey did not hold tighter control of the island. He said, 
 
“The Ottoman Empire left the island in 1870, but the Turkish Cypriots did not give up 
their Muslim faith. Religious men who came from Turkey had a big role in this. But after 
1974…the education system changed in Cyprus and religious education was no longer 
taught…There used to be religious education classes at schools…there was no child that 
didn’t know the Koran, praying and fasting… The Turkish government letting TRNC be 
so free has had a big effect in Cyprus becoming so. Turkey shouldn’t let ‘Yavru Vatan’ 
be this free….” (Kibris Postasi April 30 2013).  
 
For the religious leaders on the island and their followers, the AKP government is seen as 
having the ability to restore morality to the island by implementing religious education. 
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However, for a larger majority of Turkish Cypriots, these ideas perpetuated by the AKP 
government are seen as detrimental to the Turkish Cypriot way of life. They cite the 
increase of religious education in North Cyprus, the teaching of the Koran in secondary 
schools, the building of more mosques, and centers of Islamic theology education as 
further proof that Turkey’s rescue of the island has become invasion and domination and 
has created a new political reality in North Cyprus. The formation of this new political 
reality gives rise to a new intensity in the defense of secularism by Turkish Cypriots. 
Supporters of AKP in North Cyprus see Turkish citizens as their Muslim brothers 
(Michael 2014). Those who reject this imagined political body project exhibit their desire 
to defend secularism by ‘othering’ those in from Turkey.  
 
In attempts to clean up the seedy image of North Cyprus and to open up new sources of 
revenue to North Cyprus, plans to open “conservative” hotels in the TRNC were 
supported by the Economy, Tourism, Culture, and Sports Ministry of the TRNC. Due to 
the success of conservative hotels in Turkey, Turkish businessmen believed that these 
hotels could also be profitable in North Cyprus. These “conservative” hotels are designed 
to cater to tourists that do not gamble or drink and adhere to more of the tenets of the 
Islamic religion. For example, there is no alcohol on the premises and only halal-certified 
meat is served. Additionally, part of the hotel’s beach is reserved as a separate area for 
women only. This “halal tourism” as it has been dubbed by the tourism industry, is very 
successful in many parts of the world and works in tandem with cities endeavoring to 
attract faith tourism. Cyprus Today reported that a company spokesman for Bulut 
Construction said, “We prefer the tag ‘conservative’ to ‘Islamic’ because we think the 
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concept will attract families looking for an environment away from gambling and 
alcohol” (Canalp 2013). The head of planning at the Economy, Tourism, Culture, and 
Sports Ministry Turgut Muslu said, “This is a marketing strategy, which would seem to 
be well-intentioned and in line with current legislation. There is definitely a future for 
faith tourism here, be it Muslim or Christian. Our reputation in Turkey has been tarnished 
by gambling. If this is a sustainable project perhaps it would help to clean up the image of 
the TRNC” (Canalp 2013). The businessman views this as a tactic to increase the number 
of potential customers, while the government official sees this as an opportunity to 
improve the image of North Cyprus regarded by many as tarnished by the increase in 
gambling and vice.  
 
Many Turkish Cypriots, however, are opposed to bringing faith tourism to the island. 
Sener Elcil, the general secretary of KTOS said, “We are Turkey’s back garden and they 
have already imposed huge casino hotels on us. This proposed investment [‘conservative’ 
hotels] is not tourism, it’s a way of life” (Canalp 2013). Similarly, Adnan Eraslan, head 
of the secondary school teachers’ union (KTOEOS) said, “This kind of hotel does not suit 
our culture and I would equally oppose gambling or nudist camps” (Canalp 2013). Sener 
Elcil and Adnan Eraslan’s objections to faith tourism reflect the fears that these attempts 
at religious tourism will affect the Cypriot way of living. Their comments reveal that it is 
not the two opposing moral practices at stake, religion and gambling, but rather the 
Turkish Cypriot way of life. What they fear is that Turkey is imposing its way of living 
on Turkish Cypriots. They see both casino tourism and faith tourism as something 
imposed by Turkey and not compatible with Cypriot culture.  
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The debates amongst Turkish Cypriots about faith tourism and casino tourism are not 
only debates about what is moral in the present but are also a reflection of those values 
they foresee in the future of their country. Turgut Muslu’s hope that faith tourism will 
clean up the tarnished image of North Cyprus created by casino tourism ignores any 
contribution Turkey had in creating that role. He, along with supporters of faith tourism, 
desire a future North Cyprus that is compatible with Turkish Cypriot modernity as 
understood by the current AKP government which interpret modernity as more inclusive 
of an Islamic way of life. Turkish Cypriots who oppose both faith tourism and casino 
tourism consider these establishments as incompatible with the Cypriot way of life 
because Turkey imposed them. For these Turkish Cypriots they symbolize Turkey’s 
exploitation of the island and remind them that they have little say over their own future. 
However, as will be expanded upon, casino gambling is in part compatible with a Cypriot 
way of life as many Cypriots enjoy spending time in these establishments. The anger 
against faith tourism and casino tourism more accurately reflects their anger over 
Turkey’s affairs in Cyprus. They do not support a future in which Turkey continues to 
“pull the strings” and North Cyprus does not have a voice in shaping their own future 
based on their own values.   
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6.2.2 Turkish Cypriot Gambling Culture  
Before examining casino gambling, it is important to have a background of the gambling 
culture in North Cyprus. Legal bans prohibiting gambling have had little effect on the 
long tradition of Turkish Cypriot gambling and various forms have long been common on 
the island. Scott’s (2013) research on gambling highlights cockfighting, bingo, and card 
playing as being popular forms of gambling during the British colonial rule. Although 
illegal even under British colonial rule, these forms of gambling thrived and were means 
of socializing among Cypriots. Today card playing, backgammon, and dominos are some 
of the most common forms of gambling and are very much a part of everyday life. Scott 
(2003) argues that card playing is traditionally a social activity performed by single sex 
groups, pointing to examples of men gambling together in cafes and women gambling 
together in the home. During my field research I too noted that these single-sex activities 
were still very common, particularly amongst the older generation of Turkish Cypriots. 
One elderly Turkish Cypriot woman in her late 70’s, and living in Lefkoșa, had bi-weekly 
card games with her female friends. She set the table and prepared the sweets before her 
friends arrived, and when they came into the door she offered them coffee or tea. They 
socialized while playing ‘Konken’—a card game similar to Gin Rummy. While playing 
they would bet very little money, no more than 10TL. She and her husband explained to 
me that the purpose of the activity was not to win money, but rather to sit and enjoy each 
other’s company. Examining gambling spaces, Julie Scott (2013) illustrates how in the 
villages of North Cyprus these spaces are sharply segregated by gender with women 
traditionally gambling in the home and the coffee shop acting as the primary gambling 
space for men. Although still present, this division noted by Julie Scott was much less 
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common in urban areas, especially amongst the younger generation. Many of these 
younger people preferred to participate in mixed-gendered gambling activities within 
both the home and the café.  
 
My Turkish Cypriot acquaintances, both male and female, frequently went to Dereboyu 
together to play the domino game, Okey, at a Turkish chain café that had tables available 
to play the game. Usually the wager involved was that whichever team lost had to pay for 
everyone’s drinks and food. If a team felt that they were winning, they ordered more 
drinks and sweets for the table to chide the other team on to greater effort. Within the 
café there were many other mixed gender groups playing Okey, playing card games, as 
well as just visiting or watching football games on the television. The activity of 
gambling in this urban environment contrasts greatly with the coffee shop experience as 
described by Scott. While the village coffee shop she observed was frequented primarily 
by men, this coffee shop on the bustling street of Dereboyu was filled primarily with 
young college students and young professionals of both sexes. In both instances, social 
gambling was practiced as a pastime throughout various settings in North Cyprus and has 
continued unaffected by the legal restrictions.  
 
As the urban cafes are spaces of mixed-gendered gambling activities, so too are the 
homes. During my time in Cyprus, particularly the winter months, my Turkish Cypriot 
acquaintances had Poker nights at each other’s houses. Unlike the elderly Turkish 
Cypriot woman’s bi-weekly scheduled card games, these poker nights were unscheduled 
and varied in frequency. Before going to my first Poker night I was asked if I knew how 
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to play Poker and Texas Hold’em. I told them that I know the rules, but that I was not 
very good. In a joking manner, Talat smiled broadly, chuckled and said, “Okay, okay, 
you can come play with us. No problem.” Nefise, Ali, Talat, Hasan, and I arrived at 
Deniz’s house located on top of his family’s old restaurant, which had been converted 
into storage and entertainment space. We were to use the unused restaurant as our 
gambling space. Everyone brought snacks (pretzels, cheeses, and sweets), alcohol, and a 
variety of meat to barbeque. A fire was started in the large fireplace and we began to 
barbeque the meat as others set up the Poker table. The ante for the game was 10TL for 
which we received chips. Both men and women were playing. Nefise won chips quickly 
while Hasan lost his ante right away and had to pay another 10TL to buy himself back 
into the game. Here again was a mix-gender gambling activity, this time taking place 
within the home. Scott (2003) argues that gambling in North Cyprus is perceived as an 
activity for men and a problem for women, but in this social setting, not only was the 
Poker Night mixed-gender, but also the women’s participation in the game was not 
considered improper. Women in the game were seen as just other players of equal status.  
 
Although women were considered players of equal status, the game itself was of low 
monetary stakes. As such, there was no real monetary consequence for losing the game. 
The only consequence was the loss of bragging rights to jest with friends. Although 
defined as “poker night” and established as the reason for gathering, other activities such 
as grilling the barbeque, gossiping with friends, and having drinks were of as equal 
importance. This, as will be argued below, differs from the casinos where although one 
can partake in those activities (eating the barbeque, not grilling it), gambling is the 
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celebrated and central activity. The low monetary stakes, the informal environment, and 
the gambling opponents friendships’ defines his type of gambling as only “money 
gambling,” or to use Geertz’s (1973) definition “shallow” gambling. In shallow gambling 
the players are not highly invested in the outcome of the game and the only thing at stake 
is money.  
 
As more women arrived, Nefise and the other female players quit the game and went to 
the couch to chat and gossip, leaving me as the only girl gambling with the guys. Like 
Scott’s analysis of rural villages, towards the end of the evening there was gender 
segregation. Further, although I was still gambling with men, I was a foreigner and 
therefore not judged as a Turkish Cypriot woman gambling might be (Scott 2003). 
Osman was the last to arrive and was very proud to show me the bottle of Zivania that he 
bought, the only Turkish Cypriot brandy produced in North Cyprus. He sat at the poker 
table but chose not to gamble. When I asked him why he did not join in he explained to 
me that he had made a promise to his father not to gamble because gambling is “very bad 
for you.” He told me quietly that he thought his friends gambled too much, particularly in 
online betting. Although Osman’s position was that gambling was “very bad,” his 
presence made it clear that it was important to him to participate in the social activities 
that surrounded gambling.  
 
As the night continued, the men became bored with the small winnings and decided to 
just risk lots of chips at once, regardless of whether the cards they held were likely to 
win. After many lost their chips this way, they ante’d up 10TL more to buy back in, only 
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to lose all their chips again. This activity seemed to be performed in jest to break the 
boredom of a long game with little at stake. However, although this activity seemed to be 
performed in jest to break the boredom of a long game with little at stake, it did mimic 
high stake games in casinos. This is very different from the traditional village home as 
described by Scott (2013) wherein minimal money was spent throughout the game 
without enacting grand gestures. This activity in the urban game seemed to resemble the 
idea about what those patrons do at the high priced tables in casinos. On the other hand, 
the simultaneous activity of the small group of friends grilling meat over the fireplace 
was reminiscent of summertime barbeque traditions (described in Chapter 3). It seemed 
that this private home gambling experience included aspects of both rural and urban 
activities in a microcosm.  
 
Once the women left the table, the game resembled a more high stakes casino game. 
Casino gambling to refer back to Geertz’s (1973) analogy contains more “deep play” 
games in which there is more to stake than just money. In Geertz’s (1973) analysis of the 
Balinese cockfighter, pride was at stake in the betting games and the “deeper” the game 
the more pride was at stake. In casino gambling, Turkish Cypriots compete with the 
house (the foreign investor) as well as other foreign gamblers to include Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish nationals. In these spaces they are all seen as equal players with the same 
ability to win, which differs from their political relationships wherein the Turkish 
Cypriots are seen as having less with which to bet and less ability to win. What is at stake 
is a sense of self-determination. This game, referenced above, played at poker night was 
not a casino game and therefore a “shallow game”, but it more accurately mimicked a 
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“deep play” game when the women left the table. As such, there are gradients to a 
“shallow play”. In these more serious “shallow play” games the men were able to show 
off and indulge in risk-taking and rebellious behavior. They safely mimicked the 
overindulgence found in casino gaming tables without actually having to face the serious 
consequences of “deep play” in which a loss reinforces the idea that they are being 
exploited. They are not betting in a casino, so their losses are not going to the Turkish 
business owners. Because women were not at the table when the “shallow” game began 
to mimic a “deep play”, gender norms seemed to be enforced as Julie Scott (2003) noted. 
As such, it could be argued that “deep play” games are masculine.  
 
In addition to card gambling in homes and cafes, sports betting is also a popular activity 
in North Cyprus and is considered an acceptable form of gambling in Turkish Cypriot 
culture. Sports betting offices are widespread and can be found all across the island with 
a high density of them found in the big cities of Lefkoșa, Mağosa, and Kyrenia. It is not 
uncommon to see two or three betting offices on the same street and within very close 
proximity to one another. These offices are not state owned but rather are private 
holdings, staffed by both men and women. The names of the offices, such as ‘Nicosia 
Betting’ and ‘StanToto Betting’ are visible in large letters across the outside of the 
building in order to entice potential customers to come inside. These customers are 
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predominantly male and a mix of both tourists and locals. Inside these offices a wide 
variety of sporting games are available to bet on, including virtual sports.56  
 
Sports betting permeates everyday life, with bettors on the street who stop to check their 
phones to keep up with the various games to see if they have won to “less important” 
football matches playing on the television in the background of people’s conversations on 
the television so that those who have gambled on the game can keep up with their wins 
and losses. Unlike gambling in the home or in the café, sports betting at first glance does 
not appear to be a social activity as it is mediated only between the bettor and the supplier 
of the coupon. However, it is much more a social activity than at first appearance. 
Although the observed behavior is a solitary activity of going into the betting offices, 
placing a bet, and taking a coupon, it is actually intertwined with other social activities as 
well. As stated in Chapter 5, after the workday many young Turkish Cypriots liked to go 
to the cafes and bars to watch the soccer games with their friends. Many bettors get their 
coupons just prior to the game and take it with them to watch the game with their friends. 
Occasionally, halfway through the game they will leave to change their bet and then 
return to watch the rest of the game. If someone bets on multiple games and wins them 
all, they will post their winning coupons on Facebook for their followers to see and take 
note of their knowledge and luck. Similarly, posting coupons that almost won (e.g., three 
of the four games they bet on were accurate) is a way to boast pride in your knowledge of 
football and increase your prestige. While winning coupons increase prestige, losing 
                                                        
56 A list of sports to gamble on include: Badminton, Basketball, Cricket, Dog Racing, 
Formula 1 Racing, Golf, Hockey, Horse Racing, Rapido, Soccer, Tennis, Virtual 
Badminton, Virtual Basketball, Virtual Dog Racing, Virtual Golf, Virtual Horse Racing, 
Virtual Hockey, Virtual Soccer, Virtual Tennis.  
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betting coupons do not decrease your prestige. Like the card games at the ‘traditional’ 
gatherings mentioned above, there is little at stake in this form of gambling and as such it 
is another representation of “shallow play” as defined by Geertz (1973). 
 
This section has examined the practices of gambling in everyday spaces. Through an 
examination of these spaces, this section has articulated the ways in which gambling is 
both a traditional Turkish Cypriot pastime, as well as a practice that is seen as in part 
compatible with their modern, secular lifestyle. The next section will examine the 
practices of gambling within the space of the casino and highlight the contradiction that 
although Turkish Cypriots articulate their disapproval of casinos and interpret them to be 
symbols of Turkey’s exploitation of the island, from within the casino Turkish Cypriots 
themselves buy into the modern spectacle and perform their national ethos by gambling 
with Turkish bettors as equals.    
 
6.2.3 Casinos and Casino Tourists  
Casinos promote themselves as chic, luxury destinations in attempts to attract wealthy 
customers. After the forced closure of casinos within Turkey, one of the biggest 
differences within casinos opening in North Cyprus was the changing of the décor as 
compared to those Turkish casinos. A new emphasis was placed on the importance of the 
interior appearance. Tourists coming to Cyprus and those who live in Cyprus have been 
found to prefer the newer casinos. As such many of these new casinos have grand 
entrances with high ceilings, glass staircases, and large chandeliers in order to entice 
potential customers. Additionally, they demonstrate their wealth, as well as entice their 
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customers to stay longer by providing free food, alcohol, and cigarettes for all customers 
regardless of status. In addition to the modern look and feel of the casinos, the location is 
also an important factor in constructing it as a chic luxury destination. Although there are 
many casinos found throughout the island, both on the coast and within the landlocked 
city Lefkoșa, the wealthier customers are more apt to spend their time at the coastal 
casinos rather than the ones in the city center. One reason is the exclusiveness of the 
coastal locations. Many of the wealthier customers do not want to go to a place where 
“just anyone” can go. Those located in the center of the city are more easily accessed and 
“just anyone” does go, whereas those on the coast are more exclusive and require the 
means of transportation to get there. Some of the nicer casinos located in Lefkoșa that 
have to compete with the coastal casinos in Kyrenia attract wealthier customers by 
offering private gambling rooms, or desirable amenities and services. Wealthier 
customers are also more likely to gamble at casinos that have higher table prices whereas 
many of the more land-locked locations have considerably lower starting table prices.  
 
According to one of the casino workers, tourists from Turkey are treated as ‘very special’ 
when they come to the casinos. The workers are instructed to hover around them and 
ensure that they are provided excellent service. They are also told to inquire frequently if 
they have any other wants or desires. Many of the Turkish tourists who come are invited 
as “private customers” by the casinos due to their wealth, political importance, or the 
amount of money they have spent in the casino in the past. The casino provides them 
with free plane tickets, free hotel accommodations, free taxi service, and free food. In 
return they expect the customer to gamble only in their establishment. Additionally, if a 
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famous singer performs at the hotel, the “private customers” are informed ahead of time, 
sent invitations, and offered free admission. Casinos have fostered a modern and 
luxurious environment by hosting famous Turkish performers and fashion shows. During 
holidays, many Turkish families will come to North Cyprus and while the men gamble, 
the women and children can attend shows, go swimming, dine in the hotel restaurants, 
enjoy the spas, and participate in other available family entertainment. My informant said 
that Turkish Cypriots can also receive these special invitations, but very few are extended 
such invitations unless they are exceptionally wealthy and gamble a lot of money or are 
very important people whose influence might be useful to the casino.  
 
While the Turkish tourists traveling to North Cyprus to gamble usually acknowledge that 
gambling is a bad habit, they also believe gambling to be “acceptable behavior” in which 
to partake in North Cyprus because it is a place where gambling is legally allowed. 
Whereas sites of gambling are hidden in Turkey, in North Cyprus they are out in the open 
and therefore one does not need to conceal their behavior. From my interactions and 
conversations about gambling with these Turkish tourists, gambling is a way to 
demonstrate your social status without talking about it. It is an external demonstration 
that you have enough money to spend and lose at the casino, or in other words, a way to 
show off ones’ social status. I myself was invited on a few occasions as a guest of a 
wealthy customer, the father of one of my Turkish friends, to sit at the high priced tables. 
While my informant working in the casino stated that no business deals were negotiated 
or closed at gambling tables, my host informed me that although he has never made 
business deals at the table, he has made a few business contacts over the tables. One 
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frequent Turkish gambler I spoke with said many rich businessmen come to casinos for 
the sole purpose of making business deals. “For example, they call their friend and say 
they want to meet up somewhere to talk about business. They say, ‘You know what? 
Let’s go to Cyprus and talk about this while gambling’. So they come here”. This 
particular gambler, however, was not very wealthy and did not himself gamble at the high 
priced tables. Whether his opinion is true or false does not matter, however, because it is 
precisely these kinds of stories surrounding what happens at these higher price tables that 
add cachet to ones’ social status.  
 
Although Turkish tourists are an important part of the clientele, they usually come only 
on the weekends; therefore the most any one Turkish person is likely to come to gamble 
within a month is four times. However, people living in North Cyprus have the ability to 
go every day. Contrary to the overwhelming negative opinion about casinos in North 
Cyprus are the numbers of Turkish Cypriots gambling inside of them. According to one 
casino staffer I spoke with, more than 50% of the people gambling in casinos at any 
given time during the week are Turkish Cypriots. This high percentage is even more 
notable considering that it is illegal for Turkish Cypriots to gamble inside casinos. 
Everyone, to include the police, is aware that many Turkish Cypriots gamble daily at the 
casinos. Though illegal, controls in place to enforce this law are not very strict. My 
informant explained to me that the police usually call before coming and when they walk 
through the casino, they only “enter through the front door and exit through the back door 
without even looking around”. It is apparently just for appearances that the police show 
up at all. My informant did not directly say that the police were bribed, but he implied 
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that the casinos gave the police money to ignore the fact that there were Turkish Cypriot 
gamblers at their casinos. As such, although illegal it is apparent that it is a law that is 
seldom enforced.  
 
Although Turkish Cypriots spoke with disdain about casinos in North Cyprus, seeing 
them as a tangible manifestation of Turkey’s colonization of the island, Turkish Cypriots 
enjoyed and participated in casino gambling in North Cyprus. When asked why they 
gamble in casinos, Turkish Cypriots responded that gambling at the casino was fun and 
that they saw nothing wrong with gambling in casinos on occasion. This common 
response is further substantiated by mythology constructed by anecdotes and stories 
whereby the prized qualities of risk-taking and rebellion were engaged in when gambling.  
Casino gambling was only portrayed negatively if one became addicted or if it negatively 
affected family life; in these cases casino gambling was described as ‘poisonous’. Casino 
gambling, as I will demonstrate, functions as a metaphor to the Turkish Cypriots’ 
relationship to Turkey through their perception of the secular and over-indulgence. 
Casino gambling is rendered more toxic than traditional gambling because the stakes are 
higher and if one spends big, than they lose big. If one overindulges and loses in the 
casino then mask of modernity portrayed by the spectacle of the casino is stripped away 
and the visage of Turkey’s exploitation of the island is revealed. An occasional and 
purposeful visit to the casino, however, does not reveal this visage and one is swept up in 
the spectacle that is offered by the casino. Thus, although casinos from the outside are 
constructed by Turkish Cypriots as symbols that enable them to construct boundaries 
against Turkey and against gambling tourists, from inside casinos these boundaries are 
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momentarily forgotten as they buy into the modern spectacle casinos have to offer, seeing 
the spaces as fulfilling their notions of a Turkish Cypriot modernity and allowing Turkish 
gamblers to be considered equals partaking in the same secular activity of gambling.  
 
In order to argue that casinos are modern gambling spaces and that Turkish Cypriots see 
them as such it is necessary to gain further insight into the practice of casino gambling. 
Preliminary to this examination, it is first necessary to define those who gamble. Turkish 
Cypriot casino gamblers can be divided into three types of gamblers: those addicted to 
gambling, frequent gamblers, and special occasion gamblers. Those addicted to gambling 
do so as often as possible, daily if they have the resources or credit. Frequent gamblers do 
so a few times a month and special occasion gamblers only a few times a year, such as on 
state holidays or on a celebratory night out. I will not be discussing the habits of those 
addicted to gambling as they will gamble anywhere and anytime and as such their 
compulsive behavior does not contribute to this discussion. Instead I will focus the 
following analysis on frequent and special occasion gamblers, both which find little 
immorality in light gambling in the casino. As stated earlier in this chapter, gambling has 
long been an acceptable, although not openly celebrated, part of Turkish Cypriot culture. 
Part of the reason light gambling is not seen as sinful, I would argue, is due to the Turkish 
Cypriots’ less stringent interpretation of the Islamic religion and the dogmatic practices 
accompanying it. The Koran is explicit in its disapproval of gambling, as many of the 
more devout Turkish immigrants living in North Cyprus are quick to point out. Turkish 
Cypriots, however, do not strictly adhere to the dogmatic teachings of the Koran because 
as stated previously (Chapter 5) it is enough for most Turkish Cypriots to believe they are 
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Muslim. In this way, gambling is not seen as sinful as it would to a more fundamental 
practitioner of Islam. Inside the casino it is clear that many mainland Turkish gamblers 
are either non-religious or are less stringent in their interpretations of the Islamic 
teachings as compared to more devout Muslims or they would not be there. From outside 
the casino, Turkish Cypriots use the casino as a symbol of Turkey’s exploitation of the 
island and in doing so separate their identity from that of Turkish citizens. While inside 
the casino these boundaries are not maintained as everyone is partaking in the same 
activity.  
 
To elaborate, the casino space is not a projected version of AKP’s construction of 
Turkish modernity, but rather the space is constructed as a more sumptuous version of 
Turkish Cypriot’s own “traditional” gambling spaces. The opulence and 
contemporariness displayed within the casino transformed it from an external symbol of 
Turkey’s dominance into a modern spectacle that is to be consumed. What specifically 
makes the casino “modern”? The first feature is the free food, alcohol, and cigarettes 
provided at house expense, similar to any other modern casino anyplace else in the world. 
Frequent Turkish Cypriot gamblers generally start gambling after 6pm and will stay 
varying lengths of time, the latest usually being around 3am or 4am. A large percentage 
of these frequent gamblers are there primarily to enjoy the free food, drinks, and 
cigarettes while gambling. They will even sometimes take food and cigarettes to go, 
although this is frowned upon. As a Turkish saying goes, “Free vinegar is sweeter than 
honey”. My informant gave an example of a Turkish Cypriot man whom he said might 
think: “If I go to this restaurant I will pay 40TL for food and 30TL for drink, so it will 
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make around 70TL. So instead why don’t I go to casino? I can eat and drink more, and 
spend that 70TL on gambling. Who knows I might even win more money!” While this 
provision of free food is not unique to the casinos in North Cyprus, within the political 
context of the island providing customers with these free amenities was especially well 
received in light of the “Water Project” happening “outside” the casino. “Outside” the 
casino, water pipes were being laid to provide water to the TRNC from Turkey. Although 
this water was much needed, Turkish Cypriots balked at the idea that Turkey will charge 
them for water as well as maintain control over when and whether or not water flows 
through the pipeline. However, inside the casino, water, alcohol, cigarettes, and food are 
flowing freely and without charge.  
  
In addition to enjoying the free cigarettes, food, and drink, the Turkish Cypriots also 
enjoy the bright and festive atmosphere found within the casinos. In contrast to gambling 
in the homes or in the cafes there is grand décor and excitement in the air. Special 
occasion gamblers spend more time getting ready to go to the casinos because for them it 
is an exceptional activity. The girls beautify themselves and try on different dresses that 
they want to wear. While they do not go to the hair salon as they might for a wedding, 
they do put extra time into their hair and makeup. This is different from the preparations 
taken for gambling nights in the home, at which times they arrive in whatever outfit they 
happened to be wearing that day. This added preparation also differs from some of the 
gamblers coming in from Turkey and frequent Turkish gamblers. Although Turkish 
mainlanders and frequent Turkish gamblers do not always dress up, there are exceptions, 
for example during the Bayram holidays. While gambling, there is live entertainment, 
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even a Las Vegas style singing performance by a trio of women in matching dresses. 
Every hour a slot machine number is called out over a loud speaker and if that is your 
game number you can spin the wheel to earn extra money. There are also random 
occasions that add excitement to the gambling casino spaces. For example, my Turkish 
Cypriot acquaintance Nefise held her wedding on the beautiful grounds of one of these 
luxury hotel and casino resorts. When the wedding was over, the wedding party entered 
the casino to gamble. Nefise, as she had always dreamed, gambled in her wedding dress. 
This is not a common desire by Turkish Cypriot brides by any account, but I would still 
argue it is a telling one. It was not considered scandalous or wrong. Those present simply 
accepted what was happening and joined in the wedding festivities, which added to their 
fun.  
 
While Turkish Cypriot men spend time gambling at every venue within the casino, 
women typically spend most of their time gambling at the slot machines or mechanical 
roulette tables. The slot machines and mechanized roulette machines are seen as not as 
requiring much skill and only require a little money to play. It is well known that it is 
very difficult and almost impossible to win big money at these slot machines. As such, 
gambling at these machines is like the mixed-gendered home gambling in that both can 
be classified as “shallow play” as there is less financial risk. The gaming table is where 
the “serious” and high stake gambling takes place. While men predominantly populate 
these tables, there are occasionally women who do gamble at these tables. To understand 
the deeper meaning of this segregation of types of play, it is necessary to engage with 
Geertz’s (1973) interpretation of “deep play”. At these gaming tables not only are the 
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monetary stakes higher, but the social stakes are higher as well.  For Turkish Cypriots 
they are gambling as equals with Turkish tourists; although they are unlikely to state that 
they feel less equal than Turkish tourists, politically they understand that their island and 
its people are in part subservient to Turkey’s desires. When Turkish Cypriots gamble big 
money at these tables the more they win, the more they buy into an image of Turkey that 
resonates with their secular lifestyle. When they lose big money to the house, they are 
losing money to the foreign invaders in their country. Thus, within this context of casino 
gambling Turkish Cypriots perform their national ethos and in doing so negotiate and 
construct a Turkish Cypriot identity.  
 
 
6.3 Bi-communal casino spaces 
While Section 6.2 focused on the practices and discourses of casino gambling to 
illuminate the different ways in which Turkish Cypriots negotiate boundaries with 
Turkish citizens and construct a Turkish Cypriot identity, this section will highlight the 
ways in which casino gambling simultaneously acts as an activity that negotiates a 
Cypriot identity. To make this argument, Section 6.3.1 will demonstrate how Turkish 
Cypriots can also interpret casinos as symbols that signify transcendence of the contested 
political relationship between the TRNC and the RoC. Section 6.3.2 will illustrate how 
casinos function as bi-communal spaces where both Greek and Turkish Cypriots can 
come together. In their gambling in bi-communal spaces, Turkish Cypriots see gambling 
as symbolic of their Cypriot identity and of their difference with mainland Turks.  
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6.3.1 Casinos and the ROC 
In the contested landscape of TRNC casinos are potent signifiers of contested political 
relationships. They mark boundaries between different communities and the views they 
have about the history and future of the island. Casinos, to use Cohen’s terms, are 
multivalent symbols (Cohen 1985). Not only do they signify the political tensions 
between Turkey and North Cyprus, as I will demonstrate in this section they signify 
transcendence of the contested political relationship between North Cyprus and the 
Republic of Cyprus.  The 23rd of April 2003 was a significant day in Cypriot history 
when the Ledra Border was opened, allowing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to 
cross over to the other side for the first time since 1974. Heralded around the world as an 
important step towards unification, the opening of the Ledra Border was also 
economically beneficial as the economies of both sides had the potential to benefit from 
new customers. Because casinos were banned in the RoC, the Greek Cypriots constituted 
a new and very important market for casinos in the TRNC. This market increased in 
number as more checkpoints opened up across the border between the RoC and the 
TRNC. Scott (2013) states that in 2007 there were over a thousand Greek Cypriots 
crossing the border every day to gamble in the TRNC casinos and they were spending in 
the millions. Responding to this new and larger clientele the casinos began to cater 
specifically to the Greek Cypriots; “…employing Greek-speaking staff, using Greek 
names (such as Xenon casino), and providing slot machine games based on classical 
Greek themes, such as Trials of Heraclites, Bellepheron, and the Flight of Pegasus…” 
(Scott 2013).  
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The RoC does not condone Greek Cypriots going to gamble in the casinos in North 
Cyprus as part of the revenue generated supports the unrecognized state of the TRNC. 
Additionally, as noted by Scott, “Greek Cypriots gambling in the TRNC casinos are 
engaging with the reality of the ‘pseudo-state’ on a number of practical levels that could 
be regarded as undermining the official position of the RoC on the Cyprus conflict” 
(Scott 2013). Political figures in the RoC have responded by advocating the legalization 
of casinos in the RoC. This they argue would discourage Greek Cypriots from going to 
the North and prevent the outflow of RoC capital. Greek Cypriot public opinion was 
mixed, with many understanding the economic benefits but fearful of the effects the 
casinos would have on the culture of the RoC. While previous administrations have had 
no success in legalizing casinos in the RoC, the administration under Nicos Anastasiades 
made significant headway. After coming to power in 2013, Anastasiades asked the 
tourism organization (CTO) to update a 2007 study into the creation of casinos to help 
the government to decide what form the casinos would take (Psylides 2014). By the time 
of my field research, although casinos were not yet legalized in the RoC, the actions were 
in motion to do so.57  
 
Another political issue is that some casinos in the TRNC are built on land that is Greek 
Cypriot owned territory. Julie Scott (2013) recounts a story about a casino in Nicosia that 
is frequented by Greek Cypriots, which was built on the site of a former flour factory 
owned by a leading Greek Cypriot family. Although the land was acquired in agreement 
                                                        
57  On 21 July 2015, the parliament in the RoC enacted the “Law to Regulate the 
Establishment, Operation, Function, Control and Supervision of Casinos and Related 
Matters of 2015”.  
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with the Greek Cypriot owners, it was acquired through the Turkish Cypriot Immoveable 
Property Commission (TCIPC). As Scott argues, by going through the TCIPC the Greek 
Cypriot owners were going against the “…official Greek Cypriot position that all such 
property issues can be dealt with only as part of a comprehensive political agreement, 
thus joining private property matters to the wider issues of territorial and political 
sovereignty” (Scott 2013; Ilican 2010). The issue is particularly heightened, as the issue 
of land ownership remains one of the main problems in reaching a political solution to 
unification.  
 
6.3.2 Iki Toplum Casino [Bi-Communal Casino] 
Although the political issue surrounding casinos creates a political divide, it also creates a 
way in which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots come together. Pyla is one of four 
villages located within the UN Buffer Zone and is inhabited by both Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots. Within this village there is a shared activity that unites the people and 
that activity is gambling. In December 2013, in the remains of an Internet café, Turkish 
Cypriots working with Greek Cypriots illegally opened a casino, with ten croupiers 
working there (Afrika 2014). Like casinos in the North, this casino attracts both Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Neither the TRNC nor the RoC approve of the casino, but 
authorities on both sides are restrained from stopping gambling in Pyla due to its special 
status as a bi-communal village. According to the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Afrika 
(2014), when Greek Cypriot police visit the casino, the Turkish Cypriot owner tells them 
it belongs to the Turkish Cypriots and when the Turkish Cypriot police arrive, the owner 
states that it belongs to the Greek Cypriots. Thereby neither police force has jurisdiction. 
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According to a recent Greek Cypriot newspaper, Phileleftheros, the opening of casinos is 
only expected to increase, reaching to a total of eight (Phileleftheros 2015). The Turkish 
Cypriot newspaper Afrika stated although Cyprus has failed to unify, Cypriots have 
found a way to create a “United Casino” in Pyla operated by both Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots, as well as attracting both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into its 
establishment (Afrika 2014). These citizens of Cyprus in violation of the laws of both 
North and South, have in effect created their own mutually agreeable boundary, separated 
from and established against the wishes of the motherlands. They have constructed 
themselves a community of Cypriots by insisting on their right to gamble together. 
 
While Pyla is an example of a real bi-communal casino where citizens on both side come 
together, this situation is not relegated solely to bi-communal territory. In fact, many 
Turkish Cypriots commonly joke that casinos are the one place where Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots get along. One Turkish Cypriot stated,  
 
“The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots make some organizations and they 
call them, we call them “Iki Toplum” [Two Communities]…. [For example] Two 
Community Chorales, Two Community Theatre…It’s a good thing. Are they 
succeeding? I believe no. But there is a very successful “Iki Toplum” in casino! 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are playing together and they are drinking 
together. ‘Hello my friend! Hello my friend! How are you?’ This is very comedic. 
This is ironic. Very ironic.” 
 
This particular Turkish Cypriot did not like casinos, believing them to bring “crime, 
prostitution, and drugs” to the island. He further disapproved about how the money was 
handled stating, “They bring money from Turkey. They give money to the casino and the 
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money goes back to Turkey. What about my people? What about the people that work 
here? How can I take the money?” Here he is making a complaint voiced by many 
Turkish Cypriots, that casinos are no more than a “back garden” for Turkey’s profits and 
criticize not only Turkey, but also their own government’s handling of the situation. 
Although disapproving of the casino, he admitted that he enjoys going to the casino 
occasionally to play the slot machines. As reflected by his statement above, it can be seen 
that they construct the casino space as a bi-communal space where Cypriots partake in 
the communal activity of gambling. In his statements it becomes clear that more than any 
governmental institutions or NGOs established with the express purpose of re-uniting 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, casinos have successfully attracted a mix of nationals. 
Although said in jest and self-deprecation about the everyday trials of living in a divided 
country, I would argue that rather than the political discourses articulated by 
representatives of the different communities, the practice of gambling has united them; 
gambling is what they have in common. It is not just a Turkish Cypriot practice, or a 
Greek Cypriot one, but a “Cypriot” practice. Thus, despite the laws of TRNC forbidding 
Turkish Cypriots from gambling or the declaration of the RoC that gambling is illegal, 
many Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are participating in this shared Cypriot 
activity and forming a basis for a shared ‘Cypriot’ identity. 
 
Casinos are constructed by Turkish Cypriots, then, as multivocal symbols—evoking 
Turkey’s exploitation of the TRNC, Turkish modernity, and a reunion of Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots. Within the casino, gambling is an activity that constructs and 
negotiates a range of boundaries. While the activity of gambling works to construct and 
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embrace a Turkish Cypriot identity through the production of a common pastime, it 
simultaneously acts as an activity that negotiates and engenders the resurgence of 
‘Cypriotness’. 
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This dissertation began by asking how Turkish Cypriots understand their national 
belonging. The notion of belonging is rendered much more complex in a nation 
recognized de jure only by Turkey. As described in Chapter 2, there are two primary 
competing nationalisms in the TRNC, Cypriotism and Turkish nationalism. Cypriotism as 
it manifests in the TRNC supports the concept of the nation as a space of harmony and 
cohesion between ‘Cypriots’. Within this narrative, national identity is tied completely to 
the island, rejecting notions of a Turkish motherland. Although Cypriotism is gaining 
saliency on the island, the competing Turkish nationalism still remains a powerful and 
active ideology amongst Turkish Cypriots. Turkish nationalist discourse in the TRNC 
supports the concept that the TRNC is part of a larger Turkish nation. Within this national 
narrative, national identity is inexorably linked with notions of Turkishness. In this 
context, Turkish Cypriots imagine themselves as Turks of Cyprus as negotiated by 
Kemalist values and ‘other’ Greek Cypriots as outsiders.  
 
In Turkey, Turkish nationalism and official notions of Turkish national identity have 
been renegotiated by the AKP. AKP has shifted away from Kemalist constructions of 
Turkish nationalism towards a nationalism that embraces both Islamic values and the 
Ottoman legacy. This reconfiguration of national identity in Turkey by the AKP 
government has constructed not only new imaginings of citizens in Turkey, but has also 
effected the imaginings of Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus. This new reconfiguration 
attempts to reshape the Turkish Cypriot identity from ‘Turks’ of Cyprus to ‘Muslim 
Turks’ of Cyprus (Michael 2014). As such, this promoted Turkish national discourse by 
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the AKP government reshapes Turkish Cypriots’ relationship with Turkey has an impact 
on their understanding of their belonging to the Turkish nation.  
 
Productions of national identity designed by the governments of Turkey and the TRNC 
were met with ambivalence by the public as revealed in the examination of national 
commemorations surrounding the 30th anniversary of the 20 July 1974 Turkish ‘Peace 
Operation’. Chapter 3 demonstrates how the TRNC government articulated Turkish 
nationalist discourse through the production of national spectacle. In addition to 
examining flag ceremonies, folk dances, performances by the Ottoman Janissary band 
and dedications to Atatürk, this chapter focuses on the relationship between the military 
and the production of Turkishness. Turkish Cypriots’ dissatisfaction with the continued 
presence of Turkish troops on the island has significantly increased since the 1974 
invasion. Turkish Cypriots’ negotiations and constructions of Turkishness reflect the 
wider political negotiation of the Turkish military presence. More specifically, the 
Turkish Cypriots’ constructions of the Turkish military are one of the ways in which 
Turkish Cypriots define themselves vis-à-vis Turkey. There is an ambiguity regarding 
Turkishness and Turkish Cypriots increasingly move towards defining themselves as 
Cypriots. Thus, one response to the AKP’s reconfiguration of Turkishness is that Turkish 
Cypriots invoke an increased sentiment for Cypriotism and are actively choosing to 
construct with their own Cypriot identity. In this Cypriot identification they are actively 
rejecting Turkish rule.  
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However, Turkish Cypriots also identify with Kemalist definitions of Turkishness to 
reject Turkish rule by the current AKP government. Chapter 3 examines the relationship 
between Kemalism and the Turkish military within the unique context of the TRNC. The 
military in Turkey has long been seen as a protector of Kemalist values in Turkey against 
both external (foreign countries) and internal threats (e.g., Islamic activism and Kurdish 
nationalism (Cizre 2004)). However, the rise of the AKP has included efforts to distance 
the connection between the Turkish military and its role as protector of Kemalism. These 
efforts have implications for how Turkish Cypriots define their relation to Turkey.  
 
In the context of North Cyprus, the Turkish military was initially celebrated for saving 
Turkish Cypriots from their persecution by the Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots adopted 
not only Turkish nationalism, but also understandings of the military as the protector of 
Kemalism. Through Kemalism, Atatürk sought to modernize Turkey by erasing the 
Ottoman past, which he perceived as backwards and uncultured and sought instead to 
rebuild Turkey along a more European model. Bryant (2004) demonstrates that when 
Turkish Cypriots adopted Turkish nationalism it was with a twist, because unlike Turkey 
(which only had the intangible past as an enemy), the Turkish Cypriots faced the Greek 
Cypriots as a tangible enemy. As Bryant (2004) astutely demonstrates it was not a 
‘primordial’ enemy in the past, but “…an enemy who works against them, always in the 
present” (Bryant 2004, 233). As such, the arrival of the Turkish military was at first 
celebrated on the island because the Turkish military protected Turkish Cypriots from the 
Greek Cypriots and it was believed that they would protect the Turkish Cypriots way of 
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life. Furthermore, it was believed that the arrival of the Turkish military signaled the 
arrival of Turkish modernity as seemed to be extant in Turkey.  
 
However, understandings of the continued Turkish military presence on the island have 
become multifaceted. While the presence of the Turkish military has curtailed the 
violence of the Greek Cypriots against the Turkish Cypriots, it no longer seems to be able 
to protect Kemalist values as the AKP government increasingly distances the state from 
Kemalist values. Today, instead of living in a nation guided by Kemalist values, Turkish 
Cypriots are de facto ruled and protected by an outside government who from their 
perspective is actively working to erase Atatürk’s legacy. Thus, a paradox arises. 
Although Turkish Cypriots readily adopted Kemalism and bought into the accompanying 
promises of Turkish modernity, they believe they have been deprived of both their 
sovereignty and a modern future.  
 
Living in a politically liminal state, Turkish Cypriots have resigned themselves to the fact 
that this promised future is not going to arrive. Through an examination of a 
revitalization project in the Walled City, Chapter 4 examines the ways in which Turkish 
Cypriots articulate their loss and longing of this modern future. This modernity is located 
in a future beyond their grasp; unattainable because of the failure of the state to live up to 
its promise to build a modern nation. The loss of this modern future is felt more acutely 
as such a future is reflected in the alternative present situated in the RoC. This does not 
imply necessarily that Turkish Cypriots desire a political union with the RoC, but rather 
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that they see by this evidence the proof of their own government’s failure to achieve the 
modernity that exists in the RoC. 
 
The examination of the national parade as a celebration of the military demonstrates that 
the Turkish intervention brought promises of establishing a new nation imbued with 
Kemalist values and sovereignty, but contrary to expectations this sovereignty was never 
fully realized and Kemalist values are being eroded. Through the examination of the 
Asmaaltı Project it is clear Turkish Cypriots still long for a modern future, but in their 
current political liminal state they realize that this future is unattainable. Turkish Cypriots 
believe themselves to be the true defenders of a Kemalist secular heritage, yet they also 
understand themselves as fundamentally ‘orphaned’ by Turkey’s inability to develop and 
authorize the TRNC’s project of modernity. As a result, Turkish Cypriots are 
fundamentally ambiguous about their Turkishness. Turkish Cypriots construct their own 
demotic nationalism that privileges this ambiguity over state constructions of national 
identity.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 continue the examination of how boundaries of Turkishness are 
negotiated and constructed by Turkish Cypriots. While Chapters 3 and 4 utilize the state 
constructions of Turkishness as a starting point, Chapters 5 and 6 examine this problem 
from the grassroots of the citizen’s lives to understand how notions of national identity 
are negotiated. Chapter 5 examines the different ways Turkish Cypriots engage with the 
street Dereboyu and demonstrate that it is a place where Turkish Cypriots perform their 
secular heritage. While the Walled City is imagined as dirty and invaded by the backward 
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effects of Turkey’s intrusion (as evidenced by the presence of Turkish soldiers, the 
decaying ruins, and the presence of Turkish migrants), Dereboyu contrastingly is 
imagined as a place that embodies their promised modernity. Despite the embargoed 
status of the TRNC, Dereboyu displays brand name clothing stores, restaurants, bars, and 
cafes. However, there are still imitation stores such as ‘Burger City’ (imitating ‘Burger 
King’) and an obvious lack of brand name stores, such as Starbucks. This lack of brand 
name stores is made more frustrating by their full presence in the RoC. In this way 
Dereboyu, like the Walled City, is also experienced as an unaccomplished modernity. 
 
Dereboyu also acts as a space for Turkish Cypriots to voice their displeasure with the 
decisions of the state through official and unofficial public protests. Examining two 
political protests, this chapter demonstrates that although Turkish Cypriot demonstrators 
stand in solidarity with the Turkish protesters, they negotiate their own understanding of 
Turkishness. Through the examination of a rock bar on Dereboyu, this chapter 
demonstrates the multiple ways in which rock music is used for protest in the TRNC. 
Through an analysis of practices on this street, this chapter illustrates the complex 
layering of Turkish Cypriots’ engagement with this place, and through their different 
negotiations of Turkishness articulate a distinct demotic nationalism from below.  
 
Chapter 6 illustrates how this demotic nationalism is articulated through an examination 
of the practices of gambling on the island and the corresponding discourses regarding 
casinos and casino tourism. While Turkish Cypriots portray casinos as symbols of 
Turkey’s invasion of the island and the exportation of Turkey’s moral problems, in 
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practice they enjoy the casino as a space of spectacular modernity. Within casinos 
Turkish Cypriots perform their national ethos by playing against Turkish bettors of equal 
caliber. While casino gambling works to construct and embrace a Turkish Cypriot 
identity through the production of a common pastime, it simultaneously acts as an 
activity that negotiates and engenders the resurgence of Cypriotness.  
 
In summary, although the distinction between Turkish nationalism and Cypriotism as 
promoting a Turkish ethnic identity and Cypriot civic identity adequately highlights the 
different ways one can engage with the nation, its binary construction renders silent the 
fluidity of the boundaries of national identity negotiated by Turkish Cypriots in the 
practices of everyday life. Additionally, this framework further does not allow for 
understanding the ways in which Turkish Cypriots also assume an ethnic Cypriot identity 
or a civic Turkish identity. As such examining the construction of national identity in the 
TRNC using Cohen’s (1983) notion of boundary permits a more nuanced understanding 
of the construction of national identity as it allows for this fluidity.  
 
I will conclude with a conversation I had with a male Turkish Cypriot. In response to my 
question as to what he perceived to be the biggest problem to be in Cyprus, he responded 
by saying that it was the fact that North Cyprus was not legal under international law. He 
further clarified this to mean that he was “living nowhere, living with no identification, 
living with no passport, living without no nationality”. I interjected to ask him why he 
thought he had none of these things because in a previous conversation he had joked 
about the plethora of passports he had in his possession to include the RoC, EU, and 
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TRNC passport. He responded with a string of questions, “Who am I? I am a Turk? I am 
a Cypriot? I am Greek? Who knows about me? Who cares about me? Who am I? Who 
are we?”’   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
288 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
289 
 
Articles, Books, and Dissertations 
  
Adanır, E., 2015. The Ottoman Legacy. In: J. Samson and N. Demetriou, eds. 2015. 
Music in Cyprus. Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. pp. 89-102. 
 
Adil, M., 2007. Visibility 600 metres: reflections on the national monuments of the 
Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus. DCA Thesis. University of Wollongong.  
 
Agamben, G., 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.  
 
Ahmad, F., 1993. The Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge.  
 
Akay, K., 1996. Tourism and nationalist discourse: the case of north Cyprus. In C. Fsadni 
and T. Selwyn (eds.) Sustainable Tourism in Mediterranean islands and small cities, 
Malta: MED-CAMPUS. pp. 81-93.  
 
Akçam, T., 2004. From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian 
Genocide. London: Zed Books.  
 
Aktürk, S., 2007. Incompatible Visions of Supra-Nationalism: National Identity in 
Turkey and the European Union. European Journal of Sociology, 48 (02), pp. 347-342. 
 
Al, S., 2015. An Anatomy of Nationhood and the Question of Assimilation: Debates on 
Turkishness Revisited. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 15(1), pp. 83-101.  
 
Altinay, A.G., 2004. The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education 
in Turkey. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.   
 
Anderson, B., 1989 [1983]. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso. 
 
Andrews, C., 2010. Community uses of maritime heritage in Bermuda: a heritage 
ethnography with museum implications. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Cambridge.  
 
Angé, O. and Berliner, D., 2015. Introduction. In: O. Angé and D. Berliner, eds. 2015. 
Anthropology and Nostalgia. Oxford: Berghahn Books. pp. 1-15. 
 
Ardent, H., 1963. On Revolution. New York: Penguin Books.  
 
Argyrou, V., 2006. Postscript: Reflections on an Anthropology of Cyprus. In: Y. 
Papadakis, N. Peristianis, and G. Welz, eds. 2006. Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, 
and an Island in Conflict. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. pp. 214-224.  
 
Askew, K., 2005. Performing the Nation: Swahili Music and Cultural Politics in 
Tanzania. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
290 
 
 
Attalides, M., 1979. Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics. New York: St. 
Martins Press.  
 
_____., M., 1981. Social Change and Urbanization in Cyprus: A Study of Nicosia. 
Nicosia: Social Research Center.  
 
Ayoob, M., 2007. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim 
World. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.  
 
Azarian, R., 2011. Nationalism in Turkey: Response to Historical Necessity. 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(12), pp. 72- 82.  
 
Bahcheli, T. and Noel, S., 2010. The Political Evolution of Northern Cyprus and its 
Effect on Turkish-Cypriot Relations with Turkey. The Cyprus Review, 22(2), pp. 139-
148.  
 
Bakshi, A., 2012a. The Legacy of Ottoman Building in Nicosia: Hans as spaces of 
Coexistence in Pre-Conflict Cyprus. International Journal of Islamic Architecture, 1(1), 
pp. 107-128.  
 
_____., 2012b. A shell of memory: The Cyprus conflict and Nicosia’s walled city. 
Memory Studies, pp. 1-18. 
 
Balibar, E., 2004. We, the people of Europe? Reflections on Transnational citizenship. 
Translated from French by James Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Balkılıç, Ö. and Dölek, D., 2013. Turkish nationalism at its beginning: Analysis of Türk 
Yurdu, 1913-1918. Nationalities Papers, 41(2), pp. 316-33.  
 
Baran, Z., 2010. Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islam. Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press (Stanford University).  
 
Belge, M., 2010. Genç Kalemler and Turkish Nationalism. In: C. Kerslake, K. Öktem and 
P. Robins, eds. 2010. Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (in association with St Antony’s 
College, Oxford), pp. 27-37.  
 
Bellamy, R., 2003. Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of 
the State, Democracy and Rights within the EU. In: N. Walker, ed., 2003. Sovereignty in 
Transition: Essays in European Law. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, pp. 167-
189.  
 
Berliner, D., 2012. Multiple nostalgias: the fabric of heritage in Luang Prabang. Journal 
of the Royal Anthropological institute, 18(4), pp.769-786.  
 
291 
 
Billig, M., 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.  
 
Bissell, W.C., 2005. Engaging colonial nostalgias. Cultural Anthropology, 20(2), pp. 
215-248.  
 
Bounia, A. and Stylianou-Lambert, T., 2011. National Museums in Cyprus: A Story of 
Heritage and Conflict. EuNaMus, European National Museums: Identity Politics, the 
Uses of the Past and the European Citizen. Bologna 20-30 April 2011. In: Aronsson, P. 
and Elgenius, G., eds. EuNaMus Report No. 1. Published by Linkoping University 
Available at: http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp_home/index.en.aspx?issue=064 [Accessed 29 
September 2016]. 
 
Bozdağlioğlu, Y., 2008. Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Insight Turkey, 
10(1), pp. 55-76.  
 
Brubaker, R., 1998. Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism. In: J.A Hall, 
ed., 1998. The State of the Nation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-306.  
 
Bryant, R., 2002. The purity of spirit and the power of blood: a comparative perspective 
on nation, gender and kinship in Cyprus. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 
8(3), pp. 509-530.  
 
_____., 2004. Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus. London: 
I.B. Tauris.  
 
_____., 2010. The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
_____., 2012. Displacement in Cyprus Consequences of Civil and Military Strife. Life 
Stories: Turkish Cypriot Community. PRIO Report 2. Oslo: Peace Research Institute 
Oslo.   
 
_____., 2014. Living with Liminality: De Facto States on the Threshold of the Global. 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, 20(2), pp. 125-143.  
 
_____., 2015. Nostalgia and the Discovery of Loss: Essentializing the Turkish Cypriot 
Past. In: O. Angé and D. Berliner, eds. 2015. Anthropology and Nostalgia. Oxford: 
Berghahn Books. pp. 155-177.  
 
Calame, J. and Charlesworth, E., 2002. The Divided City as Broken Artifact. 
Mediterraneum. Tutela e valorizzazione dei beni cultruali ed ambientali, 2, pp.1-10.  
 
_____., 2007. Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalisms and the 
Minorities in the 1930s. Middle Eastern Studies, 40(3), pp. 86-101.  
 
292 
 
Calotychos, V. ed., 1998. Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an 
unimaginable community 1955-1997. Boulder CO: Westview Press. 
 
Cohen, A., 1985. The Symbolic Construction of Community. London: Routledge.  
 
Constantinou, C. and Hatay, M., 2010. Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and Conflicted Heritage. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 33 (9), pp. 1600-1619.  
 
Constantinou, C. M., Demetriou, O. and Hatay, M., 2012. Conflicts and Uses of Cultural 
Heritage in Cyprus. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14(2), pp. 177-198. 
 
Criss, N.B., 2012. Dismantling Turkey: The Will of the People. Turkish Studies, 11(1), 
pp. 45-58.  
 
Cizre, Ü., 2004. Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey 
and the European Union enlargement zone. European Journal of Political Research, 
43(1), pp. 107-125.  
 
Çağaptay, S., 2006. Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a 
Turk? New York: Routledge.  
 
Çarkoğlu, A. and Sözen, A., 2004. The Turkish Cypriot General Elections of December 
2003: Setting the Stage for Resolving the Cyprus Conflict? South European Society and 
Politics, 9(3), pp. 122-136.  
 
Çinar, A., 2005. Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places and Time. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Dayıoğlu, A. and Hatay, M., 2014. Cyprus. In: J. Nielsen, S. Akgönül, A. Jibašić and E. 
Raciu, eds. 2014. Yearbook of Muslims in Europe. Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke 
Brill. pp. 153-175.  
 
De Certeau, M., 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated from French by Steven 
Randall. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Demeteriou, N., 2015. Appropriating Culture: Traditional music and the Greek Cypriots. 
In: J. Samson and N. Demetriou, eds. 2015. Music in Cyprus. Surrey, England: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. pp. 57-76. 
 
Deren, S., 2002. From Pan-Islamism to Turkish Nationalism: Modernization and German 
Influence in the Late Ottoman Period. In: M. Dogo and G. Franzinetti, eds. 2002. 
Disrupting and Reshaping: Early Stages of Nation Building in the Balkans, Europe and 
Balkans International Network 17. Ravvena: Longo Editoire. pp. 117-39.  
 
Dressler, M., 2013. Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
293 
 
 
Eissenstat, H., 2004. Metaphors of Race and Discourse of Nation: Racial Theory and 
State Nationalism in the first Decades of the Turkish Republic. In: P. Spickard, ed. 2004. 
Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World. London: Routledge. pp. 239-256.  
 
Endres, D., and Senda-Cook, S., 2011. Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in 
Protest. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 97(3), pp. 257-282.  
 
Erdenir, B., 2014. Europeanization of Value Orientations in Turkey: Continuity or 
Change in Turkish Political Culture. Mediterranean Quarterly, 25(4), pp. 83-106.  
 
Foucault, M., 1976. The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge. Translated from 
French by R. Hurley. 1998. Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
 
French, D., 2015. Fighting the EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on 
Cyprus, 1955-1959. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
  
Geertz, C., 1973. Interpretation of cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Gellner, E., 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
 
Giddens, A., 1985. The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of A contemporary 
Critique of Historical Materialism. Reprint, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.  
 
Gillis, J.R., 1994. Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Glyptis, A.L., 2007. Kemalism as a Language for Turkish Politics: Cultivation, 
Reproduction, Negotiation. Ph.D. Thesis. London School of Economics and Political 
Science.   
 
Gökalp, Z. and Berkes N., 1981. Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected 
Essays of Ziya Gökalp. Westport Conn: Greenwood Press.  
 
Goubert, P., 1997. The Ancien Régime: French Society 1600-1750. Translated from 
French by Steve Cox. London: Phoenix.  
 
Gül, M., Dee, J., and Cünük, C.N., 2004. Istanbul’s Taksim Square and Gezi Park: of 
protest and the ideology of place. Journal of Architecture and Urbanism, 38(1), pp. 63-
72. 
 
Gülap, H., 2005. Enlightenment by Fiat: Secularization and Democracy in Turkey. 
Middle Eastern Studies, 41(3), pp. 351–372.  
 
Hammersely, M. and Atkinson, P., 1995. Ethnography: principles in practice. Second 
Edition. London: Routledge.  
294 
 
 
Hansen, T.B and Stepputat, F., 2006. Sovereignty Revisited. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 35, pp. 295-315.  
 
Has, T., 2014. Melodies of Resistance: Islamist Music in Secular Turkey. Social 
Compass, 61(3), pp. 368-383.  
 
Hatay, M., 2005. Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the 
Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus. PRIO Report, 4. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre.  
 
_____., 2007. Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-
Demography of Cyprus in the Light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-
Cypriot Census. PRIO Report 2/2007. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. 
 
_____., 2008. The Problem of Pigeons: Orientalism, Xenophobia and a Rhetoric of the 
‘Local’ in North Cyprus. The Cyprus Review 20(2), pp. 145-171.  
 
Hatay, M., and Bryant, R., 2008a. The Jasmine Scent of Nicosia: Of Returns, 
Revolutions, and the Longing for Forbidden Pasts. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 26, 
pp. 423-449.  
 
_____., 2008b. Migrant Cities Research: Nicosia North. Living Together. British Council 
and the Institute for Public Policy Research. [pdf] Available at: 
<http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Cyprus/Report%202008%20NicosiaNorth.pdf> 
[Accessed 26 September 2016]. 
 
Hecker, P., 2012. Turkish Metal: Music, Meaning, and Morality in a Muslim Society. 
Farnham: Ashgate.  
 
Herzfeld, M., 1997. Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation State. New York: 
Routledge.  
 
Hitchens, C., 1997. Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger. London: 
Verson.  
 
Hobsbawm, E.J., and Ranger, T.O., 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Huntington, S., 1993. The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), pp. 22-49.   
 
Isachenko, D., 2012. The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern Cyprus 
and Transdniestria. London: Palgrave Macmilan 
 
Jenkins, G., 2001. Context and Circumstances: The Turkish Military and Politics. 
London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.  
 
295 
 
Joseph, J., 1997. Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd.  
 
Kadioğlu, A., 1996. The paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official 
Identity. Middle Eastern Studies, 32(2), pp. 177-193.  
 
Kadioğlu, A., and Keyman, F. eds., 2011. Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing 
Nationalisms in Turkey. Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press.  
 
Karahasanoğlu, S., and Skoog, G., 2009. Synthesizing Identity: Gestures of Filiation and 
Affiliation in Turkish Popular Music. Austin: University of Texas Press. ITU Turkish 
Music State Conservatory.  
 
Karakayali, S., and Yaka, Ö., 2016. Humor, Revolt, and Subjectivity. In: A. 
Oberprantacher and A. Siclodi, eds. 2016. Subjectivation in Political Theory and 
Contemporary Practices. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.  203 – 218.  
 
Karpat, K., 2002. Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and 
Essays. Leiden: Brill.  
 
Kasaba, R., 1997. Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities. In: S. Bozdoğan and R. 
Kasaba, eds. 1997. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press. pp. 15-36.  
 
_____., 2009. A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press.  
 
Keyder, C., 1997. Wither the Project of Modernity. In: S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba, eds. 
1997. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press. pp. 37-51. 
 
Killoran, M., 1998. Good Muslims and “Bad Muslims,” “Good” Women and Feminists: 
Negotiating Identities in Northern Cyprus (Or, the Condom Story). Ethos, 26(2), pp. 183-
203.  
 
Kızılyürek, N., 1989. The Turkish Cypriot Upper Class and Question of Identity. In: M. 
Ali, ed. 1989. The Turkish Cypriot Identity in Literature. London: Fatal Publications. pp. 
20-32.  
 
_____., 1999. Cyprus: The Impasse of Nationalism. Athens: Mauri Lista.  
 
Kliot, N., and Mansfield, Y., 1997. The political landscape of partition: The case of 
Cyprus. Political Geography, 16(6), pp. 495-521.  
 
296 
 
Knapp, A.B. and Antoniadou, S., 1998. Archaeology, politics and the cultural heritage of 
Cyprus. In: L. Meskell, ed. Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. London: Routledge. pp. 13-43. 
 
Köse, A. and Yilmaz, M., 2012. Flagging Turkishness: the reproduction of banal 
nationalism in the Turkish press. Nationalities Papers, 40(6), pp. 909-925.  
 
Krasner, S.D., 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing 
States. International Security, 29(2), pp. 85-120.  
 
Kuru, A., 2006. Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and 
Development Party. In: M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. 2006. The Emergence of a New Turkey: 
Democracy and the AK Parti. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. pp.136-159.  
 
Kushner, D., 1977. The Rise of Turkish Nationalism. London: Frank Cass and Company.  
 
Kyriakides, K., 2009. The 1960 Treaties and the Search for Security in Cyprus. Journal 
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 11(4), pp. 427-439.  
 
Lacher, H. and Kaymak, E., 2005. Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-
Settlement in North Cyprus. Mediterranean Politics, 10(2), pp. 147-166. 
 
Ladbury, S. and King, R., 1982. The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek 
and Turkish Cyprus since 1974. Anthropological Quarterly, 55(1), pp.1-16. 
 
Lebovics, H., 1994. “Creating the Authentic France: Struggles over French Identity in the 
First Half of the Twentieth Century”. In: J.R. Gillis, ed. Commemorations: The Politics of 
National Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 239 - 257. 
 
Lewis, B., 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Loizides, N., 2007. Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus. International Studies 
Perspectives, 8(2), pp. 172-189.  
 
_____., 2011. Contested Migration and Settler Politics in Cyprus. Political Geography, 
30, pp. 391-401.   
 
Loizos, P., 1974. The Progress of Greek nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1970. In: J. Davis, 
ed. Choice and Change: Essays in honour of Lucy Mair. London: The Athlone Press. pp. 
114-133.  
 
_____.,1975. The Greek Gift: politics in a Cypriot village. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Lombardi, B., 1997. Turkey - The Return of the reluctant Generals? Political Science 
Quarterly, 112(2), pp. 191–215.  
 
297 
 
Low, S., 1996. Spatializing Culture: The Social Production and Social Construction of 
Public Space in Costa Rica. American Ethnologist, 23(4), pp. 861-879.  
 
Mardin, Ş., 2000. The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization 
of Turkish Political Ideas. Princeton, New Jersey: Syracruse University Press.  
 
Markides, D.W., 1998. The issue of separate municipalities and the birth of the new 
republic: Cyprus 1957-1963. London: University of London.  
 
_____., 2001. Cyprus 1957-1963: From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crises: The 
Key Role of the Municipal Issue. Minnesota Mediterranean and East European 
Monographs. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.  
 
Markides, K.C., 1977. The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
 
Mavratsas, C.V., 1997. The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and 
Cypriotism 1974-1975: Politics, Social Memory and Identity. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
20(4), pp. 717-737.  
 
_____., 1999. National Identity and Consciousness in Everyday Life: Towards a 
Sociology of Knowledge of Greek-Cypriot Nationalism. Nations and Nationalism 5(1), 
pp. 91-104.   
 
Mehmet, O., 1990. Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Michael, M., 2014. Creating a New Identity: From the Secular Turkish Cypriot to the 
Muslim Turk of Cyprus. The Cyprus Review 26(2), pp. 15-32.  
 
Mitchell, T., 1988. Colonizing Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Navaro-Yashin, Y., 1997. Uses and Abuses of ‘State and Civil Society’ in Contemporary 
Turkey. New Perspectives on Turkey, 18, pp. 1-22.  
 
_____., 2002. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
_____., 2006. De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict 
between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey. In: Y. Papadakis, N. Peristianis and 
G. Welz, eds. 2006. Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict. 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 84-99.  
 
_____., 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity. 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 
 
298 
 
Nevzat, A., 2005. Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: the first wave. Ph.D. Thesis. 
University of Oulu.  
 
Novo, A., 2012. Friend or foe? The Cyprus Police Force and the EOKA insurgency. 
Small Wars and Insurgencies, 23(3), pp. 414-431.  
 
_____., 2013. The God Dilemma: Faith, the Church, and Political Violence in Cyprus. 
Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 31(2), pp. 193-215.  
 
Öztürkmen, A., 1992. Individuals and Institutions in the Early History of Turkish 
Folklore, 1840- 1950. Journal of Folklore Research, 29(2), pp. 177-92. 
 
Özbudun, E., 2012. Turkey: Plural Society and Monolithic State. In: A. Kuru and A. 
Stepan., eds. 2012. Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey. New York: Columbia 
University Press. pp. 61-94.   
 
Özyürek, E., 2006. Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in 
Turkey. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.   
 
Panagiotis, D., 2008. British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959. 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 21(2), pp. 375-394.  
 
Panayioutou, A., 2006. Lenin in the coffee-shop: the communist alternative and forms of 
non-western modernity. Postcolonial Studies, 9(3), pp. 267-280.  
 
Pantelis, S., 1990. The Making of Modern Cyprus: From Obscurity to Statehood. 
London: Interworld Publications. 
 
Papadakis, I., 1993. Perceptions of history and collective identity: a study of 
contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. Ph.D. Thesis. University 
of Cambridge.  
 
Papadakis, Y., 1994. The National Struggle Museums of a divided city. Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 17(3), pp. 400-419.  
 
_____., 1998. Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism 
as a Contested Process. American Ethnologist, 25(2), pp. 149-165.  
 
_____., 2003. Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus. 
History and Anthropology, 14(3), pp. 253-270.  
 
_____., 2008. History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the “History of Cyprus”. Oslo: International Peace 
Research Institute (PRIO).  
 
299 
 
Papadakis, Y. and Hatay, M., 2015. The Cultures of Partition and the Partition of 
Cultures. In: J. Samson and N. Demetriou, eds. 2015. Music in Cyprus, Surrey, England: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. pp. 19-36.  
 
Peristianis, N., 2006. Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics. In: Y. Papadakis, 
N. Peristianis and G. Welz, eds. 2006. Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island 
in Conflict. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. pp. 100-120.  
 
Petersmann, E.U., 2003. From State Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Citizens in the 
International Relations of the EU? In: N. Walker, ed., 2003. Sovereignty in Transition: 
Essays in European Law. Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, pp. 145-165.  
 
Pope, N. and Pope, H., 2011. Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey. London: 
Overlook Duckworth.  
 
Ramm, C., 2006. Assessing Transnational Re-negotiation in the Post-1974 Turkish 
Cypriot Community: ‘Cyprus Donkeys’, ‘Black Beards’ and the ‘EU Carrot’. Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies, 6(4), pp.523-542.  
 
Rishbeth, C. and Powell, M., 2012. Place Attachment and Memory: Landscapes of 
Belonging as Experienced Post-Migration. Landscape Research, 38(2), pp. 160-178.  
 
Robins, P., 2007. Turkish foreign policy since 2002: Between a ‘post-Islamist’ 
government and a Kemalist state. International Affairs, 83(1), pp. 289-304.  
 
Sadrazam, H, 1990. Kibris’ta Varolus Mücadelemiz Sehitlerimiz Ve Anîtlarîmîz [Our 
Struggle, Our Memorials and Our Monuments in Cyprus]. Türkiye Sehitlikleri Îmar 
Vakfî Yayînlarî No: 4.  
 
Sahin, S., 2008. The discursive construction of national identity by the newspapers in 
North Cyprus. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Westminster.  
  
Saifi, Y. and Yüceer, H., 2012. Maintaining the absent other: the re-use of religious 
heritage sites in conflicts. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 19(7), pp. 1-15.  
 
Saraçoğlu, C. and Demirkol, Ö., 2015. Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in 
Turkey Under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity. British Journal 
for Middle Eastern Studies, 42(3) pp. 301-319.  
 
Scott, J., 2002. World Heritage as a Model for Citizenship: the case of Cyprus. 
International Journal of Heritage Studies, 8(2), pp. 99-115.  
_____., 2003. Coffee Shop Meets Casino: Cultural Responses to Casino Tourism in 
Northern Cyprus. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 11(2/3), pp. 266-279.  
 
300 
 
_____., 2013. ‘Playing Properly’ Casinos, blackjack and cultural intimacy in Cyprus. In: 
R. Cassidy, A. Pisac and C, Loussouarn, eds. 2013. Qualitative Research in Gambling: 
Exploring the Production and Consumption of Risk. London: Routledge. pp. 125-139.  
 
Scott, J. and Asikoglu, S., 2001. Gambling with Paradise? Casino Tourism Development 
Northern Cyprus. Tourism Recreation Research 26(3), pp. 51-61.  
 
Singer, S., 2013. Erdogan’s Muse: The School of Necip Fazil Kisakurek. World’s Affairs 
176 (4), pp. 81-88.  
 
Smith, A., 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Sözen, A., and Özersay, K., 2007. The Annan Plan: State Succession of Continuity. 
Middle Eastern Studies, 43(1), pp. 125-141.  
 
Şenay, B., 2013a. Beyond Turkey’s Borders: Long-distance Kemalism, State Politics and 
the Turkish Diaspora. New York: I.B Tauris.  
 
_____., 2013b. Seeing for the state: Kemalist long-distance nationalism in Australia. 
Nations and Nationalism, 19 (2), pp. 376-394.   
 
Taşpınar, Ö., 2012. Turkey: The New Model? In: R. Wright, ed. 2012. The Islamists Are 
Coming: Who They Really Are. Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. 
pp.127-136.  
 
Toprak, B., 2005. Islam and Democracy in Turkey. Turkish Studies, 6(2), pp. 167-186.  
 
Trimikliniotis, N., 2012. The Cyprus Problem and Imperial Games in the Hydrocarbon 
Era: From a “Place of Arms” to an Energy Player? In: N. Trimikliniotis and U. Bozkurt, 
eds. 2012. Beyond a Divided Cyprus: A State and Society in Transformation. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 23 - 46.  
 
Van Dobben, D.J., 2008. Dancing Modernity: Gender, Sexuality and the State in the Late 
Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic. M.A. Thesis. The University of Arizona.  
 
Varnava, A., 2010. The State of Cypriot Minorities: Cultural Diversity, Internal-
Exclusion and the Cyprus ‘Problem’. The Cyprus Review, 2(2), pp. 205-218.  
 
Volkan, V., 1979. Cyprus: War and Adaptation. Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia.  
 
Vural, Y., and Peristianis, N., 2008. Beyond Ethno-nationalism: Emerging Trends in 
Cypriot Politics after the Annan Plan. Nations and Nationalism, 14(1), pp. 39-60. 
 
Vural, Y., and Rustemli, A., 2006. Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot 
Community. Mediterranean Politics, 11(3), pp. 329-348.  
301 
 
 
White, J., 2013. Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
 
Wimmer, A., and Glick Schiller, N., 2002. Methodological nationalism and beyond: 
nation-state building, migration and the social sciences. Global Networks 2(4), pp. 301-
334.  
 
Yeğen, M., 2004. Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 40(6), pp. 
51-66.  
 
Yeşilada, B., 2009. Islam and Turkish Cypriots. Social Compass, 56(1), pp. 49-59.  
 
Yeşilada, B. and Noordijk, P., 2010. Changing Values in Turkey: Religiosity and 
Tolerance in Comparative Perspective. Turkish Studies 11(1), pp. 9-27.  
 
Zürcher, E.J., 2010. The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman 
Empire to Atatürk. London: I.B. Tauris.  
 
 
Newspapers 
 
Afrika 2013. Lefkoşa’dan İstanbul’a: AKP’ye karşı halk ayaklanmasına Kıbrıs’tan 
desktik [From Nicosia to Istanbul: support from Cyprus to popular uprising against the 
AKP].  Afrika  2 June.  
 
Afrika, 2014. İki Toplumlu Köye iki toplumlu kumarhane [Bi-communal casino for Bi-
communal village]. Afrika, 17 April. p.2a.  
 
Afrika, 2014. Lefkoşa da ayağa kalktı [Nicosia also stood]. Afrika, 12 March. p.3a.  
Alptürk, S., 2014. Işgalin 40. yılına protesto [English: Protest against the occupation of 
40 years]. Afrika, 21 July. p.1d. 
 
Bailie, B., 2013. Plant seed of inclusiveness. Cyprus Today, 2 October. p.12b. 
 
BBC News, 2014a. Police in Turkey clash with protestors after boy’s funeral. BBC News, 
[online] 12 March. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk> [Accessed 17 September 2016].  
 
BBC News, 2014b. Berkin Elvan: Turkish PM accuses dead boy of terror links. BBC 
News, [online] 15 March. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk> [Accessed 30 August 
2015].  
  
Canalp, A., 2013. Committing to Faith Tourism. Cyprus Today, 16 October. pp.12-13.  
 
Day, E., 2010. Dereboyu…. Kibris Postasi, [online] 6 May. Available at: 
<http://www.kibrispostasi.com> [Accessed 30 August 2015]. 
302 
 
 
Fırat, G., 2008. Emperyalizimin hedefındeki 1 numaralı kmoutan: Atatürk [Number 1 
targeted commander in the eyes of Imperialism: Atatürk]. Türksolu 1/196, pp. 21 July 
2008. Available at: <http://www.turksolu.com.tr/196/basyazi196.htm> [Accessed 17 
April 2017].  
 
Hurriyet Daily News, 2012a. AKP government scales down national day festivities. 
Hurriyet Daily News, [online] 07 May. Available at: 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com> [Accessed 10 May 2015]. 
  
Hurriyet Daily News, 2012b. Opposition members banned from laying wreaths at Atatürk 
monuments. Hurriyet Daily News, [online] 30 Aug. Available at: 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com> [Accessed 29 June 2015]. 
 
Hurriyet Daily News, 2013. Turkish Parliament adopts alcohol restrictions bans sales 
between 10pm and 6am. Hurriyet Daily News, [online] 24 May. Available at:  
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com> [Accessed 30 August 2015]. 
 
Kanli, Y., and Alkan, H., 2000. KKTC-Turkey row over army’s role. Hurriyet Daily 
News, [online] 5 July 2000. Available at: <http://web.hurriyetdailynews.com> [Accessed 
17 April 2017].  
 
Kerem, H., 2013a. Traffic-free start in historic centre. Cyprus Today, 30 Nov. p.7.  
 
Kerem, H., 2013b. Off the on the Right Foot? Cyprus Today, 7 Dec. p.16.  
 
Kibris724, 2014. Kaos Yaşanır [Chaos Experienced]. Kibris247, [online] 28 Dec. 
Available at: <http://www..kibris724.com/kaos-yasanir-50505h.htm> [Accessed 4 
December 2015].  
 
Levent, S., 2014. 20 Temmuz 1974 [20 July 1974]. Afrika, 21 July. p.2b. 
 
LGC News, 2013. Casinos Want Gambling Laws Relaxed. LGC News, [online] 20 July. 
Available at: www.lgcnews.com  
 
LGC News, 2014a. Turkish Cypriot couple charged for displaying Cyprus Republic flag. 
LGC News, [online] 7 May. Available at: <http://www.lgcnews.com> [Accessed 13 April 
2017].  
 
LGC News 2014b. NEU delivers Ottoman Slap to Deep Purple Critics. LGC News 
[online] 28 May. Available at: < http://www.lgcnews.com> [Accessed 6 July 2016]. 
 
Phileleftheros Public Company Ltd., 2014. Cops powerless to stop Pyla casino surge. 
Phileleftheros, [online] 14 October. Available at: <http://in-cyprus.com> [Accessed 13 
July 2016]. 
 
303 
 
Presidency of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 2016. President Akıncı received 
Dr. Kaya Bekiroğlu, Dr. Erdoğan Mirata, and Dr. Ali Niyazi Fikret.  Press Release, 8 
March 2016. Available at: < https://kktcb.org/en/president-akinci-receives-dr-kaya-
bekiroglu-dr-erdogan-mirata-ve-5118> [Accessed 2 April 2017].   
 
Psylides, G., 2014. Casino decisions expected this year. Cyprus Mail, [online] 7 January. 
Available at: <http://cyprus-mail.com> [Accessed 13 July 2016]. 
 
Sunday’s Zaman, 2013. Turkey changes color of protocol carpet to turquoise. Sunday’s 
Zaman [online] 19 November. Available at:  <http://www.todayszaman.com > [Accessed 
10 May 2015].  
 
Today’s Zaman, 2012. Ban on laying wreaths on Atatürk monuments to be relaxed. 
Today’s Zaman [online] 08 November. Available at:  <http://www.todayszaman.com > 
[Accessed 29 June 2015].  
 
Today’s Zaman, 2014. Deep Purple will play free-admission concert in Turkish Cyprus. 
Today’s Zaman [online] 26 March. Available at: <http://www.todayszaman.com> 
[Accessed 29 September 2016].  
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Compliant Feza Güzeloğlu’s lawsuit against the Endowment’s Directorate and Talip 
Atalay (Director of religious affairs of TRNC), Case no: 386/2014.  
 
Cyprus v Turkey, 25781/94, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 10 
May 2001.   
 
Eroğlu, D., 2014. “Cumhurbaşkanı Konuşması” [“President Speech”]. 20 July 2014 
Celebration. Lefkoşa, TRNC. 20 July 2014.  
 
European Commission, 2014. Eurobarometer, 81, Public Opinion in the European 
Union. Brussels: European Commission. Available online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_en.pdf
> [Accessed 12 May 2017].  
 
Evalutility Ltd., 2010. Final Evaluation: UNDP “Improvement of Infrastructure and 
Support to Urban Upgrading and Socio-Economic Revitalization of northern part of 
Cyprus”. UNDP Evaluation Plan. Available online: 
<https://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evali
d=3869 > [Accessed 29 September 2016].  
 
Hacışevik, M. A., and Bozaltı, N. N., 2013. Bedesten [English: Bedestan]. Kıbrıs 
Vakıflar İdaresi [Cyprus Evkaf Foundation]. Tourist Brochure.  
 
304 
 
Karlıtaş and Bağışkan, 2013. Lefkoșa. Nicosia: The Office of Tourism Promotion and 
Marketing.  
 
Loizidou v Turkey, 40/1993/435/514, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, 23 February 1995.   
 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, 2013. Basic Principles and Objectives. [online]. 
Available at: www.diyanet.gov.tr [Accessed 8 July 2016].  
 
Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, 2014. Crossing Points “Green Line” 
Regulations. Customs and Excise Department. 7.2 Prohibitions of goods or goods subject 
to restrictions. [online] Available at:  
<http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/customs/customs.nsf/All/05AEEF243C9BFC8BC22572BF
002D0A28> [Accessed 5 May 2017].   
 
Republic of Turkey, 2013. Official Gazette [Turkish: Resmi Gazete]. No: 28674, 11 June.  
 
The National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD, USA. CIA Papers, NSC 
Briefing, 1 July 1958. 
 
TRNC Constitution, 1983. Adopted 1985. English and Turkish Translations. [online] 
Available at:  <http://www.ombudsman.gov.ct.tr> [Accessed 13 April 2017].  
 
TRNC Department of Antiquities and Museums, 2004. Mevlevi Museum. Brochure. 
Nicosia: Tourist Information Office.  
 
TRNC Directorate of Immigration [KKTC Muchahert Dairesi Müdülüğü], 2016. The 
Internal Layout of the Citizenship Law [Yurttaşlık Yasası Içdüzenı]. Official Gazette 
[Resmi Gazete]. No: 52 (21/2015), 27 May 1993.  
http://muhaceret.gov.ct.tr/Yurtta%C5%9Fl%C4%B1k/Bakanl%C4%B1kOnay%C4%B1v
eyaBakanlarKurulu.aspx  
 
TRNC Chamber of Commerce [KKTC Ticaret Dairesi], 2016. Product Safety Law [Ürün 
Güvenliği Yasasi]. Official Gazette [Resmi Gazete]. No. 42/2014, 28 April 2014. 
http://www.ticaret.gov.ct.tr/Portals/1065/Mevzuat/Yasalar/5-2-2013-
%20%C3%9CR%C3%9CN%20G%C3%9CVENL%C4%B0%C4%9E%C4%B0.pdf  
 
US Department of State, 2016. Trafficking In Persons Report. June 2016. [online] 
Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/>  [Accessed 14 May 2017].  
 
 
 
